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Abstract 
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
is an intergovernmental organisation that manages the marine living resources of the 
Southern Ocean (approximately 11 % of the world's oceans). It has as its principal 
objective the conservation and rational use of not only the species targeted for harvest, 
but the ecosystem as a whole. 
CCAMLR utilises a consensus-based decision-making process to formulate 
management measures. This thesis examined what is meant by consensus and 
whether it has worked for CCAMLR, enabling effective implementation of 
precautionary and ecosystem approaches to fisheries management. 
A literature review was conducted to investigate and understand the idea of consensus 
and its origins within the Antarctic Treaty System. Together with an analysis of data 
gathered from questionnaires and interviews about perceptions of consensus, these 
results informed an analytical_ approach to case study material on decisions made by 
CCAMLR. Using a number of case studies, the thesis illustrated how consensus has 
been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, by CCAMLR in its 27-year history. 
The case studies used include CCAMLR's fight against Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing; CCAMLR's management of the krill fishery; CCAMLR's 
response to incidental mortality of seabirds in longline ·fishing; and CCAMLR's 
regulations for new and exploratory fisheries. 
The study also explored the relatively new term 'consensus-minus-one', which had its 
roots in CCAMLR, and assessed whether it could be effectively used as a legitimate 
decision-making alternative. Three examples of consensus-minus-one were 
examined, and it was concluded that although the use of consensus-minus-one would 
have alleviated the so called consensus paralysis, it is doubtful that the dissenting 
parties would implement any agreed measures. 
r 
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Finally the study analysed the need for consensus in CCAMLR and whether this 
approach to the making of decisions had made it more difficult for CCAMLR to reach 
its conservation objectives. The thesis measured the effectiveness of CCAMLR as a 
decision-making organisation and came to the conclusion that by using its original 
form of inclusive consensus CCAMLR has adopted and implemented conservation 
and management measures that have practically and effectively applied the ecosystem 
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"But if that ain't the consensus view, 
then hell, let's put it to a vote" 







The 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(hereafter referred to as the CAMLR Convention) is a longstanding international 
agreement. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (hereafter referred to as CCAMLR) is the intergovernmental organisation 
established by the Convention and has as its principal objective the conservation and 
rational utilisation of marine living resources in the Southern Ocean. This objective 
not only includes species targeted for harvest, but the ecosystem as a whole (Article 
II). 
CCAMLR utilises a consensus-based decision-making process to formulate 
management measures (Article XII.I). All other matters of substance are also agreed 
by consensus (Section 2.3). 
This thesis firstly explores what 'consensus' means and why it is used by CCAMLR. 
It also addresses the origins, functions and operation of CCAMLR as a decision-
making organisation. This includes exploring CCAMLR' s history and how the 
competing interests of Members1 have been appeased through cooperation, 
compromise and compliance. 
1.2 Significance of the Study 
This study is important in light of CCAMLR's principal objective to conserve 
Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR Article II.1 ). The Southern Ocean has a 
history of over-exploitation starting with the harvest of seals in the 191h century, 
1 A Member of CCAMLR is a Contracting Party that has fulfilled membership requirements as per 
Article VII of the CAMLR Convention (see Section 5.2.1.3). A Contracting Party (CP) is a State that 
has signed the CAMLR Convention, but is not a Member of the Commission. , 
1 
whales up to the middle of the 201h century, marbled rock cod (Notothenia rossii) in 
the 1970s and most recently some stocks of Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus 
eleginoides) (Constable et al 2000). 
The Southern Ocean is often referred to as a 'krill-based' ecosystem as this species is 
at the centre of the marine ecosystem that depends on it (Nicol and de la Mare 1993). 
Increasing interest in harvesting krill for human consumption, fish meal and, to a 
lesser extent, biochemical products, has mandated that CCAMLR takes its decisions 
in such a manner that the Convention's primary objectives are expeditiously met 
(Turner et al 2008). 
The decisions taken by CCAMLR during its 27-year history have been extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Constable et al 2000, Miller et al 2004, Sabourenkov and Miller 
2004, CPRP Report 2008). Conversely, the utility and effectiveness of the 
organisation's consensus based decision-making has not been widely considered other 
than to intimate that it is slow and difficult to implement (Kaye 2001 ). 
1.3 Aim 
This study aims to determine whether CCAMLR's use of consensus-based decision-
making is effective (the criteria for assessing effectiveness are described in Section 
3.2). In so doing, the study will address the following questions: 
1. Has CCAMLR' s use of consensus been effective, expeditious and efficient in 
resolving relevant issues? 
2. Does CCAMLR' s use of inclusive consensus-based decision-making facilitate 
effective and timely adoption of management measures and do CCAMLR 
Members implement accordingly? and 
3. Has CCAMLR's use of consensus-based decision-making affected the ability 
of the organisation to meet the objectives of Article II of the CAMLR 
Convention? 
2 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This study examines the questions listed above (Section 1.3), structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review undertaken to ascertain what is meant by consensus 
decision-making. Decision-making procedures in CCAMLR are discussed then 
compared to decision-making procedures in other fisheries conventions (Sections 2.3 
and 2.4). 
The methodology of the study is presented in Chapter 3. This firstly outlines how the 
literature review was undertaken (Section 3 .1) then the methodology on how the study 
will assess CCAMLR's decision-making and its effectiveness is presented (Section 
3.2). Lastly, the methodology of the questionnaires and interviews undertaken to 
better understand participants' perspectives on consensus in CCAMLR is detailed 
(Section 3.3). 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the questionnaires on consensus and then the more 
detailed interviews, analysing participants' perspectives on consensus and whether it has 
worked for CCAMLR. 
Consensus and cooperation is investigated in Chapter 5, starting with the origins of 
cooperation and compromise in the Antarctic (Section 5.1). This involves considering the 
precautionary and ecosystem approaches to resource management, as well as issues on 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, and CCAMLR Membership (Section 5.2). It also 
investigates how consensus decision-making works in CCAMLR (Section 5.4), including 
consideration of its organisational structure (Section 5.3). 
Chapter 6 investigates CCAMLR's cooperation with other international organisations, 
such as elements of the Antarctic Treaty System and other Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations. It was important to consider the effectiveness of 




Case studies of how consensus has been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, by 
CCAMLR are presented in Chapter 7. These case studies include the issues of Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing (Section 7.1), CCAMLR's krill fishery 
(Section 7.2), France's by-catch of seabirds in longline fishing (Section 7.3), CCAMLR's 
New and Exploratory Fisheries (Section 7.4) and the concept of consensus-minus-one 
(Section 7 .5). 
Chapter 8 refers back to the three questions outlined in Section 1.3, using all the 
information gathered in this study. This chapter discusses CCAMLR' s need for 
consensus (Section 8.1), whether this type of decision-making is seen as an equaliser 
between Members (Section 8.2), and whether consensus has enabled CCAMLR to meet 
its conservation objectives (Section 8.3). The study will then discuss whether CCAMLR 
has been effective in their management of Antarctic resources (Section 8.4). 
Lastly, Chapter 9 presents a conclusion on whether consensus has made it harder for 
CCAMLR to formulate and implement effective management measures in line with 
Article IX of the CAMLR Convention. 
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2. Initial Literature Review 
2.1 Consensus - A decision-making tool 
Three main elements are involved in the taking of institutional decisions: political 
will, legal obligations and institutional mechanisms (Swan 2004). Political will 
establishes an agenda of work that combines with a willingness to cooperate to direct 
consequent action towards a desirable outcome. Once a decision is taken, a legal 
obligation is usually created to bind and affect implementation of the decision. 
Institutional mechanisms provide information essential for facilitating informed 
decisions. Without these three elements any agreed decision is likely to be of dubious 
standing, and difficult to implement. Equally, implementation would essentially be 
on a voluntary basis. 
Ideally too, decision-making also should address elements associated with 
accountability, participation and transparency (Swan 2004). All parties to a decision 
should thus be provided an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process 
and need to be accountable for the final decision(s) (Swan 2004). This ensures 
ownership, and therefore implementation of the decision. Without accountability any 
decisions would be effectively voluntary. The entire process should be as transparent 
as possible (Swan 2004) to ensure broad, and in CCAMLR's case international, 
legitimacy. 
Consensus is a form of decision-making, however an exact definition is hard to 
determine. The Webster's Dictionary defines consensus as an "agreement of the 
majority in sentiment or belief'. However it is also defined in the social sciences 
domain as a "general agreement, characterised by the absence of sustained 
oppositions" and "a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all 
parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments" .2 
2 Sourced from Webster's Online Dictionary: 
http://www. websters-online-dictionarv .org/ definition/consensus 
:15 
Consensus decision-making aims to be cooperative, endeavouring to reach the best 
possible decision for the group as a whole and all of its members (Partridge, 1971). 
The ideal form of consensus would be participatory and inclusive, actively soliciting 
the input of all and including them in the discussion and resulting decision. 
With consensus decision-making parties with conflicting interests and demands can 
reach a compromise that they can accept for the short-term as a base from which 
further demands can be projected (Partridge, 1971). Although the decision may not 
be exactly what the majority of parties wanted, the decision can become a stepping-
stone towards the ultimate objective. 
It is generally understood that consensus is used in a uniform way, without flexibility. 
However from the literature, there are two versions of consensus that are not so strict. 
These are 'sufficient consensus' and 'consensus-minus-one'. 
Sufficient consensus is a term that has been used in multiparty negotiations in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland. In these instances the term meant that if a general 
consensus could not be reached (i.e. all agree or no objections) then an agreement 
could be passed if there was sufficient consensus (Mnookin 2003). Effectively this 
meant a majority vote. In the South African example, it was at the discretion of the 
Chairperson to decide what was regarded as sufficient consensus, whereas in Northern 
Ireland there was a qualifier as to the makeup of the majority (Mnookin 2003). 
Sufficient consensus is not applicable to CCAMLR and so will not be discussed 
further. 
Consensus-minus-one is a term that has been used in CCAMLR which is understood 
to mean that although there is one dissenter, the decision is binding for all. The term 
consensus-minus-one was first used in CCAMLR by Russia in 2003 (CCAMLR 
2003, paragraph 8.55) and will be discussed further in Section 7.5. 
The use of consensus for decision-making is not new although majority-type voting 
has been more prominently used as a decision-making process. Organisations such as 




Tunas (ICCAT) and the International Whaling Commission (IWC) use majority-type 
voting systems.3 However, consensus decision-making is also commonly used, with 
varying forms and meanings, in political arenas such as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAF0).4 
Consensus decision-making was first used in the Antarctic political arena by the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty (see Section 5.1.1 below), an element of the Antarctic Treaty System 
(see Section 5.1.2), of which CCAMLR is also a part. 
CCAMLR is responsible for regulating fisheries in the Southern Ocean and is 
generally considered to be more than a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
(RFMO), largely due to its origins in the Antarctic Treaty (Molenaar, 2001). 
Regardless, most of its decisions are RFMO-type decisions. Examination of decision-
making best practice, as articulated through prescriptions within the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement, is useful as a starting point for examining consensus in the 
CCAMLR context. 
2.2 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
When considering RFMO decision-making processes, one must look at the RFMO 
agreements themselves. But reference is also necessary to the 1995 United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).5 UNFSA is the international community's best, 
and most recent, attempt to outline practical action necessary to implement the ideals 
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This 
agreement provides a global framework for consolidating the role and management 
processes ofRFMOs. 
UNFSA was set up by States "determined to ensure the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks" and to 
"commit themselves to responsible fisheries" through cooperation (Preamble, UNFSA 
3 United Nations Charter, Article 18; ICCAT Article III.3; IWC Article III. 
4 WTO Article IX.1; SEAFO Article 17 .1. 
5 Full title: Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
7 
1995). It is dependent on all RFMOs establishing conservation and management 
measures for the high seas and for their enforcement through member States (Swan 
2004). 
Four areas relating to decision-making in RFMOs are addressed by UNFSA. These 
are: the precautionary approach (UNFSA Article 6), functions for RFMOs (UNFSA 
Article 10, attached as Appendix 3), transparency (UNFSA Article 12) and prevention 
of disputes (UNFSA Article 28). 
To implement the precautionary approach UNFSA requires States to "improve 
decision-making" via best scientific knowledge (UNFSA Article 6.3). Transparency 
should be provided for in the decision-making process (UNFSA Article 12.1) and 
States should "agree on efficient and expeditious decision-making procedures" and to 
"strengthen existing decision-making procedures as necessary" to prevent disputes 
(UNFSA Article 28). However, the most important of these areas of decision-making 
is the functions listed in Article 10, which calls for "effective decision-making" (see 
Box 1 ), requiring States party to RFMOs to agree on conservation and management 
measures ensuring long-term sustainability of harvested resources in a "timely and 
effective manner" (UNFSA Article lO(a) and G)). 
It is important to note that the UNFSA was agreed upon in 1995 when a number of 
RFMOs had been in place for many years prior, especially in the Northern 
Hemisphere. Consequently, States party to the Agreement are obligated to strengthen 
their decision-making capabilities to ensure they are in line with UNFSA Article. 10. 
8 
management organisations and arrangements (only r . 
In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through subregio.1:1ai . o 
management organisations or arrangements, States shall: 
(a) agree on and comply with conservation and management mea . 
. the long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly 
·c stocks; 
• > 
on- decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of 
ation and.management measures in a timely and effective manner; 
@l ·c~operation 'of their relevant national agencies and industries 
and decisions of the organisation or 
Some members of RFMOs are not party to UNFSA, and therefore are under no 
obligation to consider the wording of UNFSA (McDorman 2005). This is not 
necessarily relevant when considering CCAMLR Contracting Parties, as they are 
Members of CCAMLR and are thus obligated to implement any decisions. However 
non-Contracting Parties are under no .such obligation in respect of CCAMLR 
decisions, but if they are party to UNFSA then they are obligated to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of the resource (UNFSA Article I 7). 
2.3 Decision-making procedures in CCAMLR 
The CAMLR Convention was negotiated in the Antarctic Treaty (AT) forum and is 
part of the ATS (see Section 5.1). Therefore it could be assumed that consensus 
would have been the ideal decision-making procedure to use because it is consistent 
with other A TS conventions. However, during CCAMLR negotiations there was a 
debate on whether to use a three quarters majority or a consensus decision-making 
9 
system (Edwards and Heap 1981 ). As previously mentioned (Section 2.1 above), 
three quarters majority voting was commonly used in other resource management 
organisations, such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). But it 
was the method of consensus traditionally used by the Antarctic Treaty that was 
ultimately agreed upon for CCAMLR (see Box 2). 
During negotiations the interests of conservationist (for example Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America) and of fishing (Japan and the Soviet 
Union) nations needed to be reconciled (Beck 1986). The use of consensus in 
CCAMLR gives every participating Member an equal voice. Decisions on the size of 
catch limits are legally binding and can have economic and social effects upon the 
Members and their fishing communities. Thus, it is important that the fishing nations 
are able to have an equal vote instead of being blocked out of decisions by 
conservationists in a three-quarters majority, as experienced in the IWC (Kaye 2001). 
With consensus, no decisions are forced through on a majority vote against the will of 
10 
one or several Members. As a result the decisions that are eventually reached have 
the backing of all Parties, ensuring that these decisions will be implemented (Trolle-
Andersen, 1987). 
Consensus is not defined in the CAMLR Convention, but it was defined in another 
ATS convention, the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities6 (CRAMRA), as "the absence of a formal objection" (CRAMRA 
Article 22.5). CRAMRA was negotiated in the same arena as the CAMLR 
Convention and it could be assumed that the use of consensus in CCAMLR has a 
similar definition, i.e. the absence of formal objection. UN CLOS, whose negotiations 
culminated shortly after the CAMLR Convention, had also used this definition 
(UNCLOS Article 161.8(e). Therefore it is reasonable to assume that this also 
influenced CCAMLR's working definition of consensus. Effectively this gives any 
member of CCAMLR a veto over any proposed measure (Watts 1992, Kaye 2001 ). 
It has been argued that consensus weakens the possibility of reaching effective 
decisions (Trolle-Andersen, 1987), but it could also be argued that in CCAMLR it 
ensures decisions, including Conservation Measures (CMs), will be applied by 
Members. By reaching consensus, the decision has already achieved a level of 
acceptability with all parties concerned. 
CMs are agreed to by consensus and because CCAMLR practices inclusive 
consensus, by which all Parties debate until a common decision can be agreed upon, 
or as evidenced with the Volna issue at CCAMLR-XXV (see Section 7.5.1 below), a 
compromise is developed that all can accept (CCAMLR 2006, paragraph 9.38). ·Once 
agreed to, Members are notified that the CMs become binding 180 days later (Article 
IX.6(b)). 
In practice the CMs become binding earlier. Fishing seasons for several fisheries 
(krill, toothfish and icefish in some Statistical Areas) commence a few weeks after the 
CCAMLR meetings, thus implementing these CMs. 
6 Although this CRAMRA was signed in 1988, it has never been ratified and therefore not in force. 
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2.3. l CCAMLR Objection Procedure 
The CAMLR Convention has an objection procedure, or what is more commonly 
referred to as an '"opt out"' procedure, whereby a Member has 90 days to notify that 
it is unable to accept a CM agreed to by CCAMLR (ArticleIX.6(c)). Using this "opt 
out" procedure means that the measure "shall not, to the extent stated, be binding 
up~n that Member" (Article IX.6(c)). CCAMLR's objection procedure is further 
discussed in Section 5.4.2. 
2.3 .2 Dispute Resolution in CCAMLR 
Dispute resolution is an important element of any decision-making process. Article 
XXV in the CAMLR Convention outlines a three-step approach to be applied in this 
eventuality. Firstly, the disputing parties are encouraged to resolve the issue bi-
laterally, using negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or other peaceful means. If this 
does not work then the parties have a choice of either referring the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice, or to an arbitral tribunal (a procedure for which is 
annexed to the Convention). CCAMLR's dispute resolution procedure is further 
discussed in Section 5.4.3. 
2.4 Comparison of decision-making procedures m (other) Fisheries 
Conventions 
In the waters north of the area to which the CAMLR Convention applies7 there are 
four "Tuna Commissions" operating (Table 1): ICCAT, the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC). The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO) also shares a 
7 The area to which the CAMLR Convention applies, as per Article I will hereby be referred to as the 
Convention Area. 
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boundary with CCAMLR. All of these RFMOs have the ability to enact management 
measures. 
2.4.l Decision-making procedures in RFMOs 
The CAMLR Convention and the 2001 Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Fishery Resources in the South-east Atlantic Ocean (SEAFO) both 
contain provisions that decisions on matters of substance will be taken by consensus 
(CAMLR Convention Article XII.1; SEAFO Convention Article 17.1). However, 
neither defines what type of consensus is to be used. 
Under the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
decisions are taken by a unanimous vote (CCSBT Convention Article 7). 
The 1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) 
and the 1993 Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC) use majority voting to decide matters of substance (ICCAT 
Convention Article 111.3; IOTC Agreement Article VI.2). 
WCFPC uses consensus decision-making; in this case consensus is defined as "a lack 
of formal objection" (WCPFC Article 20.1). This convention also allows for the 
possibility that consensus may not be reached and so decisions may be made by a 
majority of Members. However, there is a qualifier as to the makeup of Members in 
the majority decision (Article 20.2). 
All of these RFMOs have developed conservation and management measures using 
their prescribed decision-making systems. 
Once the decisions are made within an RFMO the onus is on the States party to 
implement them (McDorman 2005). Swan (2004) concludes that in some RFMOs 
(not named) the decisions to manage fisheries are not binding, nor are they timely and 
effective. This could be because of the decision-making mechanism used by those 
RFMOs. 
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Table 1: Comparison of some Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and CCAMLR. (Source: information taken from respective Conventions and Agreements). 
Rei ional Fisheries Management Organisation 
TOPIC CCAMLR JCCAT CCSBT !OTC SEAFO WCPFC 
Convention on the 
Convention of the 
International Convention for the Agreement for the Conservation and 
Conservation and 
Convention on the Management of 
Convention Name Conservation of Antarctic 
Convention for the Conservation of Establishment of the Management of 
Highly Migratory 
Marine Living Resources 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Indian Ocean Tuna Fishery Resources in 
Fish Stocks in the Atlantic Tunas Tuna Commission the South-East 
Atlantic Ocean 
Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean 
Southern Ocean as 
All waters of the 
All waters beyond 
Atlantic Ocean, Species migratory Indian Ocean and Western and Central Area of competence defined by the 
including the adjacent range adjacent seas 
national jurisdiction 
Pacific Ocean Convention. in Convention Area seas 
Antarctic Marine living 
Tuna and tuna-like 
All fishery resources 
Tuna and tuna-like Southern Bluefin fishes (listed in Species Covered resources, excluding 
fishes Tuna Annex B of the 
in the Convention Tuna fishes 
whales and seals 
Agreement). 
Area 
Signature 1980 1966 1993 1993 2001 2000 




The conservation, Maintain populations of 
conservation and 
conservation and Ensure long-term 
conservation and 
Objective including rational use, of tuna and tuna-like optimum utilisation optimum utilisation conservation and sustainable use of Antarctic marine living species found in the of tuna stocks sustainable use of 
resources Atlantic Ocean 
of global Southern 
through a fishery resources 
highly migratory 




Consensus Majority Unanimous Majority Consensus Consensus8 Mechanism 
8 Article 20 of the WCPFC Convention states that decision-making shall be taken by consensus, but if consensus cannot be reached then decisions may be taken by majority 
(see Section 2.4.1). 
However, the choice of consensus or majority voting is just the mechanism used to 
reach agreement. Behind that agreement there must be Swan's (2004) three elements 
of taking decisions: political will to debate a topic and cooperate with each other; 
legal obligation to be bound to implement decisions; and institutional mechanisms 
providing information to facilitate decision-making. Without these elements, the 
implementation of decisions made may not be effective, despite the commitment of 
many Members. 
2.4.2 Objection Procedures in RFMOs 
CCAMLR, ICCAT, IOTC and SEAFO have outlined their "opt out" procedures 
(CAMLR Convention ArticleIX.6(c); ICCAT Article VIII.3; IOTC Article IX.5; 
SEAFO Convention Article 23.l(c)). These procedures in CCAMLR and the IOTC 
are fairly straightforward (see Section 2.3.1 above). The objection procedure for 
SEAFO is similar to CCAMLR' s up to a point. Having notified the Commission of 
their objection to a measure, the Member must then provide reasons for this objection 
and proposals for an alternative measure (SEAFO Article 23.l(d)). A review can be 
called by any Contracting Party and then an ad hoe expert panel is convened that will 
recommend interim measures to be binding on all parties (SEAFO Article 23. l(g)). 
This is such a lengthy procedure that it seems unlikely any Member would wish to 
lodge an objection. It could be inferred that the procedure was designed for precisely 
this purpose. 
The ICCAT "opt out" procedure appears to be a complicated and protracted objection 
procedure where Members have a right to object to the objector, thus making the 
original measure binding, unless another objection is recorded. 
The CCSBT does not have an official objection procedure outlined in the Convention. 
The WCPFC does not have an objection procedure per se. Instead any Member that 
voted against a decision, or was absent, has the opportunity to seek a review by a 
review panel (WCPFC Article 20.6). Until the review is complete the disputed 
measure is not required to be implemented. 
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2.4.3 Dispute Resolution in RFMOs Generally 
UNFSA Part VIII, Articles 27 to 32 outlines procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes using negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial 
settlement. 
CCSBT (Article 16), ICCAT (Article 26), IOTC (Article XXIII) and SEAFO (Article 
24) each have a three tiered approach similar to CCAMLR's three-step approach 
(Section 2.3.2), which are all consistent with the UNFSA procedure. 
The WCPFC does not have step by step instructions for dispute resolution outlined in 
the Convention, instead specifying that provisions set out in UNFSA apply. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The primary objective of any decision-making organisation is to provide the best 
informed advice possible in a timely and effective manner (Swan 2004 ). To this end, 
CCAMLR uses consensus decision-making to formulate Conservation Measures 
(CMs) (Section 2.3). The exact definition of consensus is not stated the CAMLR 
Convention, but is generally inferred to mean a "lack of formal objection". 
UNFSA calls for effective decision-making by all RFMOs to implement a 
precautionary approach to resource management, using transparent procedures 
(Section 2.2). Out of the twenty-five Members of CCAMLR only three are not party 
to the agreement (Argentina, Chile and China). However, the fact that they are not 
parties to UNFSA makes no difference to their obligations under CCAMLR. 
Using the information in this chapter for reference, a methodology was created to 
determine whether CCAMLR is effective in its management of Antarctic marine 
living resources (Section 3 .2), and also to gauge expert opinion on the various 




The methodology for this study is complex and involves three components. The first 
comprises the literature review, commenced in Chapter 2 and expanded here, which is 
used to extract various perspectives on consensus (Section 3.1). The second is an 
exploration of the normative and operating systems of CCAMLR (conducted below in 
Section 3.2) in order to understand how decisions are made and the players behind 
those decisions. This includes establishing a method of assessing regime 
effectiveness (Section 3.2.2), from which it can determined whether CCAMLR has 
achieved its objectives. The third is the methodology supporting the gathering of data 
(from questionnaires and interviews) which was used to interpret and understand 
informed (expert) opinions on CCAMLR and its decision-making procedures (Section 
3.3). 
3 .1 Subsequent Literature Review 
An initial literature review was undertaken in Chapter 2 to extract and examine 
variations of the concept of consensus decision-making. The literature was searched 
for definitions of consensus and for decision-making in selected RFMOs. The history 
of CCAMLR was then reviewed, using information from CCAMLR reports, journal 
articles, books and the websites of international organisations. 
From the information gathered and analysed in the initial review, a study of the 
normative and operating systems of CCAMLR will be undertaken to enable an 
assessment of CCAMLR's effectiveness. Building on the information from the initial 
literature review, questionnaires were composed and interviews undertaken to gather 
more in depth and focused information on CCAMLR's decision-making. 
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3.2 Normative System of CCAMLR and Regime Effectiveness 
3 .2.1 The normative system of CCAMLR 
This section of the methodology is adapted from that of Turner et al (2008) (see 
Attachment 1 ). 
A hybridized template was created in Turner et al (2008), and based on the work of 
Diehl et al (2003), to address the four essential CCAMLR 'Cs': cooperation, 
compromise, consensus and compliance. While CCAMLR processes are essentially 
factual and structural, this approach allowed for assessment of the normative system 
of CCAMLR in terms of both process and structure. 
The framework employed to explain the dynamics of international law, illustrated in 
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Operating system (structural) Normative system (directive) 
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Figure 1: Framework for explaining the dynamics of international law. 
(Source: Turner et al 2008.) 
As per Turner et al (2008), regime effectiveness is taken in this study as comprising 
the elements of cooperation, compromise and compliance and their interaction in 
decision-making and outcomes. 
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It was assumed that without alignment between the operating and normative elements 
of the Convention as a legal instrument, and in the absence of State commitment to 
the values and goals of that instrument, its legal or regulatory outcomes may fail. 
Therefore, as articulated by Diehl et al (2003), to assess CCAMLR's international 
legal effectiveness, the operating system, normative system and the political will must 
be considered. 
Based on interpretations from the literature, it was assumed that an operating system 
is essentially a constitution for the purposes of international law. In this study this is 
represented in the CAMLR Convention (Section 5.2). An operating system would 
usually be independent of any particular norm and would often precede the evolution 
of a norm rather than reacting to its existence (Diehl et al 2003). For this purpose, the 
operating system components include the sources of law (including the rules for law 
formation, participation, and obligation), the actors involved (including those with 
legal rights and duties), the applicable jurisdiction (including actors' or institutions' 
obligations and rights in respect of disputes) and various institutional aspects 
(including forums to enforce compliance or settle disputes) (Diehl et al 2003). Thus, 
CCAMLR itself constitutes the CAMLR Convention's operating system in structure 
and process (Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below). 
In the Turner et al (2008) methodology, the normative system allowed an 
extrapolation of CCAMLR norms from particular values or policies to then define 
acceptable standards of actor behaviour. In general terms, it was recognised that 
norms develop from issue-specific areas. Therefore, in the CCAMLR context it can 
be determined that norms are derived from the stewardship of Antarctic marine living 
resources as well as the environmental responsibility attached to the sustainable 
exploitation of such resources. Thus the CCAMLR normative system comprises the 
normative content of the regime's processes, institutional as well as regulatory. 
In assessing the CCAMLR regime's effectiveness as a decision-making organisation a 
combination of structures in an international law context were considered: 
1. the normative framework from which this structure derives, or to which it 
responds; and 
2. the reaching of political consensus in meeting the Convention's objectives. 
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3.2.2 Assessing CCAMLR's effectiveness 
In this study CCAMLR's effectiveness was evaluated against the following three 
statements: 
• The initial goals were realistic; 
• There were distinct changes in actor behaviour; and 
• There are identifiable phases of problem solving (Young 1989; Levy 1993; 
Haas et al 1994). 
Conversely, CCAMLR's lack of effectiveness was evaluated using the following three 
statements: 
• CCAMLR'S goals were unrealistic in the first place; 
• It contained imprecise objectives, leading to the parties not really knowing 
what was required of them; and 
• This lead to a superficial, or no change, to actor behaviour. 
3 .3 Methodology of Questionnaires and Interviews about Consensus 
Under normal circumstances, sampling size underpins the quantitative validity of 
questionnaires and interviews in respect to the overall population being sampled 
(Bradshaw and Stratford 2000). However, for the current study, it was considered 
that soliciting informed or expert views would be the most appropriate approach. 
Consequently, a qualitative rather than quantitative inquiry was applied. 
Potential participants in the questionnaires and interviews were chosen on the basis of 
their experience and expertise in Antarctic policy specifically or other RFMOs more 
generally. 
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It was decided that interviews would provide more clarity than questionnaires alone. 
Therefore, in-depth interviews were conducted with a small number of people 
intimately connected with CCAMLR processes and procedures to provide significant 
insights into the research topic at hand - the effectiveness of consensus decision-
making in CCAMLR. 
For the questionnaires a form of "maximum variation sampling" (Patton 1990) was 
used with participants being chosen from a wide range of backgrounds, including 
CCAMLR Members and those outside the CCAMLR community. 
The interviews were more a case of "convenience sampling" (Patton 1990), as 
participants were chosen based on their experience and expertise, as well as on the 
basis of ease of access and availability. Most interviews were conducted during the 
annual CCAMLR meetings in Hobart, Tasmania, when access to delegates from 
CCAMLR Members and participating Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was 
easiest. 
For both the questionnaires and interviews, it was deemed important to represent each 
sector within the CCAMLR community. These comprised NGOs and a Contracting 
Party which was not a CCAMLR Member.9 CCAMLR Members from the following 
demographics were questioned - delegates from developing countries (Argentina, 
Chile, Namibia, Russia, and South Africa) and developed countries (Australia, France, 
Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America)10• 
Ethics approval was given by the University of Tasmania for the questionnaires 
(Ethics Reference Number: H0008556, Project Title; Consensus in the Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)) and 
interviews (Ethics Reference Number: H0008557; Project Title: Perspectives on 
consensus in CCAMLR). 
9 As noted earlier (footnote 1) a Contracting Party (CP) is a State that has signed the CAMLR 
Convention, but is not a Member of the Commission. 
10 Classification of developing and developed countries was taken from the World Bank list of 
economies (April 2009). Website: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DAT ASTA TTSTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS 
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3 .2.1 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires regarding consensus in CCAMLR were prepared and emailed to 26 
people generally regarded as possessing experience and expertise in Antarctic policy 
or RFMOs. The questionnaires (attached as Appendix 2; list of participants is 
Appendix 3) were made up, of 15 questions with a mixed format of multiple choice 
and short answer. The questions were drafted to provide an indication of what the 
participant thought about: 
(a) The meaning of consensus; 
(b) Consensus as applied by CCAMLR; and 
(c) CCAMLR's effectiveness. 
Question 1 - What is consensus? 
Participants were given six different definitions of consensus that had been found in 
the literature (see Partridge 1971; Trolle-Andersen 1987; CRAMRA; and Kaye 2001) 
(Section 2.1 ). Participants were asked to rank their answers from the definition they 
most agreed with to the definition they least agreed with. 
Question 2 - CCAMLR is a model of what form of consensus decision-making? 
Participants were asked to choose which of the definitions in Question 1 they believed 
CCAMLR practised. 
Question 3 - In your view CCAMLR has succeeded as a decision-making system 
Participants were given a yes/no option. 
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Question 4 - In your view CCAMLR has failed as a decision-making system 
because ... 
Participants were given four reasons for CCAMLR failing. The first three options 
were criticisms taken from the literature: decisions take too long, decisions are so 
diluted as to be meaningless, and because of lack of commitment (see Trolle-
Andersen 1987 and Kaye 2001). The fourth option was "other reasons". For better 
understanding of their choice, participants were then asked to elaborate on their 
answer. 
Question 5 -Are decisions reached by consensus weaker because they have had to be 
negotiated until all parties agree? 
One of the major criticisms about consensus decision-making in the literature was that 
everybody has to negotiate until all are happy with the decision and that this makes 
the decision weaker in substance and commitment (see Kaye 2001). Participants were 
asked their opinion. 
Question 6 - It has been argued that consensus weakens the possibility of reaching 
effective decisions. Do you agree? 
This question takes Question 5 a step further by questioning the ability of a consensus 
decision-making system to reach "effective" decisions. Participants were given a 
yes/no option. 
Question 7 - Do you believe consensus should be unqualified or should there be an 
"opt out" procedure? 
Participants were questioned about their opinions regarding objection procedures (see 
Sections 2.3.1and2.4.2). They were asked what objection procedures should be used 
and how they should be used. 
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Quesrion 8 - Do you believe "opt out" procedures are contrary to the idea of 
consensus? 
This question takes Question 7 a step further to understand participants' opinions on 
whether objection procedures are consistent with their ideals of consensus. 
Question 9- What is consensus-minus-one? 
Participants were asked their views on the relatively new term 'consensus-minus-one' 
(see Sections 2.1 and 7.5). They were given six different definitions constructed by 
the student to attempt to understand the general thought of this type of decision-
making. Participants were asked to elaborate on their choice. 
Question 10 - Do you believe consensus-minus-one could be used in certain 
circumstances, such as black listing of vessels where the reaching of consensus is 
unlikely? 
There are some contentious issues in CCAMLR where achieving consensus has not 
occurred (see Sections 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.5). Participants were asked their views on 
whether they believed consensus-minus-one could be legitimately used in such 
circumstances. 
Question 11 - Do you believe that CCAMLR is in line with Article 10 of the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement? 
Participants were asked their view on whether CCAMLR has a decision-making 
procedure that facilitates the adoption of conservation and management measures in a 
timely and effective manner. 
Question 12 - Should consensus remain the basis of all decision-making in CCAMLR 
for matters of substance or is there room for another method? 
One of the major questions of this thesis is whether consensus has been and is still 
appropriate for CCAMLR to reach all its management objectives. Participants were 
asked their opinion on this. 
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Question 13 - What other decision-making method could CCAMLR use for matters of 
substance? 
Building on the previous question participants were then asked what other decisions 
making procedures CCAMLR could use. Their answers would be fundamental to 
understanding their perspectives on effectiveness. 
Question 14 - Does consensus make it harder for CCAMLR to formulate management 
measures in fulfilling the obligations of Article IX of the Convention? 
This is the main question of this study, whether the decision-making procedure that 
CCAMLR has in place enables it -to fulfil its management and conservation 
objectives. Thus, the opinions of the participants were also crucial to determining 
effectiveness. 
Question 15 - Do you have personal experience of a decision-making process other 
than consensus? 
In order to understand how CCAMLR is seen to perform in comparison with other 
international organisations, participants were asked about their experiences in other 
organisations and how decisions made in CCAMLR rate compared to the other 
organisations. 
Seven questionnaires were returned. The answers were grouped into the following 
categories: 
• Does CCAMLR operate consensus as you would define it? 
- Questions 1 and 2 
• Does CCAMLR work? 
- Questions 5 and 6 
• Should CCAMLR change the use of consensus? 
- Questions 3, 4 and 11 
• Is there an alternative for when consensus cannot be reached? 
- Questions 7 - 10 
• Is there another decision-making option for CCAMLR? 
- Questions 12 - 15 
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The answers were then collated and analysed. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted during the 2006 and 2007 annual CCAMLR meetings. 
Interviewees were asked 15 set questions based on the questionnaire (attached as 
Appendix 4; list of participants is Appendix 5). A total of 10 interviews were 
conducted. In addition, one CCAMLR delegate declined a formal interview, instead 
opting for an informal discussion. Although this discussion gave an insight into the 
Delegate's personal views, none of this information was able to be included in the 
study. All formal interviews were recorded and then transcribed. 
For consistency the answers were grouped to fit into the aforementioned categories 
(Section 3.2.1). The answers were then collated and analysed. 
Using these methods the results of analyses on the information gathered are presented 
in Chapter 4 - Results of the Questionnaires and Interviews on Consensus. 
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4. Results of Questionnaires and Interviews on Consensus 
4.1 Questionnaires 
The aim of the questionnaires was to understand in greater detail the views of 
CCAMLR participants and non-participants on the CCAMLR consensus decision-
making process. 
The results of the questionnaires are presented to address the following questions: 
(a) Does CCAMLR operate consensus as you would define it? 
(b) Does CCAMLR work? 
( c) Should CCAMLR change the use of consensus? 
(d) Is there an alternative for when consensus cannot be reached? 
(e) Is there another decision-making option for CCAMLR? 
4.1.1 Define consensus in CCAMLR 
Questions 1 and 2 
Of the seven returned questionnaires, 4 agreed that CCAMLR uses consensus as they 
would define it (i.e. they chose the same answer for both Questions 1 and 2). The 
most common definition of consensus was "lack of formal objection" (Figure 2). 
CCAMLR's model of consensus decision-making was mostly defined as "lack of 
formal objection" (57%; 4 out of 7 people), with the "everybody agrees" definition 
also considered (29%; 2 out of 7 people). One person believed CCAMLR's model for 
consensus decision-making was a majority agreement. This person had not served on 
a CCAMLR Member delegation. 
It is worth noting that the five participants that have served on CCAMLR Member 
delegations chose either "lack of formal objection" or "everybody agrees" as the 
working model of consensus for CCAMLR, yet only three chose those definitions as 
their idea of consensus in operation. Therefore it can be inferred that some 
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individuals participating on Member delegations have conflicting views on the way 
CCAMLR operates with consensus and their personal ideas of consensus. For 
example, these individuals chose "condescending to the minority point of view" and 
an "overwhelming majority agreement" as their personal definitions, but agreed that 
CCAMLR uses "lack of formal objection" as its working model for consensus. 
However, as Members questioned are consistent with their interpretation of the type 
of consensus that CCAMLR operates, it can be assumed that personal opinions 








lack offonnal everybody 
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Figure 2: Histogram of definitions of consensus (Question 1). 
4.1.2 Does consensus decision-making work? 
Questions 5 and 6 
It has been argued in the literature that decisions reached by consensus are weaker 
because they have had to be negotiated until all parties agree (Trolle-Andersen, 1987). 
Two participants agreed with this statement, believing that it was an inevitability of 
decisions requiring political commitment. However, all participants believed that 
although consensus decisions may be weaker, they could still be "effective". 
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4.1.3 Has CCAMLR worked? 
Questions 3, 4 and 11 
All but one participant believed that CCAMLR has succeeded as a decision-making 
system. The lone dissenter was of the opinion that decisions take too long and failure 
arose when "interests in appropriation obtained the right to veto conservation moves". 
This participant was a CCAMLR Member delegate. 
Despite responding that CCAMLR had succeeded, two other participants who had 
served on Member delegations also believed that CCAMLR had failed because 
decisions took too long and there was a lack of commitment from Members. 
However, all participants believe that CCAMLR is in line with Article 10 of UNFSA 
(see Appendix 3 for full text of this Article) and has a decision-making procedure 
which "facilitates the adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely 
and effective manner". 
4.1.4 Is there an alternative for when consensus cannot be reached? 
Questions 7-10 
The four participants that answered question 7 believed there should be an "opt out" 
procedure in place and quoted the procedure outlined in Article IX.6 of the CAMLR 
Convention. 
Views on whether "opt out" procedures were contrary to the idea of consensus 
(Question 8) were varied (Figure 3). Those that answered in the negative noted "opt 
out" procedures are important ensuring a Member is not obligated to implement a 
decision that their domestic legislation cannot support. 
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Yes No Sometimes 
Figure 3: Histogram of answers on question 8: do you 
believe "opt out" procedures are contrary to the idea of 
consensus. 
When questioned on the option of using consensus-minus-one as an alternative when 
consensus cannot be reached the results were tied (Figure 4 ). 
The majority (57%; 4 out of 7 people) were negative in their opinion of consensus-
minus-one as a decision-making process (Figure 4(A) - Question 9). They believed 
that it violates inclusivity in decision-making and was against the nature of the 
Antarctic Treaty, and therefore CCAMLR. Others regarded it a useful naming and 
shaming tool or a legitimate decision-making process. 
However the majority (57%; 4 out of 7 people) were in favour of using consensus-
minus-one in CCAMLR for certain issues when the reaching of consensus was 
unlikely, such as the black listing of vessels (Figure 4(B) - Question 10). It was 
believed that the Member/s whose vessel/s were being considered for inclusion on 
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Figure 4: Histogram of answers to: 
Questions 9 (A)- What is consensus-minus-one; and 
Question 10 (B)-Should consensus-minus-one be used in certain circumstances 
when reaching consensus is unlikely. 
However, those that gave negative responses believed that consensus was needed to 
ensure the full cooperation of all Members. 
4.1.5 Is there another decision-making option for CCAMLR? 
Questions 12-15 
All participants, except for one, believe that consensus should remain the basis for all 
decision-making in CCAMLR. However two believed that improvements could be 
made in some areas, with reference to dispute settlement. The lone dissenter believed 
that consensus-minus-one is the only decision-making method that can address the 
current needs of CCAMLR. This participant was from a Contracting Party (CP) to the 
CAMLR Convention, but not a CCAMLR Member. 
There were suggestions that transparent discussions and improved dispute settlement 
could be implemented, however no more detail was given. It was also suggested that 
various forms of majority voting could work in exceptional circumstances, but that 
consensus should lie at the heart of all decision-making in CCAMLR. 
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All participants agreed that consensus makes it harder for CCAMLR to formulate 
management measures because it may take longer to arrive at such decisions due to 
the necessary debate. However, all believe that the use of consensus is integral as it 
reinforces the obligatory nature of the decisions and facilitates compliance and 
uniformity in their application. One participant stated that this is the only way to 
effectively regulate the high seas. 
Some participants had experience with other decision-making processes and agreed 
that it was difficult to compare decisions made by CCAMLR to other organisations, 
as different decision-making procedures are needed, depending on the issues, time 
available and political context. All agreed that a majority system like the IWC would 
not be practical. Majority voting was seen as politicised and divisive, as the majority 
is prepared to enforce its views, irrespective of the minority. 
Overall it was agreed that for CCAMLR, the use of consensus is appropriate and has 
been demonstrated as a workable decision-making process. 
4.2 Intervie\Vs 
The aim of the interviews was to understand in greater detail the views of CCAMLR 
participants on the consensus decision-making process that CCAMLR uses. 
For consistency, the results of the interviews are presented using the following 
questions: 
1. Does CCAMLR operate consensus as you would define it? 
2. Does CCAMLR work? 
3. Should CCAMLR change the use of consensus? 
4. Is there an alternative for when consensus cannot be reached? 
5. Is there another decision-making option for CCAMLR? 
4.2.1 Define consensus in CCAMLR 
Questions 1 and 2 
All interviewees agreed that CCAMLR uses consensus as they would define it. The 
most common definition of consensus, was "lack of formal objection" (80%; 8 out of 
10 people), followed by "everybody agrees (20%; 2 out of 10 people). CCAMLR's 
model of consensus decision-making was mostly defined as "lack of formal 
objection" (80%), with the "everybody agrees" (20%) definition also considered. 
4.2.2 Does consensus decision-making work? 
Questions 5 and 6 
It has been argued in the literature that decisions reached by consensus are weaker 
because they have had to be negotiated until all parties agree (Trolle-Andersen, 1987). 
Two participants agreed with this statement, clarifying that by weaker, they meant 
decisions are delayed. However, all participants who answered concluded that 
reaching effective decisions was not affected by consensus. It was believed that 
although the decisions took longer to come about, their overall effectiveness was very 
good. 
4.2.3 Has CCAMLR worked? 
Questions 3, 4 and 11 
All participants believed that CCAMLR has succeeded as a decision-making system. 
However, one interviewee also believed that CCAMLR fails only when the 
Contracting Parties are not committed and block consensus in cases of conflicting 
interests. 
Participants did consider that failure could be implied as decisions can take too long. 
However, it was considered that CCAMLR was a reactive organisation so once there 
was a clear need for management measures a decision, based on the best scientific 
knowledge, would usually be agreed upon. 
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All but one participant believe that CCAMLR is in line with Article 10 of UNFSA 
(see Appendix 3 for full text of this Article) and has a decision-making procedure 
which "facilitates the adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely 
and effective manner". The term "timely" was considered subjective with many 
questioning its meaning. Timely for one country might mean three years, whereas 
timely for another might mean one year. However, overall it was agreed that the 
decisions were effective, especially when considering the implementation of 
measures. 
4.2.4 Is there an alternative for when consensus cannot be reached? 
Questions 7-10 
All participants, expect one, believed there should be an "opt out" procedure in place 
and quoted the procedure outlined in Article IX.6 of the CAMLR Convention. The 
dissenter believed that "you either have consensus or you don't". This respondent 
believed that an "opt out" procedure was akin to majority voting. 
The option of using consensus-minus-one as an alternative when consensus cannot be 
reached was rejected by 78% of participants (7 out of 9 people11). One believed it to 
be a useful naming and shaming tool and could effectively be used for blacklisting of 
IUU vessels. However the majority considered it nonsense. It was their opinion that 
instead of consensus-minus-one Members with an interest in the decisions, such as 
blacklisting of IUU vessels, should present their evidence, be involved in the debate 
and then abstain from participating in the decision-making process. 
It was the majority opinion that consensus was needed to ensure the full cooperation 
of all Members. 
11 One participant declined to answer Questions 9 and 10, concerning consensus-minus-one. 
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4.2.5 Is there another decision-making option for CCAMLR? 
Questions 12-15 
All participants believed that consensus should remain the basis for all decision-
making in CCAMLR. However one believed that there was also room for an 80% 
majority for issues when reaching consensus was unlikely. 
It was noted that consensus was inclusive and cooperative, involving States that are 
interested in harvesting resources as well as those that are more conservation-minded. 
The strength of consensus was its power as an equaliser, giving everyone the same 
power of veto over management measures. 
One participant believed that, although consensus should remain, punitive measures 
for failure to comply should be introduced to prevent undermining of the CAMLR 
Convention. This participant believed CCAMLR needed a work plan to ensure that 
time is not wasted on a single contentious item. The respondent proposed a formal 
Working Group be established to work on rules and regulations. 
Others suggested that for matters of compliance a majority type decision-making 
system could theoretically be set up. However, the efficacy of such a system was 
questioned, with participants believing that consensus is the only way to ensure full 
implementation and compliance with all management measures. 
The participants' views on whether consensus makes it harder for CCAMLR to 
formulate management measures were split with 40% agreeing ( 4 out of 10 people). 
Most believed that it might take longer to arrive at such decisions due to the necessary 
debate. Another believed that consensus made it difficult to deal with recalcitrant 
Members. 
However, the majority (60%; 6 out of 10 people) believed consensus carried with it a 
respect for the decision and the need to cooperate within the CCAMLR community to 
reach consensus. These respondents believed that without consensus, the chances of 
full implementation decline. 
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One participant had experience with majority type decision-making processes. They 
believed that although this style of organisation may move forward faster, the 
decisions are not as strong and their progression in terms of their objectives is far 
behind CCAMLR. 
Another had experience in the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which uses 
a three quarters majority voting system. They believed that the IWC had not been 
successful, as each country's rights were not protected. With consensus in CCAMLR, 
each Member was equal and had similar objectives, thus providing stronger and more 
efficient decisions. 
Overall it was agreed that CCAMLR is very good at making decisions and adopting 
management measures. It was believed that CCAMLR's deCisions, although not--------
perfect, are strong and that consensus decision-making has worked in CCAMLR as 
the organisation still functions and all Members participate. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
From these results it can be concluded that in a CCAMLR context consensus is seen 
as a lack of formal objection. Although this type of decision-making has its flaws, 
namely timeliness and often the need to indulge the interests of the lowest common 
denominator, consensus decision-making works for CCAMLR. Decisions that have 
been compromised to garner consensus agreement can then be used as stepping-stones 
to firmer, more proactive decisions. 
It can also be concluded that participants believe CCAMLR has succeeded as a 
decision-making system, although it was noted that decisions can take too long. It 
was also noted that due to its use of consensus, CCAMLR has the ability to fail when 
interests of States are not the interests of the Commission collectively and there is a 
lack of commitment. 
lll 3
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A minority of participants believed that when consensus cannot be reached other 
options, such as consensus-minus-one could be used. However all participants 
believed that consensus was needed to ensure the full cooperation of all Members. 
Therefore, it was the majority point of view that consensus remain the basis for all 
decision-making in CCAMLR, with improvements in transparency and dispute 
resolution being required. 
Using the methods in Section 3.2 and the results presented in Chapter 4, this study 
will proceed in considering cooperation, compromise and consensus in CCAMLR. 
These help to explain and contextualise decision-making. 
----- --------- ----- ---- - - - - --- ------------
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5. CCAMLR - Consensus and Cooperation 
5 .1 The Origins of Cooperation and Compromise in the Antarctic 
The CAMLR Convention is unique. It is unique because it is entrenched with 
cooperation, from its sovereignty compromise to the makeup of its Members, 
conservationists, harvesting nations, and more recently port States. This form of 
cooperation began in the Antarctic Treaty (AT Article III) and has flowed through to 
CCAMLR and other ATS instruments. 
5.1.1 The Antarctic Treaty 
The 12 countries active during the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 
negotiated and signed the Antarctic Treaty (AT) with the main objectives of ensuring 
that Antarctica is "used for peaceful purposes only" (AT Article I. l) and to "promote 
international cooperation in scientific investigation" (AT Article III. I) in areas south 
of 60° South Latitude (AT Article VI). The Treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961 
(ATS 2009). 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) are held annually by Member 
Countries "for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters 
of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty" (AT Article IX.I). 
As noted earlier, ATCMs operate on the basis of consensus decisions and measures 
become effective only when approved by all the Consultative Parties (AT Article 
IX.4). In practice this means that discussions about an issue continue until agreement 
which all Consultative Parties can live with is found (i.e. no objections are made). 
Although this can be a time consuming process, when considering the diversity and 
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scope of the topics discussed by Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (A TCPs) and 
the vast number of decisions12 that have been agreed upon and implemented over the 
last forty-eight years of meetings, the use of consensus decision-making in ATCMs 
could be considered effective. 
The Antarctic Treaty did not cover all aspects of human activity in Antarctica, and 
some say it never intended to because the exploitation of resources is not mentioned 
in the Treaty (Trolle-Andersen 1987). Instead the Antarctic Treaty, via its ATCMs, 
provided an arena of international cooperation for the discussion of matters of interest 
to the ATCPs and to work towards their objective of preservation and conservation of 
living resources in Antarctica (AT Article IX.l(f)). 
5.1.2 The Antarctic Treaty System 
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is a complex regime made up of the Antarctic 
Treaty, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its associated separate international 
instruments in force and the measures in effect under those instruments (Madrid 
Protocol, Article l(e)) (see Box 3). The primary purpose of the ATS is to coordinate 
relations among states with respect to Antarctica. Each of these instruments was a 
consequence of consensus, which had its genesis in the "parent" instrument, the 
Antarctic Treaty. CCAMLR's role in the ATS and cooperation with its other 
instruments is discussed in Section 6.1. 
Box 3: The Antarctic Treaty Systein (ATS): 
• The Antarctic Treaty - 1959; 
• The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (co . 
""'··t ,f .;! ;:;;<' fo;. ~ 
known as the Madrid Protocol) - 1991; · 
Convention fo~ the Conservation of Seals (CCAS) - 1972; and 
on on.the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
12 For a full list of Recommendations, Measures, Decisions, and Resolutions taken by ATCPs see the 
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website: www.ats.ag/index e.htm 
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5 .2 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
As noted earlier, commercial harvesting of fin-fish in the Southern Ocean developed 
in the late 1960s with several species becoming over-fished by the mid- l 970s (Miller 
et al 2004). A fishery for Antarctic krill, Euphausia superba, commenced in the early 
1970s (Everson 2000). As krill are at the centre of the Antarctic ecosystem, with 
many predators dependant entirely on them, there was concern over the effects that 
such a fishery might create (Miller 1991, Agnew 1997). 
CCAMLR's origins are in the Antarctic Treaty, with ATCPs at the 9th ATCM in 1977 
calling for the establishment of "a definitive regime" which would deal with both the 
direct and indirect effects of harvesting in the Southern Ocean (ATCM 
Recommendation IX-2). It was agreed that such a regime would be ecosystem-based 
and designed to regulate the use of marine living resources "within the framework of 
the Antarctic Treaty" (ATCM Recommendation VIII-10). 
From this the CAMLR Convention was signed in May 1980 (CCAMLR 2007b). The 
Convention entered into force on 7 April 1982, having application over all Antarctic 
marine living resources south of the Antarctic Convergence (Article I.1) (see 
CCAMLRMap insert, page 124). 
The CAMLR Convention defines the marine living resources it has authority over as 
populations of "fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living 
organisms, including birds, found south of the Antarctic Convergence" (Article I.2). 
This would technically include whales and seals under CCAMLR's jurisdiction. 
However, Article VI recognises the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals as having prior 
and continued authority over these species. 
CCAMLR's cooperative approach began with the Antarctic Treaty (Edwards and 
Heap 1981) and is entrenched in the Convention under Article VI and also Article 
XXIII. These Articles allow CCAMLR to cooperate with, and enter into, working 
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relationships with various inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations 
(see also Chapter 6). 
5.2.1 The CAMLR Convention is Unique 
5. 2.1.1 Ecosystem and Precautionary Approach 
The CCAMLR approach to resource management is considered unique for a variety 
of reasons. Firstly, its conservation principles apply an "ecosystem and 
precautionary" approach (Powell 1990, Constable et al 2000). 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the competing interests of conservationist and fishing 
nations needed to be resolved. By stating that the main objective of the Convention is 
"the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources" and qualifying that "the term 
'conservation' includes rational use", (Article II, Box 4), the Convention does just 
that. CCAMLR allows for the harvesting of resources in a way that will conserve 
stocks, as well as protect the species dependant upon those stocks. Article II.3.a-c 
goes on to state that any harvesting activities in the Convention Area must be 
undertaken in a precautionary manner so as to ensure: 
• The prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels 
below those which ensure its stable recruitment; 
• The maintenance of ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and 
related populations; 
• The restoration of depleted populations; and 
• The prevention of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially 
reversible over two or three decades. 
A definition of the term "rational use" was attempted for operational purposes by 
CCAMLR in 1989 by the Working Group on Development of Approaches to 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (WG-DAC) (CCAMLR 1989, 
Annex E, Appendix 1, paragraph 2). It was agreed that "rational use" included: 
1. The harvesting of resources is on a sustainable basis; 
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2. That harvesting on a sustainable basis means that harvesting activities are so 
conducted as to ensure that the potential for achieving the highest possible long-
term yield is preserved, subject to the principles of conservation (bullet points 
above); and 





2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'conse 
use. 
3. 
applies shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions o 
and with the following principles of conservation: 
a) prevention of decrease1 in the size of any harvested poP.Ulation .t 
below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this purpose its siz 
should not be allowed to fall below a level close to that which ensilres the!!W 
. ·" ·:yf 
greatest net annual increment; 
BJ. maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, . 
I . w 
• ~ !, 
dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources 
and"tfie restoration of depleted populations to the levekµefined in sub-
· '-· ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three 
· into acc.·· ount llie state of available knowledge of the 
~·· ~·- ; 
vironmental changes, with the aim of making 
~i:Villfop. of Antarctic marine living resources. 
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The definition was endorsed by CCAMLR (CCAMLR-VIII, paragraph 69) and so 
became binding, consistent with other such agreements, such as the definition and 
source of the best available science (further discussed in Section 5.3). 
It was thought that an operational definition of Article II, i.e. conservation and 
rational use, would provide criteria against which management performance 
procedures could be assessed (Miller, 1991). Conservation approaches in relation to 
the management of krill and finfish stocks were thus considered (SC-CAMLR 1990, 
paragraphs 8.1 - 8.16; SC-CAMLR 1991, paragraphs 9.1 - 9.9). From this work, the 
definitions of a new fishery were developed (SC-CAMLR 1991, paragraph 9.3). This 
point is further discussed in Section 7.4. 
5.2.1.2 The Convention Area and Jurisdiction 
The second and major point of uniqueness of the Convention is its area of application 
(see CCAMLR Map insert, page 124). The CAMLR Convention was the first 
international agreement to identify its area of application by reference to an 
ecosystem. The Convention applies to Antarctic marine living resources south of 60° 
South latitude, which is the same as the Antarctic Treaty area (Section 5.1.1). 
However, the CAMLR Convention goes further to include the area between that 
latitude and the Antarctic Convergence, which forms part of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem (Article I.1 ). The Antarctic Convergence, now termed the Polar Front, is 
where the colder waters of the Southern Ocean mix with and sink below warmer 
waters from the north (Laws 1985). This is an environmental barrier which many 
Antarctic species do not cross. It therefore effectively becomes the northern boundary 
of Antarctic marine populations covered by the CAMLR Convention. For the purpose 
of the Convention, the Antarctic Convergence/Polar Front has been defined by 
geographic coordinates (Article I.4). 
Jurisdiction has always been a highly contentious issue in the Antarctic, with disputed 
territories and recognition and non-recognition of sovereignty (Edwards and Heap 
1981; Triggs 1987; Watts 1992). The Antarctic Treaty deals with the issue of 
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claimants and non-claimants by effectively freezing current claims and not prejudging 
future claims. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty thus recognises that nothing in the 
Treaty can be used to recognise or dispute sovereignty on the Antarctic continent, nor 
can any activity undertaken support existing claims (see Box 5). This has been 
referred to as a "bifocal approach" to sovereignty and coastal State jurisdictional 
issues (Edwards and Heap 1981; Triggs 1987), in that States can interpret the Treaty 
to what best sui ts their own position. 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty .shall 
(a) · A renunciation by any Contracting Party of pre 
of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctic~ 
' *!~- )' . 
(b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Pa 
. . of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica whicb.'.'i~· 
whether as a result of its activities or those of its 
" ·· Antarctica; or otherwise; 
( e) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recc:gnition of any other State's right of claim or 
?; 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctic. 
o ,,acts" or activities taking place while the presl:'nt Treaty is in force 
' · _.: 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
w1• .. 
vereignty in Antarctic or create any rights of sovereignty in 
( . - ~ . ' 
Before negotiations began on the CAMLR Convention the associated jurisdiction 
issues were being contemplated. AT Recommendation IX-2 (1977), which called for 
a definitive regime for Antarctic marine living resources, also stated that "the 
provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty shall not be affected by the regime" 
and that "it should ensure that the principles embodied in Article IV are safeguarded 
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m application to the marme areas south of 60° South latitude" (ATCM 
Recommendation IX-2, Part III, paragraph 3(b)). This means that nothing in this 
regime would affect any claims, or non-claims, for sovereignty. 
The CAMLR Convention binds all Contracting Parties to AT Articles IV and VI in 
their relations with each other (Article IV.l). These AT Articles deal with 
sovereignty, area of jurisdiction and the high seas. The CAMLR Convention goes 
further to state that no act or activity will affect the current status of claimants and 
non-claimants. Like Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, Article IV of the CAMLR 
Convention is essentially a non-solution intended to side step any legal controversy 
(Beck 1986). It is once again a "bifocal approach" so that all States can interpret the 
Convention in a way that best suits their jurisdictional position. Other formal links 
between CCAMLR and the AT are discussed in Section 6.1. 
The Convention Area includes both high seas areas and coastal areas under national 
jurisdiction, disputed and recognised. In addition to the intentional ambiguity (bifocal 
approach) of the Convention (as per Articles III to V), a statement by the Chairman of 
the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was 
attached to the Convention and was also included as part of the Final Act of the 
Conference text (attached here as Appendix 6). 
The statement, commonly referred to as the Chairman's Statement, addresses the 
application of the Convention to waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
which fall under French jurisdiction (Appendix 6, paragraphs 1 to 4). By implication, 
the provisions are also extended to waters adjacent to other islands within the area to 
which the Convention applies, and over which the existence of State sovereignty is 
recognised by all Contracting Parties (Appendix 6, paragraph 5). 
The Chairman's Statement can be considered an ingenious piece of diplomacy to 
establish agreement from countries that did not wish to hand over authority to 
CCAMLR for what are considered "their" own resources. CCAMLR Members 
effectively have the opportunity to side-step implementation of CMs as the 
Chairman's Statement gives applicable States the freedom to choose whether they 
agree that their coastal waters are to be included in any CM (Appendix 6, paragraphs 
I~ 45 
2 and 5), leaving Members able to adopt any national measures as it deems 
appropriate. 
At present only South Africa has joined France in overtly invoking the Chairman's 
Statement for waters adjacent to Prince Edward Island. Through the years they have 
made reservations to CMs likely to impact on their jurisdiction in the form of 
footnotes to the CMs. 13 It should be noted that even though South Africa puts forward 
these reservations, it does apply CCAMLR measures. 
In these terms the Chairman's Statement could also be considered a way for Members 
to avoid their obligations, as once invoking the Chairman's Statement, they have the 
legitimate right not to implement any CMs. This will be discussed further under the 
case studies, specifically with regard to France and the issue of incidental by-catch of 
seabirds in their fishery (Section 7.3). 
Australia has, to date, never officially invoked the Chairman's Statement, but every 
year at the CCAMLR meetings it issues a statement advising CCAMLR that any 
fishing or fisheries research activities in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) around the Australian Territory of Heard Island and the McDonald Islands 
must have prior approval by the Australian authorities (CCAMLR 2007a, paragraph 
13.84). Consequently all fishing concessions are fully subscribed, seemingly by 
Australian vessels, thus closing the fishery to other Members without having to 
invoke the Chairman's Statement overtly. ~ustralia implements all applicable 
CCAMLR CMs in its waters, including a CCAMLR-derived Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC). 
Norway also has undisputed coastal waters surrounding Bouvet Island in the 
Convention Area. However, it has not made any statement regarding jurisdiction over 
these waters. This could be because there is no fishery in that area at present and so 
there is no need to protect Norwegian jurisdiction, interests and sovereignty. Norway 
13 For example: "Except for water adjacent to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands" and "Except for 
waters adjacent to the Prince Edward Islands". 
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has, however, declared a territorial sea adjacent to the islands and a special nature 
reserve. 14 
The United Kingdom's possession of, and therefore jurisdiction over, South Georgia 
Island and the South Sandwich Islands is disputed by Argentina, and therefore 
provisions of the Chairman's Statement theoretically cannot be applied. This ongoing 
dispute could potentially affect the formulation of resource management measures. 
In practice, however, it does not. The UK government has claimed a maritime zone 
(EEZ) for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (South Georgia 
Proclamation15). This proclamation states that the UK has jurisdiction over the 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources in 
this zone (paragraph 3). The UK has a fishing authority in place and issue licences to 
fish in its coastal waters. The reason behind this authority is to implement all 
applicable CCAMLR CMs, as well as some of its own measures. It does, however, 
also give the UK a physical authority over resources the proclamation covers. 
Although Argentina contests UK sovereignty, it does not block any decisions in 
CCAMLR on management measures for the disputed area. 
5. 2.1. 3 CCAMLR Membership 
The CAMLR Convention differs from other international fisheries conventions in 
terms of its membership (Kaye 2001). 
Article XXIX opens the Convention for accession "by any State interested in research 
or harvesting activities" in relation to Antarctic marine living resources to which the 
Convention applies. A State which has acceded to the CAMLR Convention is entitled 
to be a Member of the Commission "during such time as that acceding Party is 
14 More information available online at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn s/mzn53.pdf 
15 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/Proclamation (Maritime Zone) No. 1 of 1993 
taken from website: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREA TIES/PDFFILES/GBR 1993 Proclamation 1. 
llili 
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engaged in research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine living resources" 
to which the CAMLR Convention applies (Article VII.2(b)). 
It can thus be inferred that in order to become a CCAMLR Member, Acceding States 
should demonstrate a "real interest", 16 either scientific or fishery related, in the 
resources covered by CCAMLR (Molenaar, 2000). 
Members of CCAMLR are thus able to fully participate in the organisation's meetings 
and decision-making (Article VII). Contracting Parties are not able to participate in 
any CCAMLR decision-making with their participation being subject to conditions 
outlined in Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 30(b). 
Some flexibility has been extended in respect of the definition of "real interest" in the 
past. For example, Namibia became a Member of CCAMLR in 2001 (CCAMLR 
2001b, paragraph 2.3) despite not being actively engaged in scientific research or 
resource harvesting in the Convention Area. It was, however, a Port State used by 
vessels discharging toothfish and so it was beneficial for CCAMLR to have Namibia 
as a Member to implement all applicable port state CMs. 
The People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China) became a CCAMLR 
Member in 2007 (CCAMLR 2007a, paragraph 2.3). China, as a major consumer of 
toothfish, had already voluntarily implemented trade-related CMs for toothfish 
(CCAMLR 2006, paragraph 8.1). 
From this it could be inferred that a "real interest in harvesting" also includes Port 
States where fish or krill are landed. 
The Cook Islands acceded to the CAMLR Convention in 2005 with an interest in 
licensing vessels to fish in CCAMLR waters. However, the probability of full 
membership of the Commission under Article VII is unlikely due to the Cook Islands 
standing as a semi-autonomous State. 
16 The concept of "real interest" is a term used in Article 8(3) of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock 
Agreement as a condition that States must fulfil before they can participate in a Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation, meaning any State with a genuine interest in a fishery has the right to 
become aMember of the applicable RFMO. 
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In general, the makeup of a decision-making organisation's membership will always 
affect the quality of decisions. In CCAMLR it is the Members who decide the agenda 
of work (Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 17) and so they ultimately choose the 
direction that CCAMR takes. Perhaps one of the reasons that CCAMLR initiated a 
"real interest" prerequisite for Membership was so that those involved in the decision-
making were interested in obtaining the objectives in Article II. States that are not 
actively engaged in resource harvesting or scientific research may not fully 
understand or be committed to the management measures that are proposed. 
This was evidenced at CCAMLR-XXVII, when China reserved its position on the 
issue of the placement of international scientific observers on all krill vessels (further 
discussed in Section 7 .2.2) even though China does not currently participate in the 
krill fishery (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 11. 7). China's concerns were in relation to 
a proposal that new entrants to the krill fishery would require 100% coverage by 
international scientific observers for the first two years of operation, even if the rest of 
the fleet were at a scaled back percentage of coverage. From the published report, it 
could be construed that China did not fully understand the proposal and so, rather than 
be proactive on the important issue of scientific observers, it chose to be conservative. 
5 .3 Organisational structure of CCAMLR 
As stated earlier, to facilitate the objectives and principles set out in Article II of the 
CAMLR Convention the CPs established the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 
CCAMLR has various responsibilities, such as to facilitate research, compile data, 
and acquire catch and effort statistics on harvested populations. Furthermore, it is 
mandated to analyse, disseminate and publish this information (Article IX.1 ). 
CCAMLR was also instructed to implement a system of observation and inspection, 
as established in Article XXIV of the Convention (Article IX.l(g)). 
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One of the more important roles of CCAMLR is to identify conservation needs, 
formulate, adopt and revise CMs on the basis of the best scientific evidence available 
(Article IX. l (f)). These CMs are regulations on when, where and how the Members 
can participate in CCAMLR fisheries. Items such as precautionary catch limits, open 
and closed seasons, by-catch limits and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
requirements are openly discussed and decided upon in CCAMLR (for full text see 
Box 6). 
2. The Conservation Measures 
"<i •• 
following: 
(a) The designation of the quantity of any species which~ 
area to which the Convention applies; 
(b) The designation of regions aria sub-regions based 
' 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources; 
( c) The designation of the quantity which may be 
populations of regions and sub-regions; 
( d) The designation of protected species; 
may be harvested; 
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The CAMLR Convention established the headquarters of CCAMLR (Article XIII, 
paragraph 1) in Hobart, Australia, and assigned CCAMLR to appoint an Executive 
Secretary (Article :XVII.1 ). 
CCAMLR has established two standing committees in accordance with Article XIII.6 
(Figure 5). The Standing Committee on Administration and Finance (SCAF) deals 
with administrative and budgetary issues. The Standing Committee on Inspection and 
Compliance (SCIC) 17 deals with compliance issues, such as inspections, observers, 
the Catch Document Scheme (CDS), Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and Illegal, 
Umeported and Umegulated (IUU) fishing. Discussions from the standing 
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Figure 5: CCAMLR organogram illustrating connections between its Standing Committees and the 
Scientific Committee and its Working Groups. 
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To ensure CCAMLR bases its decisions on best scientific advice the Contracting 
Parties, under Article XIV, established the Scientific Committee, a consultative body 
to CCAMLR. The Scientific Committee provides a "forum for consultation and co-
operation concerning the collection, study and exchange of information" (Article 
XV. l). The designation of the Scientific Committee as the only source of the best 
17 This Standing Committee was previously titled the Standing Committee on Observation and 
Inspection (SCOI). For the discussions resulting in the change in name see CCAMLR 2002, 
paragraphs 5.15 and 5.16, and CCAMLR 2002, Annex 5, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4. 
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scientific evidence available for CCAMLR was formalised in 1990 (CCAMLR 1990, 
paragraph 7.6). This recognition took place five years before UNFSA. However, it 
does make CCAMLR consistent with UNFSA Article 6.3, in that it uses the best 
scientific knowledge to implement the precautionary approach. 
Under Article XVl.3, the Scientific Committee has set up a number of working groups 
(Figure 5). These are the Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and Management 
(WG-EMM), the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA), the Working 
Group on Incidental Mortality Associated with Fishing (WG-IMAF) and most 
recently the Working Group on Statistics, Assessment and Modelling (WG-SAM). 
The data used by these working groups are collected by Members fishing in the 
Convention Area, scientific observers, and scientific surveys (CCAMLR 200la). The 
working groups present their discussions and analyses to the Scientific Committee and 
all recommendations and advice for CCAMLR are determined by consensus.
18 
Where consensus cannot be achieved the Scientific Committee sets out all views 
advanced on the matter under consideration in its report to CCAMLR. 
Although there is no strict procedure on how to proceed when the science is either 
absent or ambiguous, generally when there is no science to allocate a catch limit then 
a precautionary approach is taken. If the Scientific Committee cannot agree on a 
catch limit then the general rule of CCAMLR seems to be to maintain the status quo 
and keep existing catch limits from the previous year. For example, at the twenty-
fourth Commission meeting in 2005 the Scientific Committee could not provide new 
advice on by-catch catch limits (SC-CAMLR 2005, paragraphs 4.179, 4.186 and 
4.187), so CCAMLR maintained the catch limits for by-catch from the previous 
season (CCAMLR 2005a, paragraph 4.49). 
At the same meeting some Members proposed an increase in the precautionary catch 
limit for Dissostichus spp. in Division 58.4.3b to allow increased fishery-based 
research, such as tagging, and to allow a greater surveillance presence. CCAMLR 
decided that it did not have enough time to consider this proposal and so deferred to 




the previous advice from the Scientific Committee and retained the existing 
precautionary catch limit (CCAMLR 2005a, paragraph 11.54). 
Examples like these are plentiful in the last twenty-seven years of CCAMLR and so it 
can be observed that the precautionary approach to resource harvesting is practised as 
a high priority. 
5 .4 Consensus in CCAMLR 
The origin of CCAMLR' s decision-making process has already beerr discussed in Section 
2.3 and from the questionnaires and interviews it can be assumed that consensus, as it is 
used in CCAMLR, does not necessarily mean that everybody agrees with the decision, 
rather that they are happy enough not to disagree, i.e. there is a lack of formal objection 
(Sections 4.1.1and4.2.1). 
5 .4 .1 Consensus at work 
CCAMLR has a vast suite of CMs in force ranging from environmental protection to 
catch limits to trade related measures. 19 At each meeting the measures are negotiated 
until everybody is satisfied with the outcome. If an agreement cannot be reached then 
the measure is deferred until the next meeting where parties can discuss 
intersessionally their issues and come back with a more readily acceptable suggestion 
(see Section 7.1 ).20 
Where there is a lack of agreement in CCAMLR the full debate is included in the 
report to ensure transparency. For example at CCAMLR-XVIII the European 
Community (EC) submitted a notification on behalf of Portugal to enter New and 
Exploratory Fisheries (CCAMLR 1999, paragraph 7.5) (Section 7.4). It was argued 
that as a CP to CCAMLR, the European Community and all its Member States were 
19 See various CMs in CCAMLR, Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 2008109 (CCAMLR, 
Hobart, Australia, 2009). Available from website: bttp://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e pubs/cm/drt.btm 
2° For a more in depth discussion on CCAMLR Conservation Measures, their development and 
efficacy, see Miller et al 2004. 
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bound by CCAMLR's CMs (CCAMLR 1999, paragraph 9.43). However, the 
majority of Members believed it would contravene the Convention if a Portuguese-
flagged vessel fished without Portugal having first acceded to the Convention 
(CCAMLR 1999, paragraph 9.44). The EC reserved its right under the CAMLR 
Convention in relation to EC vessels (CCAMLR 1999, paragraph 9.45), but Portugal 
did not fish that season, and has not fished in the Convention Area is subsequent years 
to date. 
Due to the lack of agreement on this issue CCAMLR's debate was presented in its 
entirety in the report (CCAMLR 1999, paragraphs 9.47 to 9.52). This ensures 
transparency of the decision-making process, but also allows all views to be recorded. 
5.4.2 Objection Procedures 
The objection procedure of the CAMLR Convention is outlined in Section 2.3.1. 
Popular opinion is that once an objection procedure has been used in a convention it 
becomes easier to use it again (Edwards and Heap 1981). However, from the data 
collected in this study the "opt out" procedure was seen as necessary for reasons 
relating to domestic legislation (Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4). This is evident in the first 
of only two examples in CCAMLR history of the "opt out" procedure being used. 
At CCAMLR-X in 1991 the submission of haul-by-haul data from the commercial 
fishery in five-day periods was endorsed (CCAMLR 1991, paragraph 10.8 and 10.9), 
even though some Members expressed the view that they had legal and technical 
difficulties in submitting this data (CCAMLR1991, paragraphs 4.10 and 4.11). It was 
understood that Chile notified CCAMLR, in accordance with Article IX.6(c), that it 
was unable to implement CM 37!X21 due to infrastructure reasons. This meant that 
the CM did not apply to them for the 1991/92 fishing season for Dissostichus 
eleginoides in Subarea 48.3. 
21 CM 37/X - Effort and Biological Data Reporting System for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical 
Subarea 48.3 for the 1991/92 Season. 
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It should be noted that Chile complied with all data reporting requirements, just not in 
the five-day time period that the CM required (CCAMLR 1992, paragraphs 4.3 and 
9.28). CM 37/X evolved into CM 56/XI22; the only change was that Members were 
required to submit data at the end of each month rather than at the end of each (five-
day) reporting period. Chile was able to comply with this measure. 
This measure has evolved to CM 23-0523 that requires fine-scale biological data to be 
submitted monthly. Chile has complied fully with this measure. 
The second use of the objection procedure was by Russia in 2006 when it indicated 
that it might "opt out" of CM 10-08,24 using the procedures in Article IX.6 
(CCAMLR 2006, paragraph 12.22; see also Section 7.5.1). However, as there has 
been no mention of this issue in the next two meeting reports, it can be assumed that 
Russia did not lodge an official objection. 
While objection procedures are usually condemned as weakening or delaying 
implementation of the measures (Swan 2004; McDorman 2005), they do protect a 
State from being bound by a decision that it cannot implement within national 
legislation. Therefore, instead of failing to comply with the CM the State will choose 
not to implement it in strict accordance with the CM, for example Chile in 1991. This 
is a subtle, but important difference. 
McDorman (2005) notes that while objection procedures can provide some relief from 
consensus paralysis it would not be wise to apply them in respect of catch allocation 
decisions as this would effectively allow the objecting State to set their own quota. 
For example, ICCAT allocates quota to individual Members and there have been 
instances of Members formally objecting (ICCAT 2009), thus making the agreed 
recommendation (catch allocation) non-binding to the objecting party (ICCAT Article 
VIII.3). 
22 CM 56/XI - Effort and Biological Data Reporting System for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical 
Subarea 48.3 for the 1992/93 Season. 
23 CM 23-05 - Monthly Fine-Scale Biological Data Reporting System for Trawl, Longline and Pot 
Fisheries 
24 CMl0-08 - Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party nationals with CCAMLR CMs. 
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This has not happened in CCAMLR thus far and as catches are not allocated to States, 
but as a catch limit for the entire CCAMLR fleet, it does not appear a likely event. 
However, if catch allocation to States does occur in the future then the objection 
procedure may be used regularly. 
5.4.3 Dispute Resolution 
The CCAMLR Convention dispute resolution procedure is outlined in Section 2.3.2. 
There has been no dispute requiring the implementation of this procedure in 
CCAMLR's 27-year history. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
As noted earlier, CCAMLR is sometimes considered more than an RFMO. It was the 
first international effort to apply an ecosystem approach to marine resource 
conservation (Amaudo, 2005), and has its roots in the cooperative environment of the 
ATS. 
Multispecies management is difficult to apply in practice (Molenaar, 2001 ), especially 
in an area as remote as Antarctica. Although CCAMLR does not implement such 
multispecies management implicitly, it does take into account non-harvested species 
in its management, thus applying an ecosystem approach. 
In order to achieve CCAMLR's conservation objectives it must have Member States 
that are committed, and so have a real interest. The flexibility of this real interest to 
include Port States when the need arose (Section 5.2.1.3) is an important step. 
The organisational structure, or operating system, of CCAMLR provides for an 
opportunity for cooperation and knowledge sharing between Members in order for 
appropriate CMs to be formulated and then implemented by CCAMLR Members 
(Section 5.3). 
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The objection procedure has only been used once in CCAMLR's history and from the 
lack of use of the dispute resolution procedure it can be assumed that the CCAMLR 
meetings provide an arena for sufficient debate enabling any disagreements to be 
discussed and appropriate compromises to be made (Section 5.4). 
The remoteness of Antarctica does not mean that CCAMLR is isolated from other 
international organisations. As previously discussed, CCAMLR has links with other 
elements of the ATS. CCAMLR also shares jurisdictions and boundaries with other 
RFMOs. Cooperation with these organisations is vitally important for CCAMLR to 
ensure its management measures are upheld by those with other interests in the 
Convention Area. This is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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6. CCAMLR's Cooperation with Other International 
Organisations 
CCAMLR does not operate in a vacuum and is actively involved with other 
international organisations on matters of mutual interest. The following illustrates 
CCAMLR's cooperation with the ATS (Section 6.1) and other RFMOs (Section 6.2). 
6.1 CCAMLR and the Antarctic Treaty System 
As noted earlier (see Section 5.1), cooperation is an important element of CCAMLR 
and began with the Antarctic Treaty. Thus formal links between CCAMLR and the 
Antarctic Treaty are present in both organisations. Article III of the CAMLR 
Convention binds Contracting Parties, regardless of whether they are Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty, in agreement that they "will not engage in any activities in the 
Antarctic Treaty area contrary to the principles and purposes of that Treaty" and they 
are bound by the obligations contained in Articles I and V of the Antarctic Treaty. 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1.2 the issue of areas subject to national jurisdiction, both 
disputed and recognised, and high seas areas are dealt with in the CAMLR 
Convention (Article IV and the Chairman's Statement) and AT Articles IV and VI. 
Article V of the CAMLR Convention binds Contracting Parties which are not Parties 
to the Antarctic Treaty to observe the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora and "other measures as have been recommended by the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties". 
The Antarctic Treaty has various resolutions regarding the negotiation and entry into 
force of the CAMLR Convention25, the support of CCAMLR measures26 and general 
25 Recommendation X-2 (Washington, 1979); Recommendation XI-2 (Buenos Aires, 1981). 
26 Resolution 3 (1999) - ATCM XXIII, Lima; Resolution 2 (2000) - ATCM SXII, The Hague; 
Resolution 2 (2001)-ATCM XXIV, St. Petersburg; Resolution 3 (2002) -ATCM XXV, Warsaw; and 
Resolution 1 (2004) -ATCM XXVII, Cape Town. 
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support for work of CCAMLR. 27 This means that decisions reached by CCAMLR are 
recognised by A TCPs. 
CCAMLR also has formal links with other ATS instruments, such as the Madrid 
Protocol. The Madrid Protocol established a Committee for Environmental Protection 
(CEP) (Article 11), whose functions are to provide advice and formulate 
recommendations to A TCPs with regards to the protection of the Antarctic 
environment.28 The CEP issues a standing invitation to the Scientific Committee 
Chairperson to participate as an observer, and in turn attends the annual CCAMLR 
meetings as an observer. 
CCAMLR and the CEP have worked together on the issue of Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs) (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 7.2). They have also held a joint workshop in 
April 2009 to discuss matters of mutual interest, such as MP As and 
bioregionalisation. 
The CEP Chairman was also a member of the CCAMLR Performance Review Panel 
in 2008. From this, we can see that cooperation between CCAMLR and the CEP is 
substantial. 
6.2 CCAMLR and other RFMOs 
CCAMLR interests overlap, to varying extents, with a number of other international 
bodies, including the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(F AO), the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), the Scientific 
Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR), CCSBT, IOTC, SEAFO, WCPFC (see 
Section 2.4), the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), 
the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the 
Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP). 
27 Resolution l (2006) - ATCM XXIX, Edinburgh 
28 For more information see CEP page on ATS website· http://www.ats.aq/e/cep.htm 
CCAMLR Resolution 22/XXV also lists the abovementioned RFMOs, and others,29 
with which CCAMLR seeks cooperation with the implementation of seabird by-catch 
mitigation measures (Section 7.3). 
As mentioned earlier CCAMLR concedes authority to CCAS and the ICR W for the 
conservation and harvesting of seals and whales, respectively (Section 5 .2). The Polar 
Front, which creates the boundary for the Convention Area, does not constitute a 
boundary between species within the competence of CCAMLR and other RFMOs 
(Molenaar 2001). Therefore, CCAMLR also works cooperatively with applicable 
RFMOs on matters of mutual interest and invites them to participate in the annual 
CCAMLR meetings as observers (as per Article XXIII). CCAMLR has an item on its 
agenda dedicated to "cooperation with other international organisations". 
Cooperation between these organisations suggests informed decision-making on both 
sides. 
The responsibilities of CCAMLR and CCSBT overlap as the CAMLR Convention 
applies to all marine living resources within the Convention Area while the CCSBT 
applies to Southern Bluefin Tuna throughout its range (CCAMLR 2005a, paragraph 
15.21). 
Unlike the CCSBT the CAMLR Convention is not species specific and the provisions 
of Article II include the conservation of seabirds, such as albatrosses, that breed in 
CCAMLR waters. CCAMLR has CMs in place to minimise incidental mortality of 
seabirds during longline fishing operations (CMs 24-02 and 25-0230). But these birds 
have a wide range and unknown numbers are killed in fisheries outside the 
Convention Area (SC-CAMLR 2008, paragraphs 5.14-5.17). 
29 The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the 1952 Agreement on the Organization 
of the Permanent Commission on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the 
South Pacific (CPPS), the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC), the Western 
Indian Ocean Tuna Organization Convention (WIOTO), and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Agreement (SIOFA). 
3° CM 24-02 - Longline weighting for seabird conservation; CM 25-02 - Minimisation of the 
incidental mortality of seabirds in the course of longline fishing or longline fishing research in the 
Convention Area 
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Overlap with the tuna fisheries can have an adverse effect on CCAMLR's 
management if birds that breed in the Convention Area are being killed. Therefore 
CCAMLR's cooperation with the applicable RFMOs is critical. 
CCAMLR initiated discussions with CCSBT in 2005 with the aim of establishing an 
agreement in relation to fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Convention Area, to 
try to ensure that all necessary CMs are adhered to (CCAMLR 20p5a, paragraph 
15.22). Although it seemed that the two RFMOs were exploring ways to formalise 
cooperation (Hemmings 2006), to date, there has been no response from the CCSBT 
to any communication from CCAMLR (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 16.25). 
CCAMLR adopted a Memorandum of Understanding between CCAMLR and the 
WCPFC in 2008 which facilitates cooperation between the two RFMOs, enhancing 
the conservation and rational use of stocks and species which are within the 
competence of both organisations (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 16.28 and Annex 6). 
This document provides a :framework that could be used in CCAMLR-CCSBT 
relations. 
It should be noted that CCSBT has put in place a resolution on using Vessel 
Monitoring Systems (VMS), consistent with the CCAMLR CM 10-04, when fishing 
for Bluefin Tuna in the Convention Area (CCSBT 2008, Attachment 8, paragraph 
l(c)). CCSBT also agreed on a recommendation to mitigate the impact on 
ecologically related species of fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna, which recommends 
members implement the International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catches 
of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries (IPOA-seabirds) and to comply with all binding 
CMs when fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) (CCSBT 2008, Attachment 16). Regrettably, though, CCSBT Members 
are currently under no obligation to implement the IPOA-Seabirds in the Convention 
Area. 
This is a clear example of CCAMLR' s intent to cooperate as part of its working 
paradigm, being thwarted by lack of reciprocity. CCAMLR can make the strongest 
measures to ensure the conservation of seabirds during fishing operations. However, 
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if these birds are being killed outside CCAMLR jurisdiction then the decisions and 
objectives of CCAMLR are undermined. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
CCAMLR needs the cooperation of other international organisations to ensure that its 
"best practice" management measures are being applied in the Convention Area, 
whether participating in a CCAMLR fishery or not. 
Article X of the CAMLR Convention allows CCAMLR to draw to the attention of a 
CP any activity undertaken, whether by its nationals or flagged vessels, that affect the 
implementation of the objectives of the Convention. Therefore any CP, whether or 
not it is fishing for CCAMLR managed species, should theoretically be bound by its 
obligations under the CAMLR Convention and ensure it operates in a manner which 
does not undermine the Convention. 
CCAMLR also cooperates with CPs that have jurisdiction in marine areas adjacent to 
the Convention Area, attempting to harmonise CMs in respect of CCAMLR managed 
stocks that also occur in the CP managed waters (Article XI). 
Cooperation is a key element of CCAMLR, both with other international bodies and 
within the organisation. However, as expressed by the very first Executive Secretary 
of CCAMLR, it is only realistic to expect that there will be differing positions on 
various issues among Members (Powell, 1983). Chapter 7 presents some examples of 
cooperation and compromise, and also some examples where consensus was 
ultimately unable to be obtained. 
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7. Case Studies - How CCAMLR uses consensus 
With any decision-making within an organisation there are successes and failures. In 
the 27-year history of CCAMLR there are, of course, instances of both. The 
following case studies demonstrate both successful resolution of issues facing 
CCAMLR and some issues that have not been resolved. 
7 .1 IUD Fishing in the Convention Area 
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing occurs in virtually all fisheries and 
poses a great threat to managing fish stocks (F AO 2002). The CCAMLR managed 
toothfish (Dissostichus spp.) are particularly vulnerable to over-fishing due to slow 
growth rates and limited information on the reproductive cycle of the species 
concerned (Everson and Murray 1999, Agnew 2000, Candy and Constable 2008). 
Aside from the obvious problem of resource removal, CCAMLR also has to consider 
the other effects of ruu fishing on the ecosystem. Legal fishers in the Convention 
Area must abide by strict CMs with regards to seabird by-catch mitigation and marine 
debris, whereas IUU operators do not. Thus unknown numbers of seabirds are killed 
by IUU fishing operations every year (SC-CAMLR 2008, paragraph 5.18). Although 
the Scientific Committee does try to quantify the extent of seabird mortality due to 
IUU fishing (SC-CAMLR 2007, Annex 6, Part II, Table 18), estimates are considered 
to be inaccurate, a "best guess". 
Furthermore, the fishing techniques used by IUU operators have changed from 
predominately longline to the reported use of gillnets in 2008 (SC-CAMLR 2008, 
paragraph 7.2). Little is known about this new technique and information from which 
to estimate seabirds killed by ruu is not available. Therefore no new estimates of 
mortality level due to gillnets have been possible (SC-CAMLR 2008, paragraph 5 .18). 
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Members with experience in gillnet fisheries were invited to provide information to 
WG-IMAF so that extrapolation of estimates of seabird mortalities in this fisheries 
can be calculated (SC-CAMLR 2008, paragraph 5.21). 
Reducing the extent of IUU fishing in the Convention Area has been a priority item 
on CCAMLR's agenda since 1996 (Sabourenkov and Miller 2004). No single 
measure is likely to immediately eliminate all IUU fishing in the Convention Area 
(Kirkwood and Agnew 2004), consequently a suite of CMs and resolutions have been 
adopted by CCAMLR to combat the problems associated with IUU fishing (Table 2). 
CCAMLR also has a Policy to Enhance Co-operation between CCAMLR and Non-
Contracting Parties (CCAMLR 2006, Annex 8). It should be noted that unlike CMs, 
Resolutions are not legally binding (see Table 2). 
The most important and effective of the listed CMs are the Vessel Monitoring 
Systems (VMS) (Section 7.1.1) and the Dissostichus spp. Catch Documentation 
Scheme (CDS) (Section 7.1.2). Also cooperation amongst Members has played a 
vital role in reducing IUU activity (Section 7 .1.3). 
7 .1.1 Vessel Monitoring System 
As a first step to eliminate IUU activities in the Convention Area, CCAMLR initially 
adopted Resolution 12/XVI in 1997, which urged Members to establish an Automated 
Vessel Monitoring System to monitor their flag vessels targeting finfish only. 
Consensus has not yet been reached to require vessels harvesting krill to implement 
VMS (further detailed in Section 7.2.3). 
At CCAMLR-XVII in 1998, CCAMLR adopted CM 148/XVII which required 
Members to establish an automated VMS to monitor the position of its finfish fishing 
vessels (CCAMLR 1998, paragraph 5.37). 
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Table 2: CCAMLR CMs and Resolutions aimed at eliminating IUU activities in the Convention Area. 
(Source: CCAMLR 2009a.) 
CM Title 

















Licensing and inspection obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to 
their flag vessels operating in the Convention Area 
Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish 
Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) 
Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. 
Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party vessels with 
CCAMLRCMs 
Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with 
CCAMLR conservation areas 
Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party nationals with 
CCAMLRCMs 
Notification system for transhipments within the Convention Area 
Title 
Catch Documentation Scheme: implementation by Acceding States and 
Non-Contracting Parties 
Use of ports not implementing the Catch Document Scheme for 
Dissostichus spp. 
Application of VMS in the Catch Documentation Scheme 
Use of VMS and other measures for the verification of CDS catch data for 
areas outside the Convention Area, in particular, in F AO Statistical Area 
51 
Flags of non-compliance 
Electronic Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. 
Combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Convention 
Area by the flag vessels on Non-Contracting Parties 
By 2002 it had become apparent to some Members that the automated VMS was not 
working as well as had been hoped and that some Members' vessel monitoring 
systems were not in compliance with the CM (CCAMLR 2002, Annex 5, paragraph 
5.12). A Member had sighted vessels off the Antarctic coast when the Flag State 
VMS showed them to be located over 1,000 kilometres to the north (CCAMLR 2002, 
Annex 5, paragraph 5.12). 
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As a solution Australia put forward a proposal for a centralized vessel monitoring 
system (C-VMS) at CCAMLR-XXI which would require vessels fishing for toothfish 
to transmit identification and position information directly to the CCAMLR 
Secretariat as well as to Flag States (CCAMLR 2002, paragraph 8.55). It was 
believed that the dual reporting system would ensure that all VMS units were 
compliant and therefore VMS positioning would be accurate. Although the proposal 
was discussed by CCAMLR, consensus was not reached and no decision was made. 
At CCAMLR-XXII in 2003 some Members put forward a revised proposal for a C-
VMS (CCAMLR 2003, Annex 5, paragraphs 3.27-3.54). Although most Members 
supported the rationale behind the proposal there were concerns over security and the 
financial costs of such a system, as well as the possibility of having to change national 
legislation. CCAMLR was again unable to adopt the proposal due to lack of 
consensus. As an alternative, a trial C-VMS was established and all Members were 
urged to voluntarily participate (CCAMLR 2003, paragraph 10.12). The trial was 
successful and lead to the full implementation of the C-VMS being agreed upon at 
CCAMLR-XXIII in 2004 (CCAMLR 2004a, paragraph 10.8). 
C-VMS provides Flag States and the CCAMLR Secretariat with real-time vessel 
positions, giving them the ability to verify whether a vessel has complied with 
applicable CMs. 
CM 10-04 also allows for VMS reports to be, provided by the Secretariat to Members 
undertaking, or intending to ·undertake, surveillance and/or inspections in the 
Convention Area (CMl0-04, paragraphs 20 and 21). Permission of the vessel/s Flag 
State/s is not required during active surveillance and/or inspections. This is an 
important piece of cooperation allowing sensitive information to be shared between 
Members. 
Port inspection of vessels carrying toothfish requires vessels to provide a written 
declaration that they have not engaged in or supported IUU fishing in the Convention 
Area (CM 10-03, paragraph 2). In accordance with CM 10-04, Members are able to 
request VMS reports from the Secretariat to verify such declarations. 
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Although VMS is good at ensuring Contracting Party vessels are fishing in a manner 
consistent with CMs, it has little effect on Non-Contracting Party vessels. But that is 
another discussion. What should be noted here is that CCAMLR implemented 
automated VMS after a one-year voluntary trial period, which may have been to allow 
Members to prepare for full implementation. And when CCAMLR realised that 
automated VMS was not the solution to combat IUU it fully implemented the C-VMS 
two years after it was first proposed. 
7 .1.2 The Dissostichus spp. Catch Documentation Scheme 
Toothfish stocks occur both inside and outside the Convention Area, making it 
difficult to trace fish taken during IUU operations in the Convention Area on the 
international market (Sabourenkov and Miller, 2004). A catch certification scheme 
for tracking the landings and trade flows of Dissostichus spp. from the Convention 
Area was first discussed in CCAMLR at CCAMLR-XVII (CCAMLR 1998, 
paragraphs 5.16 to 5.25). The proposal had two objectives (Sabourenkov and Miller, 
2004): 
1. to track landings of, and the world trade in, toothfish caught inside and outside 
the Convention Area; and 
2. to restrict access to international markets of toothfish caught by IUU 
operators. 
Although a proposal was put forward, not all Members were satisfied (CCAMLR 
1998, paragraph 5.24) so the Dissostichus spp. Catch Documentation Scheme was 
further developed during the intersessional period. 
At CCAMLR-XVIII in 1999, CCAMLR adopted CM 170/XVIII 'Catch 
Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.' (now CM 10-05) requiring all landings, 
transhipments and importations of toothfish into the territories of the Contracting 
Parties be accompanied by a completed Dissostichus Catch Document (DCD). This 
document specifies a range of information relating to the volume and location of 
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catch, and the name and Flag State of the vessel (CCAMLR 1999, Annex 7). This 
CM became binding on all Members on ih May 2000.31 
Although not all Contracting Parties were able to implement the CDS by the required 
date (CCAMLR 2000a, Annex 5, paragraph 2.24), by 2001 the remaining Members 
were able to fully implement the scheme (CCAMLR 200lb, Annex 5, paragraph 
2.68). 
At CCAMLR-XX in 2001, it was noted by SCIC that the issuing and copying of paper 
catch documents allows opportunity for fraudulent practices (CCAMLR 2001b, 
Annex 5, paragraph 2.95), and suggested the development of an electronic paperless 
web-based system. At CCAMLR-XXI in 2002 a pilot project of the Electronic CDS 
(E-CDS) to run alongside the paper-based scheme (CCAMLR 2002, paragraph 7.16) 
was approved. The electronic system (E-CDS) allows CDS Parties to issue and 
process catch documents online in a secure environment (Miller et al 2005). 
Although the E-CDS trial was generally considered successful, some Members have 
voiced doubts as to whether full implementation of the electronic scheme could ever 
be achieved (CCAMLR 2004a, Annex 5, paragraph 4.16). Thus at CCAMLR-:XXIII 
CCAMLR adopted Resolution 21/XXIII urging Contracting Parties and Non-
Contracting Parties to cooperate in the CDS and to adopt the E-CDS as a matter of 
priority (CCAMLR 2004b). Significantly, at CCAMLR-XXIV the US, the largest 
importer of toothfish (CCAMLR 2009b, Table 16), stated that any toothfish imports 
into the US would now have to be accompanied by electronically issued 
documentation (CCAMLR 2005a, paragraph 7.5). 
The E-CDS is no longer referred to as a trial in CCAMLR meeting reports, but as 'E-
CDS format', which is voluntary. Although Members are required to use CDS under 
CM 10-05, it is their choice if they use E-CDS or the paper based version. Since 
January 2008, all CCAMLR Members have used the E-CDS format (CCAMLR 
2008a, paragraph 2.8). 
31 See CCAMLR website www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/cds/intro.htm 
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One important provision of the CDS is that it can be implemented by Non-Contracting 
Parties (NCPs) with regards to toothfish landed, imported or exported in their 
countries. Resolution 14/XIX urges all Acceding States, Members of CCAMLR and 
NCPs which fish for, or trade in, toothfish to implement the scheme (CCAMLR 
2007b). Since 2000 many NCPs32 have voluntarily implemented the CDS. China, as 
a major importer and exporter of toothfish (CCAMLR 2008b, Section D, Tables 16 
and 17), acceded to the CAMLR Convention in 2006 (CCAMLR 2006, paragraph 2.3) 
and became a Member of CCAMLR in 2007 (CCAMLR 2007, paragraph 2.3). 
IUU operators were known to land toothfish in Port Louis, Mauritius (CCAMLR 
2000a, paragraph 5.2). With the assistance of Australia, Mauritius implemented some 
elements of the CDS in 2001 (CCAMLR 200lb, paragraph 5.37), with full 
implementation in 2004 (CCAMLR 2004a, paragraph 2.12). Mauritius also became a 
Contracting Party in 2004 ( CCAMLR 2004a, paragraph 1. 7). 
The CDS is generally considered a success, with the trade of toothfish caught both 
inside and outside the Convention Area able to be better estimated and tracked. It has 
helped CCAMLR to identify Port States such as Namibia, Mauritius and China, where 
toothfish is landed (Sabourenkov and Miller, 2004) and thus make it possible for 
CCAMLR to invite them to implement the scheme (see also Section 5.2.1.3). 
Hong Kong, as a Special Administrative Region of China, is not a CP or Member of 
CCAMLR, despite China's status (CCAMLR 2007, paragraph 4.5). Hong Kong is 
involved in the trade of toothfish (CCAMLR 2008a, Annex 5, paragraph 4.6), without 
implementing the CDS (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 9.3). Although China has 
advised CCAMLR of its willingness to consult with the Hong Kong SAR to 
voluntarily implement the CDS (CCAMLR 2008a, Annex 5, paragraph 4.6), as yet 
full implementation of the CDS has not occurred. 
Alone the VMS and CDS are vulnerable to sidestepping via loopholes, but together 
they limit the entry of illegal toothfish into the trade, ensuring operators harvest 
32 At CCAMLR-XXVII in 2008 the CDS was reported to be voluntarily implemented by Seychelles 
and partially by Singapore (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 9.1). 
toothfish in open management areas and that the fish are caught in accordance with 
CCAMLRCMs. 
There is also a noted price difference between documented toothfish catches, at US$7-
15/kg, compared to undocumented toothfish, at US$3-9/kg.33 The quoted prices 
depend upon the quality of the cut. 
These are clear examples of consensus working as a decision-making mechanism. 
When CCAMLR needed urgent action to address a matter of major concern they were 
able to use consensus and agree on these significant CMs which were implemented 
quickly. And because all Members agreed, all Members are bound by the decisions. 
CCAMLR has gone from placing the issue of IUU on its agenda in 1996 to a decade 
later virtually eliminating IUU fishing in the Convention Area (CCAMLR 2008a, 
paragraph 10.1) by blocking off trade access, requiring strict VMS use, and by the 
other CMs and Resolutions as shown in Table 2. 
7 .1.3 Member Cooperation and Compliance 
Another positive element of the CCAMLR fight against IUU operators is the resulting 
cooperation between Members with regard to compliance with CMs. This study does 
not go into detail but notes instances of positive cooperation between CCAMLR 
Members in matters of compliance. 
There have been several instances of Member cooperation. For example, South 
Africa and the US worked tog~ther convict a South African fishing company, Hout 
Bay Fishing Industries, found to be smuggling toothfish into the US in 2001.34 
Again cooperation between the US, Australia and others enabled court action against 
Antonio Vidal Pego, a Spanish national, and Faidulur S.A, a Uruguayan company, 
which were convicted of illegally importing toothfish into the US in 2004.35 
33 Natasha Slicer, CCAMLR Compliance Officer, personal communication (2009). 
34 See the statement issued by the South African Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism: 
http://www.environment.gov.za/N ewsMedia/MedStat/2002april30/Scom 30042002.htm 
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There has also been the high profile hot pursuit of the Viarsa I, a Uruguayan flagged 
vessel, found illegally fishing in Australian Antarctic waters. 36 South Africa, the UK 
and Australia all worked together to arrest the vessel on the high seas. This was an 
extraordinary case of three CCAMLR Members working together to chase a vessel 
flagged to another Member without compromising the Commission. 
Better intelligence, joint on-water patrols (Australia and France), and shared 
information are all integral components of CCAMLR's fight against IUU fishing. 
Having inclusive consensus in CCAMLR allows its Members to have an open alliance 
without compromising their own interests or the interests of CCAMLR. 
This kind of cooperation is at the core of UNCLOS (Article 118) and UNFSA 
(Articles 8 and 9) and works well in CCAMLR. 
7.2 Krill 
As discussed earlier, the Southern Ocean is often referred to as a krill-based 
ecosystem and it was concern over the potential to over-exploit this resource that 
instigated the CAMLR Convention and, therefore, CCAMLR. 
7 .2.1 Precautionary Catch Limits 
Unlike most conservation arrangements that are only entered into when their resource 
has already been heavily exploited (Edwards and Heap 1981 ), CCAMLR was set up 
prior to the heavy exploitation of krill. It was expected that CCAMLR's priority issue 
would be the management of the harvesting of krill (Nicol and de la Mare 1993), as 
this was arguably the reason behind the CAMLR Convention. After much negotiation 
the first precautionary catch limit for the harvesting of krill was agreed to in 1991 at 
CCAMLR-X (CCAMLR 1991, paragraphs 6.17 and 10.4). CM 32/X allowed for a 
35 See statement by the Australian Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Senator Ian Campbell: 
http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=27558 
36 See statement by the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill: 
http://www.minister .defence. gov .au/HillTp l.cfin ?Cun-entld=3 166 
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total catch of 1.5 million tonnes per season m Area 48, kept under review by 
CCAMLR on advice from the Scientific Committee. 
This catch limit was further defined in CM 32/X, with a precautionary catch limit of 
620 OOO tonnes (in total) in Subareas 48.1, 48.2 and 48.3. This was an important step 
for CCAMLR as the division of the catch limit specifically took into account the 
foraging range of vulnerable land-breeding predators (CCAMLR 1991, paragraph 
6.16). 
When looking at the catch (tonnes) of krill in the Convention Area since 1982 (Figure 
6), it could be assumed that the introduction of the precautionary catch limits has had 
an effect on the amount of krill caught. Reported catch sizes decreased in 1993 to 
approximately a third of the catch reported for 1992. However, it is more likely that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the cause of this decrease, as they 
consistently caught upwards of 76% of the reported krill catch each season and no 
longer participated in the fishery (CCAMLR 1992b, Table 3.2). 
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Figure 6: Catch of krill (tonnes) in the CCAMLR Area from 1982 to 2008. Source: CCAMLR Statistical 
Bulletin Volume 21 (electronic website version: www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/sb/intro.htm) 
The introduction of the precautionary catch limit was a big step in the management of 
krill resources and yet things seem to have stalled. In 2002, CCAMLR agreed to the 
establishment of Small Scale Management Units (SSMUs) in Statistical Subarea 48.1, 
48.2 and 48.3 (Figure 7). 37 The SSMUs were intended to subdivide the precautionary 
catch limit for krill in the short term, and in the long term aid in the development of a 
37 The SSMUs are around the Antarctic Peninsula (48.1), the South Orkney Islands (48.2) and South 
Georgia Island (48.3). 
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feedback management scheme for krill which accommodates localised effects on 
predators (CCAMLR 2002, paragraph 4.5; SC-CAMLR 2002, paragraph 3.4(i)). New 
SSMUs in Statistical Subarea 48.438 were agreed to at CCAMLR-XXVII (CCAMLR 
2008a, paragraph 4.8(iv); SC-CAMLR 2008 paragraphs 3.28 and 3.29). 
Although some work has been undertaken in the application of precautionary catch 
limits in these SSMUs, thus far no agreement has been reached. 
Kaye (2001) has criticised the use of consensus decision-making with the issue of krill 
management as it effectively stymied all early attempts at conservation and 
management measures because krill fishing Members (he notes USSR and Japan) 
objected to any CMs being imposed. 
His point is valid. It did take ten years before any catch limit was set. And things do 
not seem to have progressed much. Although the SSMUs are mapped out and are 
used in the reporting of catches to WG-EMM by the CCAMLR Secretariat, there has 
been no agreement over the allocation of catch limits to SSMUs. 
However, it should be noted that CCAMLR was the first and only RFMO to introduce 
a precautionary catch limit. In addition, at CCAMLR-XXVII in 2008, CM 51-0439 
was adopted to require fishing for krill in any statistical subarea or division to cease 
when the reported catch reaches 15,000 tonnes. It also states that no more than 75% 
of the catch limit shall be taken within 60nm of known breeding colonies of land-
based krill-dependant predators. 
38 The SSMUs are around the South Sandwich Islands (48.4). 
39 CM 51-04 - General measure for exploratory fisheries for Euphausia superba in the Convention 
Area in the 2008/09 season. 
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Figure 7: SSMUs in Subareas 48.1, 48.2 and 48.3. Source: CCAMLR Secretariat. 
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Although this is not a division of catch limits to the order of SSMUs, it is a big step 
on the way. The restriction with regards to breeding colonies of krill predators clearly 
demonstrates CCAMLR' s ability to incorporate the ecosystem when allocating catch 
limits. 
7 .2.2 International Observers on the krill fleet 
Article XXIV of the CAMLR Convention agrees to establish a system of observation. 
At CCAMLR-XI in 1992 the CCAMLR Scheme of International Observation was 
adopted (CCAMLR1992a, paragraph 6.11). CMs 41-01, 42-01 and 42-0240 require 
the presence of at least one scientific observer appointed in accordance with the 
CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation on all vessels fishing for 
finfish in the Convention Area. There is no such requirement for the krill fishing fleet 
in Area 48. Krill fishing vessels are required to carry at least one scientific observer 
appointed in accordance with the scheme of CCAMLR International Scientific 
Observation in Statistical Division 58.4.2 (CM 51-0341); however there is no current 
fishery in this area. 
There has been a long and frustrating debate on this issue, with two CCAMLR 
Members, Japan and Korea, continually refusing to agree to 100% coverage of 
scientific observers under the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific 
Observers. 
Systematic coverage of the krill fishery has been debated since 2005 (SC-CAMLR 
2005, paragraph 2.16), the idea being that each vessel in the krill fishery would carry 
an observer at the same time in the same areas to enable comparisons (SC-CAMLR 
2006, paragraph 2.18). However, no agreement could be reached. At WG-EMM in 
2007 different methods of data collection were discussed with the best options being 
4° CM 41-01 - General measures for exploratory fisheries for Dissostichus spp. in the Convention Area 
in the 2008/09 season; 
CM 42-01 - Limits on the fishery for Chamsocephalus gunnari in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in the 
2008/09 Season; 
CM 42-02 - Limits on the fishery for Chamsocephalus gunnari in Statistical Division 58.5.2 in the 
2008/09 Season. 
41 CM 51-03 - Precautionary catch limitation on Euphausia superba in Statistical Division 58.4.2. 
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100% coverage by international and/or national scientific observers (SC-CAMLR 
2007, Annex 4, paragraphs 4.44 to 4.56). Again, no decision was reached in the 
Scientific Committee or CCAMLR that year. 
At WG-EMM in 2008, Japan, as a member ofWG-EMM, finally agreed to systematic 
100% observer coverage on its krill fleet (SC-CAMLR 2008, Annex 4, paragraph 
4.58). But at the Commission meeting later in the same year, Japan reneged and, with 
Korea, blocked consensus on the issue (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraphs 11.8 and 11.8). 
China reserved its position on the issue even though it does not currently participate in 
the krill fishery (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 11.7). China's concerns were over the 
proposal that new entrants into the krill fishery would require 100% coverage for the 
first two years of operation, even if the rest of the fleet were at a scaled back 
percentage of coverage. 
Observer coverage on krill vessels is an important issue and, from the many 
statements made by concerned Members at CCAMLR-XXVII (see CCAMLR 2008a, 
paragraphs 11.9 - 11.21), a frustrating one. There have been continued calls for 
Members to think of science rather than politics, and see the great value and important 
data that could come from a systematic observer program on the krill fishing fleet. 
However, it seems, for the moment, politics has won. The scientific knowledge that 
could be garnered from such a system is great and undisputed. It can only be assumed, 
therefore, that some CCAMLR Members are concerned about their fishing privacy 
and do not want to share their fishing practices with others. Article XXIV agrees to 
establish a system of observation which had the intention of being applied across the 
entire CCAMLR fleet (vessels engaged in harvesting of marine living resources in the 
CAMLR Convention Area), not just in selected fisheries. However, Article XXIV 




7.2.3 Vessel Monitoring System and the krill fleet 
CCAMLR included the krill fisheries in VMS reporting in 2007 (CCAMLR 2007a, 
paragraphs 8.13(i) and 13.8), for which it had been previously excluded. CM 10-04 
now requires the krill fishing fleet to use satellite-linked vessel monitoring devices to 
continuously report on their position in the Convention Area to their Flag State. It 
should be noted that the krill fishery does not operate C-VMS and are under no 
obligation to provide the CCAMLR Secretariat with "real-time" vessel positions or 
any other VMS data.42 
There is no reference in the 2007 CCAMLR report as to why krill vessels are 
excluded from this requirement, although SCIC did discuss the matter and some 
Members43 did not agree with VMS reporting to the Secretariat (CCAMLR 2007a, 
Annex 5, paragraphs 2.49 to 2.54). Therefore it can be assumed that consensus was 
not reached to implement C-VMS on the krill fleet. 
It is a definite failure of CCAMLR as a decision-making organisation that the 
different regulatory issues surrounding the krill fishery, the acknowledged reason for 
the CAMLR Convention, cannot be agreed upon in a timely and effective manner. 
7 .3 France and the by-catch of seabirds 
The topic of seabird by-catch in the longline fisheries has long been considered by 
CCAMLR. Members were first asked to assess and monitor the species and numbers 
of birds being caught incidentally during fishing operations at CCAMLR-III in 1984 
(CCAMLR 1984, paragraph 23). Although Members may have undertaken these 
assessments, they were not calculated for the entire Convention Area (with the 
exception of Crozet and Kerguelen Islands) until 1997 (see Figure 8). 
42 See footnote 4 of CM 10-04 (CCAMLR 2009) 
43 Only Japan was named, but other Members agreed with them. 
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In 1989, CCAMLR became the first international organisation to institute seabird 
incidental mortality mitigation measures (Miller et al 2004, Miller et al 2005) with the 
adoption of Resolution 5NIII, the Protection of Seabirds from Incidental Mortality 
Arising from Longline Fishing (CCAMLR 1989, paragraphs 129 and 130). This 
Resolution urged all Parties to the Convention engaged in longline fishing in the 
Convention Area to investigate and introduce methods to minimize the incidental 
mortality of seabirds. 
In 1991 CCAMLR adopted CM 29!X, aimed at preventing or minimizing incidental 
mortality of seabirds associated with longline fishing, and CM 30!X, which prohibits 
the use of net monitor cables on trawl vessels from the 1994/95 fishing season 
(CCAMLR 1991, paragraphs 10.l and 10.2). CM 29!X initiated the mandatory use of 
streamer lines to keep birds away from the line during day settings and weighting of 
baited hooks to ensure fast sink rates, among other things. Although it has been 
considerably revised as new methods of deterrence have been found, it is still in force 
today as CM 25-02. 
In 1994 the first ad-hoe Working Group on Incidental Mortality Arising from 
Longline Fishing (ad-hoe WG-IMALF) was held (SC-CAMLR 1994, Annex 8). The 
terms of reference included the review of data on seabird by-catch and the efficacy of 
seabird mitigation measures. The Working Group's name was changed in 2001 to the 
ad hoe Working Group on Incidental Mortality Associated with Fishing (ad hoe WG-
IMAF) to reflect the work of the group in also considering incidental mortality 
associated with trawl and pot fisheries. At CCAMLR-XXVII, the Working Group 
dropped ad hoe from its name (SC-CAMLR-2008, Annex 6). 
WG-IMAF has been successful in quantifying and reducing incidental seabird 
mortalities. Unknown numbers of seabirds were incidentally caught in 1994 and large 
numbers (6589 seabirds) were observed caught in 1997 (CCAMLR 1997, paragraphs 
6.40 and 6.41). At present CCAMLR is proud of the continued low levels of 
incidental seabird mortality in regulated fisheries and for the first time in 2006, no 
albatrosses were reported taken in legal longline operations (CCAMLR 2006, 
paragraph 5.6). Since then numbers of seabirds caught have remained low (Figure 8). 
Ill 1
8 
This is not only a direct result of strict mitigation measures, but also the resolve of the 
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Figure 8: Total extrapolated incidental mortality of seabirds in the Convention Area from 1997 to 2008. 
Source: SC-CAMLR 2008, Annex 6, Table 3. 
It must be noted that the French Kerguelen and Crozet islands are not included in 
these figures because France has invoked the Chairman's Statement regarding seabird 
mitigation measures. This means it is under no obligation to apply CCAMLR agreed 
measures; instead they can use their own. Seabird by-catch levels at the Kerguelen 
and Crozet Islands are high (Figure 8) and are mainly White-chinned petrels 
(Procellaria aequinoctialis) and Grey petrels (Procellaria cinerea) (SC-CAMLR 
2008, paragraph 5.3(i)). Both species are listed on the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened species; White-chinned 
petrels are listed as "vulnerable", while Grey petrels are "near threatened", both with 
declining populations (IUCN 2008). 
It is interesting that CCAMLR is acknowledged as having best practice mitigation 
measures for avoiding seabird deaths in longline fishing (Waugh et al 2008), yet 
France has chosen not to use these methods that have been proven so effective in 
other parts of the Convention Area. The longline fishery around South Georgia was 
catching thousands of birds in 1997, yet with season closures during critical breeding 
times and the implementation of other CCAMLR CMs, these numbers have been 
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reduced to an observed by-catch of zero since 2006 (SC-CAMLR 2008, Annex 6, 
Table 3). 
France has not been forthcoming with information about numbers of seabird 
mortalities in their EEZ fisheries (SC-CAMLR 2003, paragraph 5.4). This seems to 
be changing, however, with historical data provided starting from the 2001 (only 
partial data) and 2002 seasons (SC-CAMLR 2004, paragraph 5.4). At CCAMLR-
XXVI France announced it had developed a three-year plan to reduce mortalities of 
seabirds in the French EEZs by a factor of two (CCAMLR 2007a, paragraph 6.6). 
The results of the first year of the plan were presented in 2008 at CCAMLR-XXVII 
showing observed reductions in incidental mortality of seabirds (CCAMLR 2008a, 
paragraph 6.8). This is a positive step and it is encouraging to see that France has 
implemented a number of measures in an effort to bring mortalities to near zero 
levels. 
7.4 New and Exploratory Fisheries 
Ideally, all the information needed for the sustainable exploitation of fish stocks 
should be known before commercial harvesting begins to allow "before and after" 
comparisons of stock status (Miller et al 2004, Miller et al 2005). This may seem an 
unrealistic approach, yet CCAMLR has protocols in place for new !ffid exploratory 
fisheries that require the collection of data prior to and during the development of a 
fishery. 44 This helps to ensure that development does not outpace CCAMLR's ability 
to collect the data necessary to achieve the objectives of Article II (CCAMLR 1990, 
paragraph 9.3). 
Under CM 21-01,45 Members are required to notify their intention to fish a new 
fishery; this includes established fisheries that employ new fishing techniques. This 
measure aims to collect the necessary information on the target and associated 
species, as well as limiting catch and/or effort. 
44 See CCAMLR 1990, paragraphs 9.1to9.10; CMs 21-01 and21-02. 
45 CM 21-01- Notification the Members are considering initiating a new fishery. 
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After a year of fishing as a new fishery, a fishery then becomes an exploratory fishery 
(Miller et al 2004). Exploratory fisheries are not new, but still require intensive data 
collection for informed management. CM 21-0246 provides for the necessary data 
collection. 
Combined, these CMs allow CCAMLR to actively implement a precautionary 
approach when setting catch limits and open/closed areas. It also reduces the 
potential for reversible changes to the ecosystem. 
Using the information gathered the Commission, via the Scientific Committee, can 
then discuss and decide upon issues such as catch limits, division of the catch in areas, 
and also limit the number of vessels allowed to fish in some areas. This is a very 
important example of the successful use of consensus to continually determine the 
potentially contentious issue of catch allocation. Members could block such catch 
limits with ease. However, as these limits are based on the best scientific knowledge 
available from the Scientific Committee and its working groups, there is no apparent 
reason to dissent. Such dissention could be seen as political and not in the best 
interest of the Convention. 
7.5 CCAMLR and consensus-minus-one 
From the data collected for this study, views on the legitimacy of consensus-minus-
one as a decision-making tool were varied (Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4). While some 
considered it a legitimate decision-making tool, others believed it was nonsense. As 
one interviewee said, "consensus-minus-one is not consensus, it is nothing". And 
although some considered it useful, they did not believe it was appropriate for use in 
CCAMLR. However as matters become more complicated, the use of consensus-
minus-one is inviting. 
46 CM2 l-02 - Exploratory fisheries. 
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7.5.1 IUU Vessel Lists 
The idea of consensus-minus-one has arisen in CCAMLR discussions over the years, 
but never as clearly as in the 2006 meeting during the discussion of the Contracting 
Party IUU Vessel List. The CCAMLR Contracting Party IUU (CP-IUU) and Non-
Contracting Party IUU (NCP-IUU) vessel lists are prepared by the Secretariat using 
information provided by Members intersessionally (CM 10-0647 and 10-0748). 
Evidence is presented indicating that vessels were/are engaged in IUU activities in the 
Convention Area and as such have undermined the effectiveness of CMs in force. 
Once the IUU vessel lists are adopted, Members are required to take action against 
listed vessels by blocking their ports to them, refusing to register, or deregisteri;ng the 
vessels concerned, withdrawing fishing licences, nullifying catch documents and/or 
other trade related measures (CMl0-06, paragraph 17; CM 10-07, paragraph 21). 
At CCAMLR-XXV in 2006 the inclusion of the Russian-flagged Volna on the CP-
IUU list was unable to be agreed upon due to lack of consensus (CCAMLR 2006, 
paragraph 9.16). Although it had been placed on the list for fishing in a closed area, 
Russia stated that the longlines had been set in an open area, but had drifted into the 
closed area and the vessel was simply retrieving them. However other Members were 
convinced that the Volna had been engaged in illegal activities and thus satisfied the 
criteria for being included on the CP-IUU list. Russia blocked consensus on the 
decision, thus leaving the Volna off the list. In the absence of a decision the Volna 
was not included on the CP-IUU list. The following describes the event, as reflected 
in the CCAMLR-XXVI meeting report. 
It was reported that on the 1 st of February 2006 the Russian-flagged vessel Volna was 
sighted hauling a longline and dumping by-catch in a small scale research unit 
(SSRU) in Subarea 88.2 that, at that time, was closed for fishing (CCAMLR 2006b, 
Annex 5, paragraph 2.37). It was included in the Provisional CP-IUU vessel list for 
having "fished during closed fishing periods or in closed areas in contravention of 
CCAMLR Conservation Measures", namely CM 10-06. 
47 CM 10-06 - Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR 
conservation measures 




During SCIC discussions of the Provisional CP-IUU vessel list, Russia noted that it 
had informed Members (via the CCAMLR Secretariat, COMM CIRC 06/51) that it 
had conducted a full investigation into the matter. Russia concluded that the Volna 
had been fishing inside Subarea 88.1, in an SSRU that was open when one of their 
longlines had tom and drifted into the closed SSRU in Subarea 88.2 (CCAMLR 
2006b, Annex 5, paragraph 2.38). The captain had decided to haul the longline that 
was inside the closed area. 
Some Members found this explanation improbable and a paper was tabled indicating 
the drift theory was unlikely due to currents in the area flowing in the opposite 
direction to that necessary to carry the longline into the closed SSRU (CCAMLR 
2006b, Annex 5, paragraphs 2.39 and 2.41). 
Perhaps anticipating the inability of SCIC to reach consensus over the CP-IUU vessel 
list some Members had, at the start of the debate, called for Members whose flag 
vessels were under consideration for inclusion on the CP-IUU vessel list to 
voluntarily abstain from the decision-making process (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, 
paragraph 2.29). Though this could be construed as using consensus-minus-one, these 
Members believed that it would not undermine the concept of consensus-based 
decision-making as no formal objection would be raised (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, 
paragraph 2.29). Other Members believed that it was important to maintain an 
unqualified consensus, "in keeping with the highest objectives of the Antarctic Treaty 
System" (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, paragraph 2.30). 
Russia noted that other vessels had contravened CMs but were not being considered 
for inclusion on the IUU vessel lists (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, paragraph 2.56). 
Either these vessels did not fit the criteria set out in CM 10-06 or there were, 
potentially, double standards at play. 
Whether or not the Volna was involved in IUU fishing is not the point; more 
interesting is the fact that Russia would not agree to the placement of the Volna on the 
CP-IUU list, despite demonstrable evidence for the inclusion, and so effectively 
blocked the consensus. This resulted in some Members calling for a reversal of the 
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procedure in which it would take consensus to remove the vessel from the list 
(CCAMLR.2006b, paragraph 9.32). 
The procedures set out in CM 10-06 are very clear and the provisional CP-IUU vessel 
list is prepared without bias by the Secretariat, so it is most probable that the Volna 
had been correctly placed on the list. Nevertheless the Volna debate was lengthy and 
SCIC remained unable to reach consensus (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, paragraph 
2.57), and the issue was forwarded to the Commission. A compromise was finally 
accepted when Russia agreed to investigate further using new information and would 
communicate the results to CCAMLR "in a timely fashion the actions that it would 
now take to bring this issue to_an acceptable resolution" (CCAMLR 2006b, paragraph 
9.39). Other Members accepted this compromise and agreed to postpone the decision 
on whether to include the Volna on the CP-IUU vessel list until, or before, CCAMLR-
XXVI (CCAMLR 2006b, paragraph 9.40). 
Regardless, the Volna continued fishing in the Convention Area during 2007 and 
Russia neglected to provide licence details to the Secretariat as required in CM 10-
02. 49 At CCAMLR-XXVI in 2007 Russia concluded that the incident was of a 
technical and non-deliberate nature and the case was therefore closed (CCAMLR 
2007a, paragraph 10.63). CCAMLR Members were not satisfied with this situation, 
but the Volna was not included in CP-IUU vessel list (CCAMLR 2007a, 
paragraph! 0.67). 
This is a clear failure of CCAMLR, through the use of consensus, to reach a decision 
in an effective and timely manner. If consensus-minus-one had been used as a 
legitimate decision-making tool an agreement would have been reached at CCAMLR-
XXV. However, whether the dissenting party would have agreed to any actions 
against its vessel is doubtful. 
49 CM I 0-02 - Licensing and Inspection obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to their flag 
vessels operating in the Convention Area. 
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7.5.2 Australian CITES proposal 
There have also been cases of consensus-minus-one in reverse. In the following 
example a Member's actions were limited by the need for consensus in order for them 
to put forward a proposal seemingly on behalf of CCAMLR. 
At CCAMLR-XXI in 2002 Australia advised CCAMLR that it had nominated 
toothfish for listing under Appendix II50 of the Convention for the International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES) (CCAMLR 2002, paragraph 10.1 ). Australia 
believed this would give a greater coverage of trade measures with States that are 
Members of CITES but not party to CCAMLR. 
However, the majority of CCAMLR Members opposed the Australian proposal for a 
variety of reasons (CCAMLR 2002, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.75). Mostly they were 
concerned that CCAMLR's competency and authority might be undermined by 
deference to CITES. As a result CCAMLR did not support Australia's proposal. 
Consequently toothfish was not listed under Appendix II of CITES, but at the Twelfth 
Conference of Parties (CoP12) CITES adopted Resolution Conf. 12.4 which 
recommended that their Parties adhere to the CAMLR Convention and CCAMLR's 
Conservation Measures. 51 
Consensus-minus-one could have its uses in a decision-making organisation such as 
CCAMLR, especially with regards to the Volna issue, however its legitimacy as a 
binding decision, and consequent implementation, would be debatable. 
That having been said, there are circumstances where CCAMLR has used a form of 
consensus-minus-one as a norm in their decision-making procedure. 
50 Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be 
controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival. 
From website: www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.shtml 
51 CITES Resolution Conf. 12.4 - Cooperation between CITES and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources regarding trade in toothfish. 
From website: http://www.cites.org/eng/res/12/12-04.shtml 
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7.5.3 CCAMLR Member Contributions 
Every Member of CCAMLR must contribute to the budget (Article XIX.3). Member 
contributions are determined by two criteria: the amount harvested and an equal 
sharing among all Members (Article XIX.3). The proportion in which the criteria 
apply is decided by CCAMLR. 
Individual contributions can be quite high and given the demographic of Members 
(developed and non-developed States) it would be reasonable to assume that some 
Members may find it difficult to pay by the date required. 
CCAMLR's Financial Regulations52 permit extensions of the due date (1 5t January) of 
up to 90 days for individual Members who are unable to comply (CCAMLR 2007b, 
paragraph 5.6). The Executive Secretary then reports at each CCAMLR meeting on 
the receipt of the contribution and the position of those Members who are in arrears. 
Article XIX.6 states that a Member who "fails to pay its contributions for two 
consecutive years shall not, during the period of its default, have the right to 
participate in the taking of decisions of the Commission". 
In 1999 CCAMLR defined the period of default in Article XIX.6 to be "the period 
commencing when a contribution is payable, if the whole or part of the previous 
contribution is outstanding, and ending when both these contributions are paid in full" 
(CCAMLR 1999, paragraph 3.12). 
There have been a few cases of financial default, most notably Brazil and Ukraine in 
2000 (CCAMLR 2000a, paragraph 3.5). Brazil advised CCAMLR that this was a 
temporary situation and despite being in default, it would participate in the 
discussions (CCAMLR 200a, paragraph 3.6), although it correctly did not say 
52 First adopted at CCAMLR-I (paragraph 23), and amended at CCAMLR-XIII (Annex 4, Appendix 2), 
CCAMLR-XVII (Annex 4, Appendix III), CCAMLR-XVIII (paragraph 3.5; Annex 4, paragraph 38) 
and CCAMLR-XXI (Annex 4, paragraph 23). 
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"decisions". Ukraine referred to its financial difficulties and indicated that it would 
make efforts to make payments to its obligations (CCAMLR 2000a, paragraph 3.7). 
At CCAMLR-XX in 2001, one Member was still in financial default (CCAMLR 
2001b, paragraph 3.4) although the report does not state which Member. Once again 
at CCAMLR-XXI in 2002 one Member was in financial default (CCAMLR 2002, 
paragraph 3.8), and again the report does not identify the Member. 
Brazil was once more in financial default at CCAMLR-XXIII in 2004. There is no 
mention of it in the SCAF report, however ~n the CCAMLR-XXIII report, paragraph 
3.26 states that: 
"Brazil noted that funds have now become available to enable its 
outstanding contribution to be paid in full very shortly. It expressed 
appreciation to all Members for their patience and understanding of 
Brazil's difficulties in this respect, extended to Brazil during this 
year's meeting." 
From this brief statement it can be assumed that Brazil was not excluded from the 
taking of decisions as it should have been. It is also interesting to note that despite 
Brazil defaulting on its payments a Brazilian was elected Chair of the Scientific 
Committee that year (SC-CAMLR 2004, paragraph 14.1). 
Ukraine was again in fi:t;1ancial default in 2007. However, CCAMLR decided that the 
previous definition of default would not be applied and asked SCAF to discuss 
interpretations of Article XIX.6 of the CAMLR Convention (CCAMLR 2007a, 
paragraphs 3.30 to 3.32). SCAF discussed the issue in 2008, with three options being 
proposed by Members (CCAMLR 2008a, Annex 4, paragraph 48). Consensus could 
not be reached on any one option (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 3.35). 
These examples raise a number of issues. First, does the intentional exclusion of a 
Member from the decision-making processes due to financial default turn CCAMLR's 
inclusive consensus into consensus-minus-one? And if so, are excluded Members 
able to renege on agreed measures as they weren't party to the agreement? 
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The Convention was agreed to and signed by each Member. The Financial 
Regulations were negotiated and adopted by CCAMLR using consensus. The 
definition of "default period" was agreed to using consensus. Therefore by earlier 
agreeing to the process of exclusion due to financial default, no Member appears to 
have the right to reject decisions made based on their non-participation in the 
decision-making process. As Brazil demonstrated at CCAMLR-XXIII, just because 
you cannot participate in the decisions, doesn't mean you can't contribute to the 
discussion leading up to such decisions. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
In the 27-year history of CCAMLR there have been both successes and failures as 
decision-making organisation. The fact that CCAMLR is in charge of such precious 
resources means that any failures may have dire consequences. 
CCAMLR's fight against IUU fishing is impressive (Section 7.1). Trade in IUU 
toothfish has been virtually cut off with the introduction of CDS, and more 
importantly E-CDS, and C-VMS for all vessels fishing for toothfish in the Convention 
Area, as well as other CMs and Resolutions (shown in Table 2). 
CCAMLR' s management of krill fishing has both positive and negative elements. It 
is impressive that CCAMLR uses precautionary catch limits for the krill fishery, 
although this is lessened somewhat by the unsuccessful attempt to break these catch 
limits further into SSMUs (Section 7.2.1). However, even this has taken a positive 
step recently with the introduction of CM 51-04. The lack of agreement for 
international scientific observers across the fleet and the use of C-VMS is a concern 
and does reflect badly on CCAMLR's record (Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3). 
These case studies show that CCAMLR, as a decision-making organisation, can 
effectively implement appropriate management measures when needed (IUU), 
however consensus has been used to block decisions that would benefit the 
conservation objectives of the CAMLR Convention (Sections 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.5.1). 
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This chapter has also shown that the pressure of the Commission and the cooperation 
of Members can compel a coastal state Member to conform to CCAMLR's objectives 
of near zero incidental mortality levels of seabirds during fishing operations (Section 
7.3). 
It has also shown that CCAMLR's operating system allows CCAMLR to use the best 
scientific knowledge to appropriate catch allocation, what could be a contentious 
issue, by consensus each year (Section 7.4). 
Using these case studies as examples, and the information presented in the previous 





The real challenge of decision-making processes within any RFMO is to have a 
process that respects State sovereignty, yet limits the ability of States to obstruct the 
adoption and effective implementation of conservation and management measures 
(McDorman 2005). Has CCAMLR risen to this challenge? To assess this we must go 
back to the three questions listed in the aim of the study: 
1. Has CCAMLR' s use of consensus been effective, expeditious and efficient in 
resolving relevant issues? 
2. Does CCAMLR's use of inclusive consensus-based decision-making facilitate 
effective and timely adoption of management measures and do CCAMLR 
Members implement accordingly? and 
3. Has CCAMLR's use of consensus-based decision-making affected the ability 
of the organisation to meet the objectives of Article II of the CAMLR 
Convention? 
8.1 The need for consensus in CCAMLR 
Consensus in CCAMLR is seen as a lack of formal objection. This does not 
necessarily mean that everybody agrees; more that they are satisfied enough to not 
disagree. 
From the literature, the most notable disadvantage of consensus decision-making is 
that it takes too long. This shortcoming has become clear in this study. When 
Members cannot agree to a common purpose there is no alternative but to agree to 
nothing. After 27 years the krill fishery is still considerably under-managed. 
CCAMLR did well to implement catch limits in 1991, even though it took an entire 
decade after the CCAMLR Convention, yet virtually nothing has been done since. 
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There are no small scale catch limits, no mandatory observers and no obligation to 
implement C-VMS. 
CCAMLR relies on advice from the Scientific Committee, which in turn relies on 
information gathered from scientific observers, as well as scientific research and 
commercial fisheries data. At present the Scientific Committee is the best available, 
but it could be better. In the krill fishery, for the 2007/08 season, 20-67% of the 
vessels had observers (national and international) on board at some time during their 
trips (SC-CAMLR 2008, Annex 6, paragraph 2.19). Of these low percentages of 
vessels, between 20-86% of the tows were observed, per observer trip (SC-CAMLR 
2008, paragraph 6.20). This gives a low overall percentage of observation in this 
fishery. As a result, the data collection, and hence the scientific advice garnered, is 
not at CCAMLR's usual "best practice" (as per the finfish fisheries) and potentially 
puts CCAMLR and its management objectives at a disadvantage. 
Another problem with the inclusive consensus that CCAMLR uses is that Members 
have the ability to block a decision that could affect them negatively. This has been 
exemplified over the years by Japan and Korea with the krill fishery and also Russia 
with the IUU listing of vessels. 
The Volna episode was not the first time that consensus has been blocked by Russia 
for the CP-IUU vessel list. At CCAMLR-XXII in 2003 two other Russian-flagged 
vessels were nominated for inclusion in the list. Russia denied reports of toothfish 
offloads from two of their vessels, the Strela and the Zarya, using fishing licenses and 
catch documents that couldn't be verified as authentic (CCAMLR 2003, Annex 5, 
paragraphs 2.48 and 2.49). Russia argued that this incident had occurred under 
previous Bolivian owners and so the vessels should not be included in the CP-IUU 
vessel list (CCAMLR 2003, paragraph 8.30). It also rejected claims that the Strela 
was sighted by Australia in its EEZ in Division 58.5.2. Russia asserted to have 
evidence of the vessel's inability to be at that location (CCAMLR 2003, Annex 5, 
paragraphs 2.51 and 2.52). Consensus was not reached and although Russia did not 
want to be singled out in the report as blocking consensus (CCAMLR 2003, 
paragraph 8.55), the European Community reiterated that all Members except Russia 
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had agreed that the Strela and the Zarya should be on the CP-IUU vessel list 
(CCAMLR 2003, paragraph 8.56). 
Alternatively, several Uruguayan-flagged vessels have been recommended for 
inclusion on the CP-IUU vessel list since its inception in 2002 and Uruguay has not 
once used the need for consensus to block their inclusion. 
From the continual blocking of consensus by Russia, it is obvious that the use of 
consensus decision-making does not always work when applied to the blacklisting of 
Member vessels. Using consensus-minus-one could resolve this issue, but then there 
may be an issue of the dissenting party not agreeing with the decision and thus not 
implementing any measures and/or penalties. The Member whose vessel is 
nominated for inclusion could abstain from the decision, as suggested by some 
Members at CCAMLR-XXV (CCAMLR 2006b, Annex 5, paragraph 2.29). 
However, in order to do this the Rules of Procedure would need to be changed - by 
consensus. 
The idea of "inclusive" consensus is that everyone participates in the discussions and 
the resulting decisions. Therefore mandatory abstaining from a decision is against the 
ideal of the consensus that CCAMLR uses. 
Article XXII, paragraph 1 of the Convention states that: 
"each Contracting Party undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one 
engages in any activity contrary to the objective of this Convention". 
It could be construed that by blocking consensus a CP may be engaging in activities 
contrary to the objectives of the Convention. 
At CCAMLR-:XXVI in 2007 it was decided to undertake a Performance Review of 
the organisation (CCAMLR 2007, Annex 7, (Appendix I)). A review panel was 
appointed by CCAMLR and carried out the review in 2008.53 The CCAMLR 
53 Report of the CCAMLR Performance Review Panel. From CCAMLR website: www.ccamlr.org 
Ill 9
2 
Performance Review Panel Report (CPRP Report) was submitted to, and discussed at, 
CCAMLR-XXVII. The report concluded that consensus decision-making has worked 
for CCAMLR over a long period of time, but there may have been some costs 
associated with it (CPRP Report, Chapter 5.1.1, recommendation 1). The CPRP do 
not list these costs, but some have been identified in this study. When national 
interests are put in front of the interests of CCAMLR as a whole, issues do not get 
resolved. The examples given in this study is the krill fishery (Section 7.2), which is 
considerably undermanaged when compared to the finfish fisheries and France's 
actions in respect to seabird by-catch during longline fishing (Section 7.3). 
The CPRP also stated that consensus can ~reate problems and prevent or delay 
decisions on the implementation of some CMs (Chapter 5.1.2, paragraph 7). This has 
been exemplified with the krill fishery case study (Section 7.2) and the CP-IUU vessel 
lists (Section 5.2.5). The CPRP suggests that decisions regarding implementation 
could be adopted by majority rule, or that any State concerned would abstain from 
participating in the decisions. Alternatively, it proposed that these decisions are not 
seen as matters of substance, as articulated by Article XII.2, and therefore do not 
reqmre consensus. 
However, these are clearly matters of substance, as demonstrated by the in-depth 
debates recorded in the CCAMLR reports. With regard to resource management it is 
difficult to subjectively determine what is not considered a matter of substance, as all 
issues are important. This would be especially difficult for CCAMLR, noting that 
their ecosystem approach means the focus is not entirely on the resources harvested. 
Any decision that leads to legal obligation could be seen as a matter of substance. 
However, consensus comes with a moral expectation; if it was agreed upon by all then 
it must be implemented by all. Therefore, a matter of substance could be seen as a 
decision that leads not only to legal obligation, but moral obligation also. 
The literature maintains that consensus can be seen as an obstacle to achieve effective 
and timely decisions yet the CPRP concluded that the need for consensus on matters 
of substance did not prevent CCAMLR from addressing important issues (CPRP 
Report, Chapter 5.1.1, paragraph 2). However, this study has shown that the need for 
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consensus m CCAMLR can be harmful to CCAMLR's overall conservation 
objectives when consensus cannot be reached. This is when national interests have 
outweighed a Member's commitment to the CCAMLR objectives. 
8 .2 Consensus in CCAMLR is an equaliser 
CCAMLR practices an inclusive decision-making process. All Members have the 
right to participate in the discussion and decision. Consensus brings with it a strong 
sense of cooperation and compromise. Although the debate and negotiations can 
make the process longer, a decision is made that all Members have agreed to and so 
are bound to implement. This makes the decisions strong as there is political will 
behind them and Members respect and will implement the decisions. 
CCAMLR's Members are from different socio-economic groups. All Members come 
to the meetings with differing opinions and interests. Consensus enables them all to 
have a voice. It is an equaliser. If there were a majority vote then the fishing nations, 
70% of CCAMLR's membership, would be in control of the decisions. This could 
lead to CCAMLR's conservation objectives being secondary to resource harvesting. 
Another positive element of CCAMLR's decision-making procedure is the 
transparency it displays. Transparency in the decision-making process and other 
activities of regional fisheries management organisations is important (Swan 2004) 
and adds to the legitimacy of the regime. 
In the literature transparency is usually associated with the inclusion of observers in 
discussions (see Swan 2004). In the case of CCAMLR, observers are invited to 
participate in the annual meetings of the Scientific Committee and the Commission. 
However, they are currently unable to attend any meetings of the Scientific 
Committee Working Groups. 54 Members can also restrict the presence of observers in 
the Commission and the Scientific Committee agenda items. 55 
s4 Birdlife International has been represented at WG-IMAF. However, they have attended as "invited 
experts" rather than observers. 
ss CCAMLR Rules of Procedure, Rule 33(b); Scientific Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 22. 
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This restriction of observers in the discussions of CCAMLR, and its subsidiary 
bodies, does not necessarily reduce its transparency. Member delegations can and do 
include NGO observers as expert advisors. This gives the Members added expertise 
and NGOs a voice in forming decisions. 
In addition, all CCAMLR discussions and resulting decisions are published in the 
meeting reports and are available publicly. Also publicly available from CCAMLR is 
' 
the current, and historical, Schedule of Conservation Measures, and the CCAMLR 
-Basic Documents. 56 
The CPRP concluded that the consensus procedure followed by CCAMLR is 
transparent and consistent, and adopts management measures in a reasonable 
timeframe (Chapter 5.1.2, paragraph 6). 
8.3 CCAMLR and its conservation objectives 
Links with the ATS clearly differentiates CCAMLR from other RFMOs (CPRP 
Report, Chapter 5.1.1, paragraph 1). With the other components of the ATS, 
CCAMLR works to protect the Antarctic as a whole. CCAMLR was the first 
international organisation to apply an "ecosystem" and "precautionary" approach to 
resource management and has been adopted as a best practice standard on how to do 
so. 
Article II of the CAMLR Convention attempts to limit the effects of vast unchecked 
harvesting and instigates the "precautionary approach" to fisheries management. At 
the time of entry into force of CCAMLR, less than 40% of the Members were fishing 
States (CPRP Report, Chapter 1.3, paragraph 23). That proportion has increased over 
time to 70% of Members classed as fishing States in 2008. 
56 The CCAMLR Basic Documents contain the CAMLR Convention, Commission and Scientific Rules 
of Procedure and other CCAMLR regulations and rules. 
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The CPRP concluded that CCAMLR has a very strong record of developing and 
applying the precautionary approach to fishery management and is recognised 
internationally as a leader ofthis (Chapter 3.5.2, paragraph 104). 
Willock and Lack (2006) undertook an assessment of best practice in RFMOs and 
concluded that CCAMLR is the most advanced of the RFMOs assessed in their 
application of the precautionary and ecosystem approaches, noting the CAMLR 
Convention, unlike other RFMO governing conventions, is framed around an 
ecosystem rather than a species. 
Another assessment of RFMOs by Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg (2007) also · 
concluded that CCAMLR was the most advanced of the RFMOs assessed in 
developing and implementing management measures using precautionary and 
ecosystem approaches. 
The New and Exploratory Fisheries case study (Section 7.4) is an excellent example 
of how CCAMLR has achieved implementation of a "precautionary" approach that is 
in line with Article II of the CAMLR Convention. 
Another example of the ecosystem approach to resource management 1s the 
CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program (CEMP). The CEMP was established in 
1985 to detect and record significant changes in the ecosystem and distinguish 
between changes due to harvesting of commercial species and changes due to 
environmental variability (SC-CAMLR 1985, paragraph 7.2). The program uses 
'indicator species', species dependant on harvested commercial species, to detect 
changes. CEMP has been active for over two decades and the CCAMLR Secretariat 
holds data on four penguin species, the Black-browed albatross and the Antarctic fur 
seal. 
A more recent example of CCAMLR's commitment to conserving the ecosystem is 
their work with Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs). United Nations General 
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Assembly Resolution 61/10557, in 2006, called upon States to take immediate action 
to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems (paragraph 80). In response, CCAMLR 
began to develop approaches to avoid and mitigate significant adverse impacts on 
VMEs (CCAMLR 2008a, paragraph 5.4). The result was the adoption of CMs 22-
0658 and 22-07. 59 These CMs require Members to notify all encounters with VMEs 
while fishing and in cases where prescribed amounts of VME materials are found, 
fisheries in the local area are closed. 
This was an important step for CCAMLR, once again putting it at the forefront of 
fisheries management practices by actively implementing the ecosystem and 
precautionary approach as a high priority. 
As well as the precautionary approach to fisheries management, CCAMLR identifies 
conservation needs and formulates, adopts and revises CMs on the basis of the best 
scientific knowledge, provided by the Scientific Committee and its working groups 
(Section 5 .1 ). The organisational structure, or operating system, of CCAMLR allows 
for the different working groups and committees to interact and give CCAMLR not 
only scientific advice but also the best overall advice available. This is very 
important; if the different groups didn't cooperate then the advice could be one-sided 
or biased, rather than inclusive. 
McDorman (2005) contests that using consensus to allocate catch limits can lead to 
paralysis and continuation of outdated, and not necessarily sustainable, quotas. 
However, the organisational structure of CCAMLR makes it easier for Members to 
agree on catch limits. WG-FSA and WG-EMM calculate the limits, where they are 
firstly discussed in the Scientific Committee. They are then presented to the 
Commission, and given that it is the 'best scientific advice' they will be agreed upon. 
57 UNGA Resolution 61/05 - Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments. Website: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/500/73/PDF/N0650073.pdf?OpenElement 
58 CM 22-06 - Bottom fishing in the Convention Area. 
59 CM 22-07 - Interim measure for bottom fishing activities subject to Conservation Measure 22-06 
encountering potential vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Convention Area. 
As stated earlier (Section 5.3), the Scientific Committee is officially the only source 
of the best scientific evidence available for CCAMLR. 
All Members have the opportunity to be involved in the science and the resulting 
decisions. This negates the likelihood of any consensus paralysis at the Commission 
level. By working its way up the chain it has been agreed to, by consensus, by all. 
Although this organisational structure may make it harder to formulate management 
measures, as every relevant group must have their say, by the time the decision is 
ready to be made it has been comprehensively evaluated. 
8.4 Measuring CCAMLR's effectiveness 
Using the three statements from Section 2.1, and reintroduced here, CCAMLR's 
effectiveness can thus be evaluated. 
8.4.1 Were the initial goals realistic? 
CCAMLR's goals or objectives, while very ambitious, were realistic. Put simply, it 
wished to conserve the Antarctic ecosystem, while still operating a viable fishing 
industry. With the objectives so clearly defined in the CAMLR Convention, the 
organisation has been able to keep these goals a priority. CCAMLR has formulated 
and implemented various CMs aimed at conservation, e.g. protection of VMEs, 
seabird measures, and New and Exploratory measures, as well as having a long 
standing Ecosystem Monitoring Program that has collected a vast amount of scientific 
data to better understand the ecosystem implications of resource harvesting. 
From all these measures it is clear that CCAMLR is not just an organisation managing 
resource harvesting, it is an arena for scientists to share their research. CCAMLR 
uses this expertise to better understand the Antarctic environment and thus better 
implement the "ecosystem" and "precautionary" approach to fisheries management. 
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8.4.2 Was there distinct changes in actor behaviour? 
CCAMLR's consensus is based on cooperation and compromise. Without these 
elements the decisions would never be made. CCAMLR considers itself to be 
proactive, using feedback management for all fisheries (SC-CAMLR 1991, paragraph 
9.7), for example krill and New and Exploratory measures (Section 7.2 and 7.4). 
CCAMLR also needs to be reactive with the ability to be flexible and change to the 
issues of the day. IUU fishing is a good example of this. With IUU fishing prevalent 
in the Convention Area, drastic measures needed to be taken. The CDS has 
succeeded in monitoring the trade in IUU, but without the commitment of Member 
States it would not have been so effective. 
Uruguay is a good example of positive changes in behaviour. It had vessels listed on 
the CP-IUU list, with one interviewee going so far as to call Montevideo a port 
rampant with pirate fishing vessels. However, with the introduction of a suite of 
compliance measures (see Table 2, Section 7.1) and the commitment of Uruguay to 
abide, there have been no recent connections between IUU operations and Uruguay. 
There have, however, been other Members who continually use consensus to block 
decisions that will affect them (Russia and black listing of vessels; Japan, Korea and 
China and krill measures). 
8.4.3 Were there identifiable phases of problem solving? 
CCAMLR has many examples of incremental problem solving. Through various 
seabird CMs, CCAMLR has virtually eliminated mortalities in the Convention Area, 
with the exception of the French Islands of Crozet and Kerguelen. However, due to 
continual pressure by other Members, France is currently undertaking a three-year 
plan to reduce seabird mortalities during fishing operations to near zero levels 
(Section 7.3). 
Again, the problem with IUU (Section 7.1) has been swiftly and efficiently dealt with 
by CCAMLR using an increasingly sophisticated array of CMs to tackle the problem 
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as different elements of the problem were revealed. This illustrates that when there is 
urgent need for action, CCAMLR is able to respond. 
Therefore it can be concluded that CCAMLR, as a decision-making organisation, has 




The use of consensus in CCAMLR has harmonised the contrasting views of Members 
enabling a common purpose and common goal, the conservation of Antarctic marine 
living resources, including the rational use. Links with the ATS clearly differentiates 
CCAMLR from other RFMOs (CPRP Report, Chapter 5.1.1, paragraph I). With the 
other components of the ATS, CCAMLR works to protect the Antarctic as a whole. 
Swan's (2004) three elements of taking decisions: political will, legal obligation and 
institutional mechanisms, are all exhibited in CCAMLR decisions. There is science, 
political will and self-enforcement. Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg (2007) concluded in 
their report of RFMO best practices that CCAMLR and its respective Contracting 
Parties appeared to comply consistently with both scientific advice and the 
corresponding management measures. 
CCAMLR has been working for 27 years to conserve the marine living resources of 
the Southern Ocean, while rationally harvesting finfish and krill. There has been a 
vast amount of scientific research undertaken by CCAMLR Members: CEMP, the 
CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation, and research surveys. 
CCAMLR has adopted precautionary catch limits, open and closed fishing areas, by-
catch mitigation measures, as well as trade related measures. There are a vast number 
of Conservation Measures and Resolutions in place. 60 All of this combines to present 
strong evidence that consensus decision-making has worked for CCAMLR. 
It is evident that the work of CCAMLR is going to become more difficult over time. 
The inclusion of climate change on the agenda (CCAMLR 2008a, Annex 3), and the 
vast work being undertaken with regard to VMEs, 61 in addition to the already heavy 
workload of CCAMLR and its subsidiary groups, means that a considerable amount 
of work must be done in a short amount of (meeting) time. It has been acknowledged 
60 See CCAMLR website: www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e pubs/cm/drt.htm 
61 For the full discussions on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems at CCAMLR-XXVII see CCAMLR 
2008a, paragraphs 5.4 to 5.30. 
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that some decisions are negotiated at late hours and without all the necessary input, 
and while this may produce a consensus decision, it does not necessarily produce a 
sound and effective outcome (CPRP Report, Chapter 5.1.2, paragraph 8). 
A majority style voting system may save time, as decisions would not have to be 
discussed until everybody agrees or until it is clear that there will be no formal 
objection. Even consensus-minus-one could work in those instances when only one 
Member objects. However, consensus is an important element of CCAMLR. It is 
inclusive and an equaliser, giving every Member the same rights. With the different 
socio-economic makeup of CCAMLR' s_ membership, it is important that all contribute 
to the decisions, whether it be sending their scientists to the working group meetings, 
or just participating in the debate at the CCAMLR meeting. This ensures ownership 
of all decisions, making implementation more likely. 
There is also a chance that any change in the decision-making method could, in very 
extreme circumstances, force a Member to consider withdrawing from the 
Convention. As the third element of IUU is unregu./ated fishing, this would be a less 
than ideal situation. 
Instead of attempting to change the decision-making procedures to accommodate its 
increasing workload and the problems that will be associated with it, the suggestion 
has been made that perhaps CCAMLR should look to its dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Although Article XXV of the CAMLR Convention does contain a 
dispute settlement mechanism (as discussed in Section 5.2.4) the CPRP concluded 
that it appeared to be unsatisfactory (Chapter 5.2, recommendation 1). Their opinion 
was that it is weak and can prevent a dispute from being considered if a Member is 
not willing to submit it to a third party. 
The CPRP suggested the possibility of following the WTO example which allows the 
political body to cast a decision of the Appellate body in the last resort (CPRP Report, 
Chapter 5.1.1, recommendation l(b)). This would mean that the decision by the 
impartial organ would be binding, but it would still give CCAMLR the ability to 
decide otherwise in the last resort, and even then consensus would be required. 
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This study has shown that CCAMLR is consistent with Article 10 of UNFSA, to 
which all but three of CCAMLR Members are also Parties. By using inclusive 
consensus as their decision-making process, CCAMLR has, with a few exceptions, 
adopted and implemented CMs in a timely and effective manner. Such measures 
practically and effectively apply the "ecosystem" and "precautionary" approach to 
fisheries management as a high priority. Therefore it can be concluded that consensus 
has not made it harder for CCAMLR to formulate and implement management 
measures is consistent with Article IX of the CAMLR Convention. 
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Appendix 1 
Article 10 ofUNFSA- Functions of Subregional and Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations and Arrangements 
(Source: UNFSA 1995) 
In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements, States shall: 
(a) agree on and comply with conservation and management measures to ensure the long-
term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; 
(b) agree, as appropriate, on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable catch or 
levels of fishing effort; 
( c) adopt and apply any generally recommended international minimum standards for the 
responsible conduct of fishing operations; 
( d) obtain and evaluate scientific advice, review the status of the stocks and assess the 
impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species; 
( e) agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of data on 
fisheries for the stocks; 
(f) compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data, as described in Annex 
I, to ensure that the best scientific evidence is available, while maintaining confidentiality 
where appropriate; 
(g) promote and conduct scientific assessments of the stocks and relevant research and 
disseminate the results thereof; 
(h) establish appropriate cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring, control, 
surveillance and enforcement; 
(i) agree on means by which the fishing interests of new members of the organization or 
new participants in the arrangement will be accommodated; 
G) agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation 
and management measures in a timely and effective manner; 
(k) promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Part VIII; 
(1) ensure the full cooperation of their relevant national agencies and industries m 
implementing the recommendations and decisions of the organization or arrangement; and 
(m) give due publicity to the conservation and management measures established by the 




Consensus in CCAMLR - Questionnaire 
Benefits: First hand knowledge and opinions from professionals with experience and 
I 
expertise in Antarctic policy or Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. 
1. What is consensus? 
Please rank your answers from 1 to 6, 1 being the answer you most agree with and 6 
being the answer you least agree with. 
1. lack of formal objection 
2. everybody agrees 
3. lowest common denominator that everybody agrees 
4. condescending to minority point of view 
5. overwhelming majority agreement 
6. a mechanism allowing inclusiveness in decision-making 
2. In your opinion CCAMLR is a model of what form of consensus decision-
making? 
Please choose one. 
(a) lack of formal objection 
(b) everybody agrees 
( c) lowest common denominator that everybody agrees 
( d) condescending to minority point of view 
(e) overwhelming majority agreement 
3. In your view CCAMLR has succeeded as a decision-making system 
YES NO 
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4. In your view CCAMLR has failed as a decision-making system because 
(a) decisions take too long 
(b) decisions are so diluted as to be meaningless 
(c) because oflack of commitment 
( d) other reasons 
Please elaborate on your answer. 
5. Are decisions reached by consensus weaker because they have had to be 
negotiated until all parties agree? 
YES NO 
6. It has been argued that consensus weakens the possibility of reaching effective 
decisions. Do you agree? 
YES NO 
7. Do you believe consensus should be unqualified or should there be an "opt 
out" procedure? 
If so, what "opt out" procedure should be used and how? 
8. Do you believe "opt out" procedures are contrary to the idea of consensus? 
YES NO 
9. What is consensus-minus-one? 
Please choose one. 
(a) nonsense 
(b) useful for naming and shaming 
(c) legitimate decision-making tool 
( d) is against the nature of the Antarctic Treaty, and therefore CCAMLR 
( e) is useful in CCAMLR 
(f) violates inclusivity in decision-making 
Please explain your answer. 
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10. Do you believe consensus-minus-one could be used in certain circumstances, 
such as black listing of vessels where the reaching of consensus is unlikely? 
YES NO 
11. Do you believe CCAMLR is in line with Article 10 of the United Nations Fish 
Stock Agreement (attached for your reference) and has a decision-making procedure 
which "facilitates the adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely 
and effective manner"? 
YES NO 
12. Should consensus remain the basis of all decision-making in CCAMLR for 
matters of substance or is there room for another method? 
YES NO 
13. What other decision-making method could CCAMLR use for matters of 
substance? 
14. Does consensus make it harder for CCAMLR to formulate management 
measures in fulfilling the obligations of Article IX of the Convention (attached for 
your reference)? 
YES NO 
15. Do you have personal experience of a decision-making process other than 
consensus? And if so, how would you rate the decisions made compared to those in 
CCAMLR? 
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Questionnaire participant list 
Dr Marcus Haward - School of Government, University of Tasmania 
Dr. Marie Jaccobsson - Sweden 
Ambassador Jorge Berguno - Chile 
Dr Enrique Marschoff - Argentina 
Dr Erik Molenaar - Netherlands 
Dr Mike Richardson - United Kingdom 




Consensus in CCAMLR - Interview questions 
Benefits: First hand knowledge and opinions from professionals with experience and 
expertise in Antarctic policy or Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. 
1. What is consensus? 
2. In your opinion CCAMLR is a model of what form of consensus decision-
making? 
3. In your view CCAMLR has succeeded as a decision-making system 
4. In your view CCAMLR has failed as a decision-making system because 
5. Are decisions reached by consensus weaker because they have had to be 
negotiated until all parties agree? 
6. It has been argued that consensus weakens the possibility of reaching effective 
decisions. Do you agree? 
7. Do you believe consensus should be unqualified or should there be an "opt 
out" procedure? If so, what "opt out" procedure should be used and how? 
8. Do you believe "opt out" procedures are contrary to the idea of consensus? 
9. What is consensus-minus-one? 
10. Do you believe consensus-minus-one could be used in certain circumstances, 
such as black listing of vessels where the reaching of consensus is unlikely? 
11. Do you believe CCAMLR is in line with Article 10 of the United Nations Fish 
Stock Agreement (attached for your reference) and has a decision-making 
procedure which "facilitates the adoption of conservation and management 
measures in a timely and effective manner"? 
12. Should consensus remain the basis of all decision-making in CCAMLR for 
matters of substance or is there room for another method? 
13. What other decision-making method could CCAMLR use for matters of 
substance? 
14. Does consensus make it harder for CCAMLR to formulate management 
measures in fulfilling the obligations of Article IX of the Convention (attached 
for your reference)? 
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15. Do you have personal experience of a decision-making process other than 
consensus? And if so, how would you rate the decisions made compared to 
those in CCAMLR? 
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Interview participant list 
Mr Peter Amutenya - Namibia 
Ambassador Karsten Klepsvik - Norway 
Mr Gennady Boltenko - Russian Federation 
Mr Martin Exel- Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) 
Mr Michel Trinquier - France 
Ms Theressa Akkers (Frantz)- South Africa 
Dr Seo-Hang Lee- Republic of Korea 
Appendix 5 
Mr Alistair Graham - Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) representative 
Dr Andrew Constable - Australia 
Dr Anthony Press - Australia 
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Statement by the Chairman of the Conference on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(Source: CCAMLR 2007b) 
Appendix 6 
The Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources decided to 
include in the publication of the Final Act of the Conference the text of the following 
statement made by the Chairman on 19 May 1980 regarding the application of the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources to the waters 
adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet over which France has jurisdiction and to waters 
adjacent to other islands within the area to which this Convention applies over which 
the existence of State sovereignty is recognised by all Contracting Parties. 
1. Measures for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources of the 
waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet, over which France has jurisdiction, adopted 
by France prior to the entry into force of the Convention, would remain in force after 
the entry into force of the Convention until modified by France acting within the 
framework of the Commission or otherwise. 
2. After the Convention has come into force, each time the Commission should 
undertake examination of the conservation needs of the marine living resources of the 
general area in which the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet are to be found, it 
would be open to France either to agree that the waters in question should be included 
in the area of application of any specific CM under consideration or to indicate that 
they should be excluded. In the latter event, the Commission would not proceed to the 
adoption of the specific CM in a form applicable to the waters in question unless 
France removed its objection to it. France could also adopt such national measures as 
it might deem appropriate for the waters in question. 
3. Accordingly, when specific CMs are considered within the framework of the 
Commission and with the participation of France, then: 
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France would be bound by any CMs adopted by consensus with its participation for 
the duration of those measures. This would not prevent France from promulgating 
national measures that were more strict than the Commission's measures or which 
dealt with other matters; 
in the absence of consensus, France could promulgate any national measures which it 
might deem appropriate. 
4. CMs, whether national measures or measures adopted by the Commission, in 
respect of the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet, would be enforced by France. 
The system of observation and inspection foreseen by the Convention would not be 
implemented in the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet except as agreed by 
France and in the manner so agreed. 
5. The understandings, set forth in paragraphs 1 to 4 above, regarding the 
application of the Convention to waters adjacent to the islands of Kerguelen and 
Crozet, also apply to waters adjacent to the islands within the area to which this 
Convention applies over which the existence of State sovereignty is recognised by all 
Contracting Parties.' 
No objection to the statement was made. 
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Ocean Governance 
Consensus or Not Consensus: That Is the CCAMLR 
Question 
Jacquelyn Turner, Julia Jabour, and Denzil Miller* 
Institute of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies, University of 
Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent commentary has highlighted inconsistencies between international 
legal concepts (norms and rules) and the capacity of States to adopt or 
implement them.1 In some cases, the State legal systems in place are readily 
able to accommodate the dynamic new norms that have evolved from rapid 
changes in contemporary international values or policies (e.g., in respect of 
torture, trade, greenhouse gas emissions, etc.). When this is not the case, 
the obvious conclusion is that legal operating systems need to adapt, or 
imbalances are likely to persist and new norms will not be given full effect. 2 
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CAMLR Convention) 3 is a longstanding international agree-
ment that celebrated its 25th annual meeting in 2006. In this article, we 
retrospectively analyze the Convention's implementation by its administra-
tive Commission (CCAMLR) to evaluate the regime's adaptability. The 
article focuses on the key role that CCAMLR's consensus-based decision-
making has played in relation to a recent qualification to past practice 
arising from "consensus-minus-one" decisions. The overall effectiveness of 
the regime is accordingly assessed. 
Recognizing that consensus does not operate in a vacuum, we 
hypothesize that CCAMLR's management of Southern Ocean marine living 
*The opmions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not 
represent the collective, or official, views or decisions of the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 
1. C. Ku and P. Diehl, "Filling in the Gaps: Extrasystemic Mechanisms for 
Addressing Imbalances Between the International Legal Operating System and the 
Normative System," Global Governance 12 (2006): 161-183. 
2. Id., p. 161. 
3. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 19 
International Legal Materials 837. 
Ocean Yearbook 22: 117-157. 
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resources comprises at least four essential elements: cooperation, compro-
mise, consensus, and compliance. To help explain how CCAMLR functions, 
a particular methodological template is applied to these elements to 
ascertain if it is possible to place them within either an operating or a 
normative system or sometimes both. As Figure 1 shows, the elements are 
essentially discrete, but linked; we emphasize this point by illustrating how 
they interact. · 
Our study begins by exploring CCAMLR's history and how cooperation 
has beep. achieved even though the overriding interests of the States 
involved encompass a commercially competitive activity (harvesting). Like 
many international legal instruments, the Convention's negotiation invari-
ably led to compromises. The Chairman's Statement, appended to the 
Convention, is itself a built-in compromise on the application of CCAMLR's 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, we examine what is meant by "consensus": how it operates to 
underpin compliance, and what the emerging notion of "consensus-minus-
one" implies. Our primary objective is to establish if the current CCAMLR 
decision-making process actually improves compliance-a reasonable ex-
pectation that indicates if the regime is working effectively. 
METHODOLOGY 
Based on the work of Diehl et al.4 a hybridized template was created to 
address the four essential CCAMLR Cs (cooperation, compromise, consen-
sus and compliance) highlighted in Figure 1. While CCAMLR processes are 
essentially factual and structural, our approach allowed explanatory interro-
gation of the normative system in terms of both process and structure. 
The framework employed to explain the dynamics of international law 
illustrated in Figure 2 was used to formulate a way to measure CCAMLR's 
effectiveness. 
As such, regime effectiveness (E) in our study was taken as comprising 
the function: 
Where: 
C1 = Cooperation 
C2 = Compromise 
C3 = Compliance 
4. P. Diehl, C. Ku and D. Zamora, "The Dynamics of International Law: The 
Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems," International Organization 57 
(Winter 2003): 43-75. 
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FIG. 2.-Framework for explaining the dynamics of international law 
(after Diehl et al., n. 4). 
INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FUNCTIONS , 
-------- ----------A mechanism for A mechanism for shaping facilitating cross-border values and goals these 
interactions interactions pursue 
I I 
Operating system Normative system 
(Structural) (Directive) 
A B 
It was also assumed that without alignment between the operating and 
normative elements of the Convention as a legal instrument, and in the 
absence of State commitment to the values and goals of that instrument, its 
legal or regulatory outcomes may fail. As articulated by Diehl et al., our 
formulation above can then be refined in terms of international legal 
effectiveness (E) to: 
E=A+B+Pc 
Where: 
A = Operational System (Structural) (see Figure 2) 
B = Normative System (Directive) (see Figure 2) 
Pc = Political Consensus and Will 
Based on interpretations from the literature, we assumed that an 
operating system (A) is essentially a constitution for the purposes of 
international law. It would be derived from such instruments as the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties5 and appropriately represented in the 
CAMLR Convention. As such, an operating system would usually be 
independent of any particular norm and would often precede evolution of a 
norm rather than reacting to its existence. 6 For our purposes, operating 
system components include the sources of law (including the rules for law 
formation, participation, and obligation), the actors involved (including 
5. Diehl, Ku and Zamora, see n. 4 above, p. 46. 
6. Id., p. 48. 
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those with legal rights and duties), the applicable jurisdiction (including 
actors' or institutions' obligations and rights in respect of disputes) and 
various institutional aspects (including forums to enforce compliance or 
settle disputes).7 CCAMLR itself therefore constitutes the Convention's 
operating system in structure and process. 
In our methodology, the normative system (B), as interpreted by Diehl 
et al., allowed us to extrapolate CCAMLR norms from particular values or 
policies and then to define acceptable standards of actor behavior. In 
general terms, we recognized that norms generally develop from issue-
specific areas, such as human rights, or more recently, nuclear non-
proliferation.8 In the CCAMLR context, norms are derived from the 
stewardship of common resources as well as the environmental responsibili-
ty attached to the sustainable exploitation of such resources. The CCAMLR 
normative system was thus seen to comprise the normative content of the 
regime's processes, institutional as well as regulatory. 
Therefore, in assessing the CCAMLR regime's effectiveness, we have 
considered a combination of structure in an international law context; the 
normative framework from which this structure derives, or to which it 
responds; and the reaching of political consensus in meeting the Conven-
tion's objectives. Diehl and Ku have described such interaction between 
these components as "colouring within the lines,"9 a most appropriate 
artistic analogy. 
THE OPERATING SYSTEM-COOPERATION AND COMPROMISE 
CCAMLR is an intergovernmental organization with legal personality 
established under Articles VII and VIII of the CAMLR Convention. Its 
primary purpose is the conservation and rational use of marine living 
resources in the Southern Ocean south of the Antarctic Convergence (now 
termed the Polar Front) .10 The genesis of the CAMLR Convention,11 
CCAMLR itself and the attached structural system is to be found in the 
Antarctic Treaty.12 
7. Id., p. 47. 
8. Id., p. 53. 
9. P. Diehl and C. Ku, "Coloring Within the Lines: How the Intemauonal 
Legal Operating System Influences Treaty Making" (paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Internauonal Studies Association, Chicago, 28 Feb.-3 Mar. 2007). 
10. CCAMLR Basic Documents, available online: <http:/ /www.ccamlr.org>. 
ll. D. Edwards and]. Heap, "Convention on the Conservation of Antarcuc 
Marine Living Resources: A Commentary," Polar Record 20, 127 (1981): 353-362. 
12. 402 United Nations Treaty Series 71. 
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ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The twelve countries active during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
of I957-58 signed the Antarctic Treaty in Washington, D.C. on I December 
I959. The Treaty's main purposes are to ensure that Antarctica is "used for 
peaceful purposes only" (Article I.I) and to promote "international 
cooperation in scientific investigation" (Article III.I) in areas south of 60° 
South latitude (Article VI). It entered into force on 23 June I961. 
States Parties hold annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
(ATCMs) to exchange information and _consult together on matters of 
common interest pertaining to Antarctica. They formulate and deliberate 
on measures in "furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty" 
(Article IX.I), including the "preservation and conservation of living 
resources" (Article IX. I (f)). 
ATCMs operate on the basis of consensus decisions taken by Consulta-
tive Parties, whereby discussions continue until an agreement acceptable to 
all Consultative Parties is found. ATCM outcomes are only brought into 
effect "when approved by all the Contracting Parties" (Article IX.4). 
Consultative Parties comprise the twelve original signatories plus sixteen 
additional Contracting States that have demonstrated their interest in 
Antarctica by conducting significant scientific research there (Article IX.2). 
The Antarctic Treaty draws heavily on a strong philosophy of coopera-
tion based on the free exchange of information, personnel, and scientific 
results within the Treaty Area (especially under Articles III and IX). This 
philosophy was derived from some of the key events associated with the 
Treaty's genesis. The most prominent of these was scientific collaboration 
during the IGY, which helped to smooth the way for, and inspire confidence 
in, a political process aimed at solving potential problems attached to 
Antarctic sovereignty.13 Seven States (Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, 
New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) claimed parts of the 
continent; two others, the United States and the former Soviet Union (now 
the Russian Federation), reserved their right to make claims in the future; 
while the three remaining original Treaty signatories (Japan, Poland, and 
South Africa) were silent on the issue. This situation encouraged the States 
most actively involved with the IGY to reach a compromise on sovereignty as 
outlined in Article IV of the Treaty. Effectively, Article IV acknowledges the 
existence of, but then sets aside, all claims in favor of the ongoing peaceful 
use of Antarctica. This compromise has served the Treaty Parties well over 
13. P. Beck, The Intematzonal Politics of Antarctica (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 
1986). 
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the years by allowing States to engage in peaceful activities in the Treaty 
Area. 14 
Finally, the Antarctic Treaty relies on States to implement their Treaty 
obligations and to assist with compliance: a system of mutual observation 
and inspection was established by Article VII. 
The Antarctic Treaty itself did not explicitly regulate all forms of 
human activity in Antarctica, such as harvesting of marine living resources 
or mineral exploitation. In fact, Article VI clearly states that the Treaty's 
provisions are without prejudice to any rights that States might enjoy under 
international law with respect to the high seas. Under the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea15 (UNCLOS) such rights would 
include the right to fish as balanced with the obligation to cooperate in the 
conservation of marine living resources under UNCLOS Articles 116-119. 
In fact, this derogation appears to have been a compelling motive for Parties 
to negotiate a dedicated regime to conserve Antarctic marine living 
resources at a time when there was major concern that an impending 
Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba) fishery could have severe implications for 
the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole.16 
Since the Treaty Consultative Parties themselves negotiated the CAMLR 




Significant commercial harvesting of finfish in the Southern Ocean 
developed in the late 1960s and the development of a krill fishery followed 
in the early 1970s.17 With the severe commercial depletion of Antarctic 
whale and seal populations in mind, and given the key position of krill in 
the Antarctic marine food chain,18 this development gave rise to growing 
concern that over-harvesting of krill might have serious effects on other 
14. C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1998). 
15. 21 International Legal Materials 1261. 
16. D. Miller, "Explmtation of Antarctic Manne Living Resources: A Brief 
History and a Possible Approach to Managing the Knll Fishery," South African 
journal of Manne Science 10 (1991): 321-339. 
17. I. Everson, Knll: Biology, Ecology and Fzshenes (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 
2000). 
18. D. Agnew, "Review: The CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Programme," 
Antarctic Science 9, 3 (1997). 235-242. 
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species and the Antarctic marine environment. This point was clearly 
expressed in the CAMLR Convention's Preamble.19 
At the ninth ATCM in 1977 the Consultative Parties initiated Recom-
mendation IX-2, calling for the establishment of a definitive regime for the 
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources within the Treaty frame-
work. Ideally, this required an ecosystem-based management regime to deal 
with both the direct and indirect effects of harvesting. 20 A Special 
Consultative Meeting was convened in 1978 to draft such a regime. 
The CAMLR Convention was subsequently negotiated during a series of 
formal and informal consultations before being finalized at an international 
conference (the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources) in Canberra, Australia in May 1980.21 The Convention 
entered into force on 7 April 1982. 
Institutional Provisions 
The CAMLR Convention defines marine living resources as "populations of 
fin-fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, 
including birds, found south of the Antarctic Convergence" (Article I.2). 
Technically this would place whales and seals under CCAMLR jurisdiction. 
However, Article VI of the Convention expressly recognizes the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the 1972 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals as having prior and 
continued authority over the harvesting and conservation of whales and 
seals respectively. 
The CCAMLR approach is considered unique for a variety of reasons. 
These include its conservation principles, which apply an "ecosystem and 
precautionary approach"22; the fact that conservation is balanced with 
rational use; and its bio-geographical definition of the Convention Area 
(Figure 3). Therefore, as set out in Articles I and II of the Convention, 
19. B. Mitchell and R. Sandbrook, The Management of the Southern Ocean 
(London: Internatrnnal Institute for Environment and Development, 1980); S. Nicol 
and W. de la Mare, "Ecosystem Management and the Antarctic Krill," American 
Scientist 81 (1993): 36-47. 
20. Edwards and Heap, see n. 11 above. 
21. CCAMLR Basic Documents, see n. 10 above. 
22. D. Powell, "Antarctic Marine Living Resources and CCAMLR," in Antarcti-
ca's Future: Continuity or Change? ed. R. Herr, H. Hall and M. Haward (Hobart: 
Tasmanian Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 61-70, A. Constable, W. de la 
Mare, D. Agnew, I. Everson and D. Miller, "Managing Fisheries to Conserve the 
Antarctic Marine Ecosystem: Pracucal implementation of the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Livmg Resources (CCAMLR)," ICES Journal of 
Manne Science 57 (2000): 778-791. 
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FIG. 3.-CCAMLR area of application. 
Source. <http·/ /www.ccamlr.org>. 
CCAMLR became the first international regime to formalize an ecosystem 
and precautionary approach for a defined bio-geographical area. 23 
The bio-geographic definition of the CAMLR Convention Area applies 
not only to Antarctic marine living resources south of 60° S (that is, the 
Treaty Area), but also to living resources farther north to encompass the 
area south of the Antarctic Convergence (now termed the Antarctic Polar 
Front). The Convergence is essentially a hydrographic feature that separates 
cold Antarctic waters from warmer sub-Tropical waters to the north. It is 
thus seen as constituting an effective bio-geographic boundary to organisms 
found in Antarctic waters of the Southern Ocean as well as to the Antarctic 
marine ecosystem.24 While the Convention not only duplicates Treaty 
sovereignty provisions (Articles IV and V), it effectively expands the Treaty's 
geographic influence northwards to the Convergence as defined in Article 
1.4 of the CAMLR Convention .. 
The CAMLR Convention therefore encompasses areas within the 
Treaty Area, high seas areas, and areas subject to national jurisdiction, both 
disputed and universally recognized. As highlighted, Article IV specifically 
deals with sovereignty in the Treaty Area along Treaty lines. However, this 
raises questions concerning the Convention's application within areas 
23. R. Arnaudo, "A short history of CCAMLR: A Unique Management and 
Conservation Regime" (paper presented to CCAMLR Symposium, Valdivia, 05-08 
Apr. 2005); see also Constable et al., n. 22 above. 
24. Id. 
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under national jurisdiction in the CCAMLR Area north of 60°S. The 
interpretive statement (the so-called "Chairman's Statement") made by the 
presiding Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources draws on the precedent of French sovereignty over 
waters adjacent to Kerguelen and the Crozet Islands to outline how 
conservation measures agreed by CCAMLR under Article IX could be 
applied in such waters. In practice, various interpretations of the Chair-
man's Statement have been applied to other islands within the Convention 
Area.25 
The CAMLR Convention was open for signature by all States participat-
ing in the Conference (Article XXVI), and accession has been subsequently 
offered to any State interested in research or harvesting (Article XXIX). 
Under Article XXVIII, regional economic integration organizations may 
also accede to the Convention; the European Community became a Party 
on 21 April 1982 and then a CCAMLR Member on 21 May 1982. The 
conditions for becoming a CCAMLR Member are more stringent under 
Article VII.2 ("actively involved in harvesting or research") and a Party must 
accede before seeking membership. Only Members take part in decision 
making under Article XII, meaning that the system is essentially two-tiered 
in that respect. 
Under Article XXI, the Convention imposes obligations on each 
Contracting Party to "take appropriate measures within its competence to 
ensure compliance" with the Convention's provisions and with "conserva-
tion measures adopted by the Commission to which the Party is bound in 
accordance with Article IX.'' 
CCAMLR was established under Article VII of the Convention to give 
effect to the objectives and principles set out in Article II. The functions of 
the Commission are enumerated in Article IX; they include facilitating 
research, compiling data, and acquiring catch and effort statistics on 
harvested populations. The dissemination and publication of attached 
information is also part of CCAMLR's mandate (Article IX.l). 
However, CCAMLR's key function is to develop measures (Article IX.l 
and 2) in relation to conservation needs and to formulate, adopt, and revise 
such measures based on the best scientific evidence available (Article 
IX.l (f)). Such "conservation measures" (hereafter CMs) generally regulate 
where and how Parties can participate in CCAMLR-sanctioned fisheries. 
CCAMLR negotiates measures such as precautionary catch limits, open and 
closed seasons/areas, by-catch limits, and Vessel Monitoring Systems. 
Like any other matter of substance before CCAMLR (Article XII), 
decisions on CMs are made by consensus. Once a decision is made on a CM, 
the Members are notified and, in the absence of any objection, the CM 
25. CCAMLR Basic Documents, see n. 10 above. 
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becomes binding after 180 days (Article IX.6). However, Article IX sets out 
what is commonly referred to as an "opt out" procedure, wherein a 
Member has ninety days to notify CCAMLR that it is unable to accept a CM. 
Under this provision the measure "shall not, to the extent stated, be 
binding upon that Member" (Article IX.6(c)). 
Under Article XXIV, CCAMLR has adopted both a System of Inspec-
tion and an International Scientific Observer Scheme. Both these institu-
tions aim to promote the Convention's objectives and monitor its imple-
mentation in respect of compliance with CMs and the collection of essential 
scientific data from fishing vessels, respectively. 
Article XXV outlines a three-step approach to be applied in resolving 
disputes. First, the affected Contracting Parties are urged to resolve issues 
bilaterally and in-house. Should this fail the parties can then choose either 
to take the matter to the International Court of Justice, or attempt to resolve 
it by convening an arbitral tribunal under a procedure annexed to the 
Convention. It is worth noting that no dispute has arisen in CCAMLR's 
twenty-five year history. 
Administrative Arrangements 
The CAMLR Convention establishes CCAMLR's headquarters (Article 
XIII.I) in Hobart, Australia and appoints an Executive Secretary (Article 
XVlI. l). The Executive Secretary and the Secretariat staff "perform the 
functions entrusted to them by the Commission" (Article XVlI.3). The 
Secretariat therefore supports the annual meetings and carries out 
CCAMLR's day-to-day administrative functions. These include: 
• facilitation of communications with and between Members; 
• production and distribution of publications; 
• receipt and management Qf scientific data; 
• central management of a Catch Document Scheme and Vessel 
Monitoring System; and 
• monitoring of compliance with CMs and other decisions of the 
Commission. 
CCAMLR is served by two standing committees established under 
Convention Article XIII.6 (see Figure 4). The Standing Committee on 
Administration and Finance (SCAF) deals with administrative and budget-
ary issues. The Standing Committee on Inspection and Compliance (SCIC), 
formerly the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection, deals 
with compliance issues such as inspections, observers, the Catch Document 
Scheme, Vessel Monitoring Systems, and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulat-
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ed (IUU) fishing. The Standing Committees essentially advise CCAMLR and 
inform its consensus-based decision making. 
The Scientific Committee, established under Convention Article XIV, is 
a consultative body that also advises CCAMLR. It provides a "forum for 
consultation and co-operation concerning the collection, study and ex-
change of information" (Article XV.I) and is the source of the "best 
scientific evidence available," consistent with Article IX.l(f). The designa-
tion of the Scientific Committee as the only source of the best scientific 
evidence available for CCAMLR was formalized in 1990.26 
The Scientific Committee also uses consensus as the basis for decisions 
on matters of substance. Where consensus cannot be achieved the Scientific 
Committee sets out all views advanced on the matter under consideration in 
its report to CCAMLR 27 
Largely as a legacy of the Convention's origins in the Antarctic Treaty, 
cooperation and compromise are essential elements of CCAMLR's operat-
ing system. Both manifest themselves in the normative system, where they 
are implemented through consensus decision making-the element that, 
added to the moral compunction to comply with Articles IX and XXI-
inspires compliance. 
THE NORMATIVE SYSTEM-COMPROMISE AND COMPLIANCE 
General 
The CCAMLR normative system ongmates in the cooperative elements 
described in the previous section, but is also inherently bounded by 
compromise and compliance. As such, consensus-based decision making is 
the glue that holds CCAMLR's normative system together. These four 
elements provide both prescriptions for acceptable behavior and proscrip-
tions on certain unacceptable activities. Under Article II of the Convention, 
CCAMLR's normative objective is to ensure that key Antarctic marine 
ecosystem elements are taken into account when applying precaution to the 
management of Antarctic marine living resources. 
In terms of prescriptions for acceptable behavior, it is worth noting that 
the Convention was negotiated at a time when the interests of conservation-
minded States (for example, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) had to be balanced with those of harvesting States (for example, 
26. Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-IX), (Hobart: 
CCAMLR, 1990), para. 7.6. 
27. Scientific Committee Rules of Procedure, Part II, Rule 3, m CCAMLR Basic 
documents, see n. 10 above. 
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FIG. 4.-CCAMLR organogram illustrating connections between its Standing 
Committees, Scientific Committee and scientific Working Groups. 
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Japan and the Soviet bloc) .28 This compromise is clearly reflected in Article 
II of the Convention, which states that the main objective of the Convention 
is "the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources" such that "the 
term 'conservation' includes rational use." Article II then outlines the 
"principles of conservation" to be applied in meeting this objective (Article 
II.3), including CCAMLR's ecosystem and precautionary approach. Article 
II also sets some standards for risk ·minimization in addressing the 
anticipated effects of harvesting and environmental variability. The Scientif-
ic Committee provides the scientific advice on which to base any attached 
management action aimed at achieving Article II goals. · 
Ideally, all the information required for sustainable exploitation of fish 
stocks should be known before commercial harvesting begins.29 To this end, 
CCAMLR has protocols in place for new and exploratory fisheries that 
require the collection of data prior to and during the development of a 
fishery. This helps to ensure that development does not outpace CCAMLR's 
ability to collect the data necessary to achieve its objectives.30 
CCAMLR's normative system is evident in the way in which the 
Scientific Committee goes about its business. In accordance with Article 
XVI.3, the Scientific Committee has set up a number of working groups to 
facilitate its work (see Figure 4). These comprise the Working Groups on 
Ecosystem Monitoring and Management (WG-EMM), Fish Stock Assessment 
(WG-FSA), an ad hoe Working Group on Incidental Mortality Associated 
with Fishing (WG-IMAF), and most recently, the Working Group on 
Statistics, Assessment and Modelling (WG-SAM). Members fishing in the 
Convention Area, scientific observers, and scientific surveys provide the data 
used by CCAMLR's scientific working groups. 31 The products of these 
Groups' deliberations are formally presented to the Scientific Committee, 
where all recommendations or advice to CCAMLR are determined by 
consensus or recorded if consensus cannot be reached. 32 
28. Beck, see n. 13 above. 
29. D. Miller, E. Sabourenkov and D. Ramm, "CCAMLR's Approach to 
Managing Marine Living Resources," in Deep Sea 2003: Conference on the Governance 
and Management of Deep-sea Fishenes, Part 1: Conference reports,-1-5 December 2003, 
Queenstown, New l:edand, ed. R.-Shotton (Rome: FAO, 2006), pp. 433-481. 
30. CCAMLR-IX, see n. 26 above, paras. 9.1-9.10; D. Miller, E. Sabourenkov 
and D. Ramm, "Managing Antarctic Marine Living Resources: The CCAMLR 
Approach," International Journal of Manne and Coastal Law 19, 3 (2004): 317-325. 
31. CCAMLR Comm1ss10n, "CCAMLR's Management of the Antarctic" (Ho-
bart: CCAMLR Secretariat, 2001). 
32. CCAMLR Basic Documents, n. 10, Part II, Rule 3. 
Consensus or not Consensus in CCAMLR 131 
COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS 
As noted earlier, CCAMLR decisions on matters of substance are consensus-
based. To avoid confusion, it is important to establish exactly how the term 
"consensus" is used, first in general terms and then in the CCAMLR 
context specifically. 
Consensus decision-making was enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty 
System (ATS) following the enactment of Treaty Article IX.4. Since the 
CAMLR Convention was negotiated under the Treaty forum and the 
Convention is a key part of the ATS, consensus-based decision-making 
procedure naturally followed the precedent set in the Treaty itself, as well as 
in the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS). 
In the CCAMLR context, consensus decision-making also serves to 
reconcile the conservationist and harvest-directed interests of the participat-
ing States as highlighted above. Under Article XII of the CAMLR 
Convention, each CCAMLR Member has an equal voice in decisions. Such 
decisions are legally binding and, in the case of catch limits, can have 
significant economic or social implications.33 In contrast to the Internation-
al Whaling Commission, where a three-quarters majority voting procedure 
prevails, harvesting interests within CCAMLR are given equal weight when 
making decisions affecting harvesting activities. In other words, no 
CCAMLR decision is forced through against the will of one or more of the 
Parties.34 
Although the form of consensus used by CCAMLR is not explicitly 
defined, it has been defined in another ATS instrument. Article 25.5 of the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(CRAMRA35 ) described consensus as "the absence of a formal objection." 
Although never formally ratified, CRAMRA was opened for signature in 
1988, six years after CCAMLR entered into force. However, both agree-
ments were negotiated under the Treaty's auspices for a similar purpose, 
that is, management of commercial resource exploitation.36 Therefore, it 
would appear justified to assume that "consensus" in the CCAMLR context 
has a similar interpretation, that is, a decision made in the absence of any 
formal objection. 
33. David Anderson, pers. comm. (2006). 
34. R. Trolle-Anderson, "The Antarcuc Scene: Legal and Political Facts," m 
The Antarctic Treaty Regtme: Law, Environment, & Resources, ed. G. Triggs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 57-64. 
35. CRAMRA, available online: <http:/ /www.ats.aq>. 
36.]. Charney, "The Antarcuc System and Customary International Law," in 
International Law for Antarctica, eds. F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International), pp. 51-101 at pp. 52-53. 
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It has been said that consensus gives any single CCAMLR Member a 
power of veto over any proposed measure.37 However, practice appears to 
indicate otherwise. The opt-out provisions of Article IX of the Convention 
have only been invoked twice in twenty-five years and the dispute resolution 
procedures in Article XXV have never been activated. Therefore, since 
consensus is essentially inclusive, CCAMLR tends to debate an issue until 
consensus is achieved, as the Volna issue at CCAMLR-XXV demonstrates 
(see below), or until a compromise acceptable to all is reached.38 
The pace at which the institution has been able to pursue innovative 
and trend-setting measures is further evidence for the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR decision-making. In both timing and effect such measures have 
tended to outpace those of other regional fisheries management organiza-
tions39 and have set the standard for best practice intemationally.40 
From a regime perspective, CCAMLR decisions are also confined by 
three key attributes-political will, legal obligation, and institutional 
mechanisms.41 Political will influences not only the overall decision agenda 
but also represents a desire, collective or otherwise, to cooperate in 
reaching an acceptable outcome. The attached cost(s) are usually assessed 
in terms of self-interest and carry with them a moral obligation to 
implement any decision taken. 
Institutional mechanisms provide the necessary information to facilitate 
decision making. In CCAMLR's case, this ranges from the reporting of 
necessary information by Members (Convention Article XX) through the 
compilation of necessary data, including dissemination of essential informa-
tion (Article XV.2 (b )-( d)), to the provision of scientific advice (Article 
XV.2. ( e)). In the absence of the three attributes outlined above, attached 
decisions would be essentially pointless since their implementation is 
voluntary and the basis for the decision would be dubious. On balance, our 
hybrid analysis framework is closely aligned with this general formulation, as 
CCAMLR's structure (the operating system) and directives (the normative 
37. A. Watts, Intematzonal Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications, 1992); S. Kaye, International Fzsherzes Management (London: 
Kluwer Law, 2001). 
38. Report of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXV) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 2006), para. 9.38. 
39. Miller et al., see n. 30 above. 
40. A. Willock and M. Lack, Follow the Leader: Learning from Experience and Best 
Practice zn Regional Fzsherzes Management Organzsatzons (WWF International and 
TRAFFIC International, 2006). 
41. J. Swan, "Decision-Making in Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements: 
The Evolving Role of RFBs and International Agreement on Decision-Making 
Processes,'' FAO Fzsherzes Circular No 995 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Orgamzation 
of the United Nations, 2004). 
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system) conJom with political ownership to ensure the effectiveness of 
decisions. 
In CCAMLR's case, it can therefore be said that decision making is fair 
and strives to include elements of accountability, participation, and 
transparency. It follows that all Member States share responsibility for any 
decision made and should be held accountable for its effective implementa-
tion, since they participated in making the decision in the first place. 
Transparency in turn serves to provide legitimacy to the decision, particular-
ly for those outside the normative system. 
To summarize CCAMLR's circumstances, consensus is essentially 
decision making that reflects a modicum of agreement between all 
Members. In these terms, decisions represent the collective "best interest." 
However, recent developments within CCAMLR now appear to challenge 
this institutional norm. 
CONSENSUS-MINUS-ONE 
The notion of "consensus-minus-one" has emerged in CCAMLR delibera-
tions over the past few years. At CCAMLR's twenty-fifth meeting in 2006, the 
SCIC was unable to reach consensus on the inclusion of the Russian-flagged 
Volna42 in the IUU Vessel List set up under CCAMLR CM 10-06.43 The 
Russian delegation explained that while the vessel had been placed on the 
List for fishing in a closed area, it had in fact set its longlines in an open 
area. Having drifted into a closed area, the vessel was in the process of 
retrieving its lines when observed. Other Members were equally convinced 
that the Volna had been acting in such a way as to justify inclusion in the 
CCAMLR IUU Vessel List for Contracting Parties in accordance with CM 10-
06. The absence of a decision thus resulted in the Volna not being listed. We 
will now attempt to examine the facts of the matter as reflected in the 
meeting record. 
The CCAMLR Contracting Party (CP-illU) and non-Contracting Party 
(NCP-IUU) IUU vessel lists are both prepared by the Secretariat using 
information provided by Members intersessionally. They are based on 
agreed-upon criteria elaborated in CMs 10-06 and 10-07.44 
It was reported that the Volna had been sighted on 1 February 2006 
hauling a longline and dumping by-catch in a part of CCAMLR Statistical 
42. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, para. 9.16. 
43. The text of this, and all CCAMLR Conservation Measures, is available 
online at <http:/ /www.ccamlr.org>. 
44. Report of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Comm1ss1on (CCAMLR-XXIV), 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 2005), CMs 10-06 and 10-07. 
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Subarea 88.2 that was closed to fishing at the time.45 It was included in the 
Provisional CP-IUU Vessel List in accordance with procedures set out in 
paragraphs 8-11 of Conservation Measure 10-06 on the basis of having 
"fished during closed fishing periods or in closed areas in contravention of 
CCAMLR Conservation Measures.'' 
During SCIC discussions under paragraph 12 of Measure 10-06 Russia 
noted that it had informed Members46 of a full investigation into the Volna 
incident. The investigation had concluded that the vessel was fishing inside 
Subarea 88.1, in an area open to fishing, when one of its longlines tore and 
drifted into an adjacent closed area in Subarea 88.2.47 The vessel Master 
then decided to retrieve the longline from inside the closed area. Some 
Members found this explanation improbable and a paper was tabled to 
indicate that any ocean current prevailing at the time was likely, in fact, to 
have moved the line in a direction opposite to that suggested.48 
Anticipating the SCIC's inability to agree to the CP-IUU Vessel List, 
some Members opened the debate by calling for those States whose flag 
vessels were being considered for inclusion to voluntarily abstain from the 
decision-making process.49 While this could be construed as consensus-
minus--0ne decision-making, these Members believed that it would not 
undermine the general principle of consensus as no formal objection would 
be raised.5° Conversely, other Members felt that it was important to 
maintain an unqualified consensus, "in keeping with the highest objectives 
of the Antarctic Treaty System. " 51 
Russia also noted that other vessels had contravened CMs but were not 
being considered for inclusion on the IUU vessel lists.52 This would suggest 
that either these vessels did not fit the criteria in CM 10-06, or some double-
standard was at work. Since the procedures set out in CM 10-06 are clear 
and were judiciously applied, it can only be concluded on the balance of 
probability that the Volna was correctly listed in the Provisional CP-IUU 
Vessel List. 
Therefore, the question then became not whether the Volna had been 
involved in IUU fishing but rather how agreement on its status could be 
reached. This situation resulted in some Members calling for a reversal of 
45. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, Annex 5, para. 2.37. 
46. CCAMLR Secretariat, COMM CIRC 06/51. 
47. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, Annex 5, para. 2.38. 
48. Id., paras. 2.39 and 2.41. 
49. Id., Annex 5, paras. 2.28-2.62. 
50. Id., para. 2.29. 
51. Id., paras. 2.57, 2.29 and 2.30 respectively. 
52. Id., para. 2.56. 
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the procedure so that a consensus would be necessary to remove the vessel 
from the CP-IUU Vessel List.53 
Despite the lengthy debate, the SCIC remained unable to resolve the 
issue, and it was forwarded to CCAMLR for further consideration. A 
compromise was finally struck when Russia agreed to investigate the Volna's 
actions further based on the new information provided at CCAMLR-XXV. 
Russia also undertook to "communicate to the Commission in a timely 
fashion the actions that it would now take to bring this issue to an 
acceptable resolution."54 The other Members accepted this compromise 
and CCAMLR agreed to postpone any decision on whether to include the 
Volna on the 2006 CP-IUU vessel list until, or before, CCAMLR-XXVI.55 
It could thus be said that in failing to achieve consensus on the Volna 
issue CCAMLR demonstrated a clear failing of this type of decision-making. 
Individual interest(s) overwhelmed any possible agreement. Consensus-
minus-one as suggested above56 appears an obvious solution. However, 
consensus as a principle means that all parties have a say in any decision. 
Furthermore, mandatory abstention from a decision runs rather counter to 
the inclusivity implied by ATS practice over time. The dissenting party may 
also choose not to agree with a consensus-minus-one decision and decide 
not to implement it, even invoking the opt-out provisions in Article IX.6 of 
the CAMLR Convention. 
Objection or opt-out procedures are widely criticized for weakening or 
delaying the implementation of measures.57 However, it should be noted 
that these procedures are employed to protect a State from being bound by 
a decision that is inconsistent with or cannot be applied by their current 
domestic law.58 In the two instances where such a procedure has been 
invoked in relation to CCAMLR CMs this has appeared to be the case. 59 
An additional consideration is that by not reaching consensus on a 
matter of substance, any particular CCAMLR Member could be held to 
account for violating the provisions of Article XXI.l of the Convention. 
Allowing a vessel to continue operating in a CCAMLR-sanctioned fishery 
when, on the reasonable balance of available evidence, it has been 
implicated in contravention of agreed CMs could well be interpreted as 
53. Id., para. 9.32. 
54. Id., para. 9.51. 
55. Id., paras 9.52, 9.40 and 9.39 respectively. 
56. Id., para. 2.29. 
57. Swan, see n. 41 above. 
58. T. McDorman, ''Decision-Making Processes of Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Organizations (RFMOs)," (paper presented at the Conference on the 
Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement, 
St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, 1-5 May 2005). 
59. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, para. 12.22. 
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such a violation. It would then be the place of the Member concerned to 
ensure that appropriate measures were taken to rectify the situation under 
Article XXI.l. Failure to achieve this, along with an apparent unwillingness 
to join a consensus aimed at addressing such a problem, could then be 
construed as a lack of commitment to the Convention's objectives as well as 
a cause for dispute under Article XXV. This would be a final resort, and an 
avenue that has not yet been explored by or within CCAMLR. Its main 
advantage would be that it might provide for an interpretive precedent to be 
set. 
The above situation would be exacerbated if non-Contracting Parties 
are seen to be treated differently to CCAMLR Members when they are 
subject to IUU listing procedures under CM 10-07. This could well lead to a 
perception of discrimination or bias inconsistent with Article 116 of 
UNCLOS, as well as an imbalance in applying Article XXII. l of the 
Convention when compared to Article XXI.l. 
Finally, it is possible that the debate should not be about consensus as a 
principle, but rather about "consent," and that any decision should be 
made only when no Party has any persuasive objection to that decision. The 
consent principle differs from consensus because, with respect to consensus-
based decision making, the participants are agreeing to a decision; with 
respect to consent-based decision making there is no formal statement of 
"unacceptance" required.60 This definition of "consent" is very similar to 
CCAMLR's "lack of formal objection" standard. Therefore it could be said 
that although CCAMLR makes its decisions by consensus, it governs by 
consent-and in the case of the Volna, such consent is lacking. 
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 
A number of articles in the CAMLR Convention help the Parties to maintain 
harmony, comply with general principles and conservation measures, 
ensure compliance from third parties, and deal with breaches. These 
include, inter alia, Articles X (third parties and integrity), XI (harmonization 
with adjacent jurisdictions), XX (information), XXI (compliance), XXII 
(third party compliance), XXIV (observation and inspection), and XXV 
(dispute settlement). As Green and Agnew and others point out, the biggest 
compliance issue facing the Parties is IUU fishing. 61 Globally, IUU fishing is 
60. P. Partridge, Consent and consensus (London: Pall Mall Press L1m1ted, 1971). 
61. J. Green and D. Agnew, "Catch Document Schemes to Combat Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishmg: CCAMLR's Experience with Southern Ocean 
Toothfish," Ocean Yearbook 16 eds. E. Mann Borgese, A Chircop and M. McConnell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002): 171-194 at 172-173. 
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a feature of almost all fisheries and poses a great threat to managing fish 
stocks.62 However, the relatively open access to the CCAMLR-managed 
Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus ekginoides) is particularly susceptible to 
this kind of fishing. The species is also vulnerable to overfishing since it 
grows very slowly and reproduces at an advanced age (between six to ten 
years old). Its management is also complicated by limited information on 
various key aspects of the species' biology.63 
Aside from the obvious danger of overexploitation of the target species, 
IUD fishing in the CCAMLR Area also appears to have a detrimental effect 
on the ecosystem as a whole. Legal fishers in the CCAMLR Area are bound 
by stringent measures aimed at mitigating seabird by-catch during longlin-
ing, as well as measures minimizing marine debris (especially CM 29 /X, 
now CM 25-02). The accepted wisdom is that IUU fishers have no incentive 
to abide by such measures and therefore significant numbers of seabirds are 
killed by IUD fishing operations every year. Although estimates are 
uncertain, they are sure to be well in excess of any incidental seabird 
mortality in CCAMLR-sanctioned fisheries. 64 
The topic of seabird by-catch in the longline fisheries has long been 
considered by CCAMLR. The Commission asked Members at CCAMLR-VIII 
to assess and monitor the species and numbers of birds being caught 
incidentally during fishing operations.65 CCAMLR thus became the first 
international organization to institute seabird incidental mortality mitiga-
tion measures with the adoption of Resolution 5/\711166 : the Protection of 
Seabirds from Incidental Mortality Arising from Longline Fishing.67 The 
Resolution urged all Parties to the Convention engaged in longline fishing 
in the Convention Area to investigate and introduce methods to minimize 
the incidental mortality of seabirds. 
In 1991, the Commission adopted CM 29/X, aimed at preventing or 
minimizing incidental mortality of seabirds associated with longline fishing, 
62. FAO, Imflementatzon of the International Plan of Actzon to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Rome: Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, 2002); U. Sumaila, ]. Alder and H. Keith, 
"Global Scope and Economics of Illegal Rishing," Manne Policy 30, 6 (2006): 
696-703. 
63. I. Everson and A. Murray, "Size at Sexual Maturity of Patagonian Toothfish 
(Dissostichus elegmoides)," CCAMLR Science, 6 (1999): 37-46. 
64. Report of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-
CAMLR-XXN), (Hobart: CCAMLR, 2005), Annex 5, Appendix 0, Table 18. 
65. Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-VIII), 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1989) para. 25. 
66. Unlike CMs, Resolutions are not legally binding. Resolutions are consecu-
tively numbered according to the meeting they were adopted, that is, in this case the 
fifth Resolution from the eighth Meeting. 
67. CCAMLR-VIII, see n. 65 above, paras. 129-130. 
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and CM 30/X, which prohibits the use of net monitor cables on trawl vessels 
for the 1994-1995 fishing season.68 Conservation Measure 29/X initiated 
the use of streamer lines to keep birds away from the longline as it is set and 
the weighting of baited hooks to ensure fast sink rates, among other 
measures. Although it has been considerably revised as new methods of 
deterrence are found, it is still in force today as Conservation Measure 25-
02 (2005). 
In 1994, the first ad hoe Working Group on Incidental Mortality Arising 
from Longline Fishing (WG-IMALF) was held. 69 The terms of reference 
included a review of data on seabird by-catch and the efficacy of seabird 
mitigation measures. The Working Group's name was changed in 2001 to 
the ad hoe Working Group on Incidental Mortality Associated with Fishing 
(WG-IMAF) to reflect the work of the group in considering incidental 
mortality associated with the trawl and pot fisheries. 
IMAF has been successful in quantifying and reducing incidental 
seabird mortalities. Unknown numbers of seabirds were incidentally caught 
in 1994 and large numbers were observed caught in 1997.70 At present, 
CCAMLR is proud of the continued low levels of incidental seabird 
mortality in regulated fisheries. For the first time, no albatrosses were 
reported taken in longline operations71 (see also Figure 5). This is a direct 
result not only of strict mitigation measures, but also of Members' will to 
ensure that their vessels comply with such measures. (It must be noted that 
the French islands of Kerguelen and Crozet are not included in these 
figures, as the French have invoked the Chairman's Statement regarding 
seabird mitigation measures.) 
Reducing the extent of IUU fishing in the Convention Area has been a 
priority item on the Commission's agenda since 1996.72 Consequently, 
CCAMLR has adopted a suite of CMs and Resolutions to combat the 
problems associated with IUU fishing (Table 1). A Policy to Enhance Co-
operation between CCAMLR and non-Contracting Parties has also been put 
in place.73 
68. Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-X) (Hobart: 
CCAMLR, 1991), paras. 10.1-10.2. 
69. Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SG-CAMLR-
XIII), (Hobart: CCAMLR, 1994), Annex 8. 
70. Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XVI) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1997), paras. 6.40-6.41. 
71. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, para. 5.6. 
72. E. Sabourenkov and D. Miller, ''The Management of Trans boundary Stocks 
of Toothfish, Dzssostichus spp., Under the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources," in Management of Shared Fzsh Stocks eds. A. 
Payne, C. O'Brien and S. Rogers (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004): pp. 
68-94. 
73. Report of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-
CAMLR-XXV) (Hobart· CCAMLR, 2006), Annex 8. 
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FIG. 5.-Reported incidental seabird catches by regulated and IUU fisheries 
during longline fishing in the CCAMLR Area (note the different scales). A notable 
decrease in the former to negligible numbers is apparent. 
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Source. Information as compiled from CCAML Scientific Committee reports, available 
online: <http://wwwccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/sr/drt htm>. 
Two key measures have been CCAMLR's introduction of a Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS) and the Dissostichus spp. Catch Documentation 
Scheme (CDS). As a first step, CCAMLR requires vessels to be licensed (CM 
10-02 in Table 1). Licensing allows authorities to determine whether a vessel 
is fishing with due authorization. To that end, vessels may be inspected at 
sea under the System of Inspection or are inspected in port on their return 
from fishing grounds (CM 10-03). 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
To counter IUU activities in the Convention Area, CCAMLR initially 
adopted non-binding Resolution 12/XVI in 1997. The resolution urged 
Contracting Parties to deploy automated VMS to monitor the location of 
flag vessels targeting finfish. (The Contracting Parties have never reached 
consensus on the issue of requiring vessels harvesting krill to implement 
VMS.) The following year CCAMLR adopted CM 148/XVII (now CM 10-
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Table 1.-CCAMLR Conservation Measures and Resolutions Aimed at Eliminating 
IUU Activities in the Convention Area (in consecutive order). 
CM 
10-01 (1998) 
1 0-02 (2006) 
1 0-03 (2005) 
1 0-04 (2006) 
1 0-05 (2006) 
1 0-06 (2006) 











Marking of f1sh1ng vessels and fishing gear 
Licensing and inspection obligations of Contracting Parties 
with regard to their flag vessels operating in the Convention 
Area 
Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish 
Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) 
Catch Documentation Scheme for Oissostichus spp. 
Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party vessels 
with CCAMLR conservation measures 
Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party 
vessels with CCAMLR conservation areas 
Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party nation-
als with CCAMLR conservation measures 
Title 
Catch Documentation Scheme: implementation by Acceding 
States and non-Contracting Parties 
Use of ports not implementing the Catch Document Scheme 
for Dissostichus spp 
Application of VMS 1n the Catch Documentation Scheme 
Use of VMS and other measures for the verification of CDS 
catch data for areas outside the Convention Area, in particu-
lar, in FAO Statistical Area 51 
Flags of non-compliance 
Electronic Catch Documentation Scheme for D1ssost1chus 
spp. 
Combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the 
Convention Area by the flag vessels on non-Contracting Par-
ties 
* Will not become applicable until 1 July 2008. Contracting Parties may voluntar-
ily implement prior to this date. 
Source· CCAMLR Secretariat 
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04), mandating Contracting Parties to deploy VMS and imposing various 
operational requirements.74 
By 2002, it had become apparent to some Members that VMS was not 
working as well as expected and that some Members' VMS were not fully 
compliant with CM 10-04.75 A centralized VMS (C-VMS) was proposed; the 
C-VMS would require licensed toothfish vessels to transmit positional 
information to the CCAMLR Secretariat as well as to Flag States. 76 Although 
the C-VMS proposal was discussed at length, no decision was made. 
In 2003, the C-VMS proposal was revised.77 Although most Members 
supported the proposal's rationale, many expressed concerns over the 
security and the financial cost of such a system as well as the need to modify 
national legislation in some cases. In the absence of consensus, a trial C-
VMS was established and all Members were allowed to participate. 78 Full 
implementation of a CCAMLR C-VMS was finally agreed upon in 2004.79 
While VMS makes it easy to locate licensed Contracting Party vessels 
fishing in the CCAMLR Area, VMS is likely to have little effect on non-
Contracting Party vessels other than endorsing the assumption that vessels 
observed fishing without VMS are involved in IUU fishing. 
On balance, CCAMLR's introduction of C-VMS was an iterative process 
that took place over the course of two years. It took into account potential 
technical difficulties while striving to make the System as effective as 
possible. As such, it stands as one of the few examples of such a System 
globally.SO 
Dissostichus spp. Catch Documentation Scheme 
CCAMLR first discussed certification as a means of tracking toothfish 
(Dissostichus spp.) landings from, and trade of, catches in the Convention 
Area in 1998.81 Although a proposal was put forward, the actual develop-
ment of the CDS took place during the 1998/99 intersessional period. 
74. Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XVII) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1998), para. 5.37. 
75. Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXI) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 2002), Annex 5, para. 5.12. 
76. Id., para. 8.55. 
77. Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXII) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 2003, Annex 5, paras. 3.27-3.54. 
78. Id., para. 10.12. 
79. Report of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXIII) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 2004), para. 10.8. 
80. Willock and Lack, see n. 40 above. 
81. CCAMLR-XVII, see n. 74 above, paras. 5.16-5.25 
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In 1999, CCAMLR adopted CM 170/XVIII Catch Documentation 
Scheme for Dissostichus spp. (now CM 10-05). The measure requires a 
completed Catch Document for all landings, transshipments, and importa-
tions of toothfish into the territories of CCAMLR Contracting Parties. This 
Document specifies a range of information relating to the volume and 
location of catch and the name and Flag State of the vessel. Conservation 
Measure 10-05 became binding on all Members on 7 May 2000.82 
Not all Contracting Parties were able to implement the CDS by the 
required date. However, by 2001 the Scheme was fully implemented.83 
To counter fraudulent practices that could arise from issuing and 
copying paper documents, the development of an electronic, paperless, 
Web-based CDS was proposed in 2001.84 The following year, CCAMLR 
approved a pilot project for an electronic CDS (E-CDS) to run alongside the 
paper-based Scheme.85 The electronic system enhances security by issuing 
and processing catch documents online. 86 
Although the E-CDS trial was generally seen as successful, some 
Members voiced doubts that its full implementation could ever be 
achieved.87 Consequently, Resolution 21/XXIII was adopted in 2004, urging 
Contracting Parties and non-Contracting Parties to cooperate in implement-
ing the CDS and adopt the E-CDS as a matter of priority. In 2005, the U.S. 
indicated that any toothfish imports into the U.S. would have to be 
accompanied by electronically issued documentation.SB 
While most CDS Parties apply the E-CDS exclusively, it essentially 
remains on trial.89 It is likely to remain on trial until the domestic legislation 
of all CCAMLR Members at least provides for the full implementation of E-
CDS. Domestic legislation will allow CDS Parties to eventually comply with 
E-CDS requirements, while also promoting a positive image of its efficien-
cy-given current levels of implementation. 
COMPROMISE 
As indicated, the Treaty Parties' desire to regulate Antarctic marine living 
resources north of 60° S and south of the Polar Front involved islands which 
82. Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XVIII) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1999), para. 5.27 and attached footnote. 
83. Reports of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Meetings of the Commission 
(CCAMLR-XVIX and XX) (Hobart: CCAMLR, 2000 and 2001), Annex 5, para. 2.24 
and Annex 5, para. 2.68 respectively. 
84. Id., CCAMLR-XX, Annex 5, paras. 2.89 and 9.12. 
85. Id., CCAMLR-XX, para. 2.95; CCAMLR-XXI, n. 75 above, para. 7.16. 
86. Miller et al., see n. 29 above. 
87. CCAMLR-XXlll, see n. 79 above, Annex 5, para. 4.16. 
88. CCAMLR-XXIV, see n. 44 above, para. 7.5. 
89. Id., para. 4.5. 
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for the most part were subject to undisputed sovereignty. During the 
CAMLR Convention's negotiation, it was logically assumed that States 
asserting sovereignty would be unwilling to abrogate any jurisdictional rights 
attached to managing living resources in the maritime zones90 of such 
islands. Nevertheless, Treaty Parties expressed concerns and, as indicated by 
the first CCAMLR Executive Secretary, ''It was only realistic to expect there 
would be differing positions on various sovereignty issues among Mem-
bers. "91 
The CAMLR Convention solved a potential impasse over sovereignty in 
the Convention Area by applying four key principles. Discussed below, these 
comprised: (1) clear linkage with the Antarctic Treaty; (2) decision 
unanimity through consensus (already discussed); (3) the ability to 
legitimately opt-out of decisions (CCAMLR Article IX.6.c-6.d); and ( 4) the 
Chairman's Statement (appended to the Convention). 
Compromise Through Opt-Out 
While it may appear inconsistent to allow parties to opt out of decisions 
made by consensus, this is not an unusual procedure (the SEAFO 
Convention also allows parties to opt out) for the reasons explained above. 
For example, at CCAMLR's tenth meeting in 1991 the submission of 
haul-by-haul data from the commercial fishery per five-day period was 
endorsed. 92 However, some Members expressed legal and technical difficul-
ties in submitting this data. 93 In particular, Chile was understood to have 
notified the Commission, in accordance with Article IX.6(c), that it was 
unable to implement CM 37 /X due to infrastructure deficiencies. This 
meant that the Measure did not apply to Chile in the 1991-1992 fishing 
season in respect of the Dissostichus el,egi,noides fishery in Subarea 48.3. Chile 
complied with all data-reporting requirements,94 just not in the time period 
that the CM required. Conservation Measure 37 /X evolved into CM 56/XI 
in 1992; the only change was that Members were required to submit data at 
90. UNCLOS was not in force at the time of the CCAMLR negotiations, 
although a 200-NM fishing zone was not uncommon. Australia declared its 
Australian Fishing Zone in 1979, including the area around Heard Island but 
excluding waters adjacent to its continental Antarctic territory. 
91. D. Powell, "Scientific and Economic Considerations Relating to the 
Conservation of Marine Living Resources in Antarctica" in Antarctic Resources Policy: 
Scientific, Legal and Political Issues, ed. F. Vicuna (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), pp. 111-118. 
92. CCAMLR-X, see n. 68 above, Conservation Measures 36/X and 37 /X. 
93. Id., paras. 4.10 and 4.11. 
94. Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XI) 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1992), paras. 4.3 and 9.28. 
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the end of each month rather than at the end of each (five-day) reporting 
period. 
Compromise and the Chairman's Statement 
The Statement arose from the need to reconcile sovereignty arrangements 
(Article IV of the Treaty) in the Treaty Area with such arrangements for the 
CCAMLR Area under ATCM Recommendation IX-2 (1977, see extract 
below). The Recommendation's attached instructions proscribed any 
variation to Treaty sovereignty arrangements, but prescribed an extended 
area of application: 
(1) The Special Consultative Meeting shall base its work on this 
recommendation and ... in the elaboration of a draft definitive 
regime, shall take into account inter alia the following elements: 
(a) the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty shall not be 
affected by the regime. It should ensure that the principles 
embodied in Article IV are safeguarded in application to the 
marine areas south of 60° South latitude; [ ... ] 
(b) the regime should, [however], extend north of 60° South 
latitude where that is necessary for the effective conservation of 
species of the Antarctic ecosystem, without prejudice to coastal 
state jurisdiction in that area;95 
The necessary linkages to the relevant Antarctic Treaty Area sovereignty 
provisions in Articles III to IV of the CAMLR Convention are clearly present, 
notwithstanding the rights referred to in Article VI of the Treaty, already 
discussed. 
The Chairman's Statement is an integral part of the CAMLR Conven-
tion. The Statement preserves the juridical rights of all coastal States over 
the maritime zones surrounding their sub-Antarctic territories located 
within the CCAMLR Area. While the Statement's content is unique in 
international law, reservations to multilateral treaties are not unusual.96 
However, they are not often incorporated into an agreement as an 
attachment, but are rather elaborated in the final act when the agreement is 
adopted. The Statement specifically refers to France, since France already 
95. Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Extract from ACTM Recommendation IX-2, 
available online: <http:/ /www.ats.aq>. 
96. D. Miller and E. Molenaar, "The SEAFO Convention: A Comparative 
Analysis in a Developing Coastal State Perspective," Ocean Yearbook 20, eds. A. 
Chircop, S. Coffen-Smout and M. McConnell (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2006): 305-375. 
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had measures for the conservation of living resources in place at the time of 
the CAMLR Convention's negotiation. However, the Statement's provisions 
extend to all sovereign coastal States by virtue of its Preamble and 
Paragraph 5 in cases where all CCAMLR Contracting Parties recognize 
sovereignty. The Statement may be used by such States in two ways: 
• to complement CCAMLR CMs by implementing stricter regulations 
than those promulgated by Member consensus (Statement Para 3.a); 
and/or 
• to supervene CMs by making a reservation (Para 3.b) and effectively 
applying different regulations, as deemed appropriate in accordance 
with national measures. 
Thus, the Statement is available to all sovereign coastal States (Austra-
lia, France, Norway, South Africa, and, arguably, the United Kingdom/ 
Argentina) to use as they see fit. Such discretion comes from their rights 
under Part V of UNCLOS (Articles 55-58), which affirms the right of coastal 
States to declare a range of maritime zones (including a 200-nautical mile 
(NM) exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) seaward from their terrestrial 
baselines. Coastal States also have corresponding rights to exploit marine 
living resources in their own EEZs (UNCLOS Article 56) as well as duties to 
conserve the living resources of any such zones (UNCLOS Article 61). 
Prior to UNCLOS's entry into force in 1994, and following discussions 
at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, many States exercised 
their rights to delimit 200-NM EEZs or "Fishing Zones" (FZ). France 
undertook such delimitation in 1978 around its southern possessions, 
including the Kerguelen Islands. Australia followed suit in 1979 for the 
territories of Heard Island and the McDonald Islands adjacent to Kerguel-
en. A bilateral treaty97 in 1982 prescribed the coordinates of the shared 
boundary between the French EEZ and the Australian FZ. 
Argentina proclaimed a 200-NM EEZ around South Georgia and the 
South Sandwich Islands in 1991.98 Previously, Argentina had made a 
declaration, attached to its ratification of the CAMLR Convention, to the 
effect that nothing in the Convention affected or impaired its rights of 
sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the area.99 The United Kingdom 
97. Agreement on Maritime Delimitation between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the French Republic (Melbourne, 4 Jan. 1982). Australian 
Treaty Series 1983, No. 3. 
98. P. Vigni, "Antarctic Maritime Claims: 'Frozen Sovereignty' and the Law of 
the Sea,'' in The Law of the Sea and Polar Marztzme Delimztatzon and jurzsdzctzon, eds. A. 
Oude Elferink and D. Rothwell (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 90. 
99. W. Bush, Antarctica and Internatzonal Law: A CoUectzon of Interstate and 
Natzonal Documents, 3 Vols. (London: Oceana Publications, 1982), 1: Doc. 
AT20051980B, p. 431. 
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also proclaimed a 200-NM maritime zone (not an EEZ as such) around 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in 1993, 100 which was 
justified on the basis of supplementing and reinforcing CCAMLR conserva-
tion measures. However, the United Kingdom maintained control of 
licensing arrangements, monitoring, and enforcement in the zone through 
a subsequent Ordinance and an attached Order.IOI South Africa extended 
its maritime zones to formally proclaim an EEZ around Prince Edward and 
Marion Islands in 1994.102 Some of these declarations predated UNCLOS's 
entry into force and some occurred during the Treaty Parties' negotiations 
of CCAMLR as well as after its entry into force. 
Again, it needs to be emphasized that under UNCLOS coastal States 
have jurisdictional rights, obligations, and duties with respect to the EEZ. 
These rights entitle coastal States to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage 
the living resources in the EEZ (UNCLOS Article 56.a); exercise jurisdiction 
over, among other things, the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment in the EEZ (56.b.iii); and determine total allowable catches in 
the EEZ (TACs; Article 61.1). 
Provided that they exercise some form of jurisdictional control, 
CCAMLR coastal States within the CCAMLR Area are able to determine 
when they will apply CCAMLR CMs, mutatis mutandis, to waters under their 
control. The Chairman's Statement effectively grants such States the right to 
decide the most appropriate strategy for management of the marine living 
resources in their sovereign waters either when they accept CCAMLR 
measures, when national measures are more stringent than those set by 
CCAMLR (Statement paragraph 3(a)), or when coastal States exercise an 
exclusion of application for such measures in national waters (Statement 
paragraph 2). As such the Statement poses no legal conflict with other 
CCAMLR obligations. However, there may be practical considerations 
attached to coastal State invocation of an exclusion to CCAMLR measures in 
national waters under the Chairman's Statement (see below). 
Article IV.2.b of the CAMLR Convention preserves the Contracting 
Parties' right under international law to exercise coastal State jurisdiction in 
any part of the CCAMLR Area. This provision largely renders the 
Chairman's Statement irrelevant. However, and even if there are fundamen-
tal concerns about the Statement's legal standing, the explicit application of 
100. United Kingdom, Proclamation (Maritime Zone) No. 1, 1993 (1 May 
1993). 
101. United Kingdom, The F1shenes (Conservation and Management) Ordi-
nance 1993 (23 July 1993) and The Fishing (Maritime Zone) Order 1993 (26 July 
1993). 
102. South Africa, Mantzme Zone Act No. 15, 1994. Application to the Prince 
Edward Islands is as per the Pnnce Edward Islands Act No. 43, 1948. 
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the Chairman's Statement by France and other undisputed claimants103 over 
the past twenty-five years implies that the CCAMLR community accepts the 
legal effect of the Chairman's Statement on the Convention's provisions, 
and in the application of CCAMLR measures. In these terms, it is 
worthwhile to examine the extent to which various Contracting Parties have 
invoked the Chairman's Statement in practice. 
As indicated, Australia, France, South Africa, and the United King-
dom/ Argentina have proclaimed EEZs, FZs, or maritime zones around 
islands in the CCAMLR Area. At this stage, Norway has not extended a 
fisheries zone or EEZ around Bouvet0ya Island, although it declared a 
territorial sea adjacent to the islands and a special nature reserve in 1971.104 
Australia has never formally recorded a reservation under the Chair-
man's Statement. In 2006, for example, Australia accepted all of the 
measures contained within CM 41-08, including the TAC of 2,427 t for 
Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Division 58.5.2. However, Australia 
customarily makes a declaration reaffirming its jurisdiction, which has been 
recorded in the CCAMLR Report: 
any fishing or fisheries research activities in that part of Divisions 58.4.3 
and 58.5.2 that constitutes the Australian EEZ around the Australian 
Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands must have the prior 
approval of Australian authorities .... Presently fishing concessions are 
fully subscribed and no further concessions are available.105 
It could be inferred that by placing such remarks on the meeting 
record, Australia has invoked the Chairman's Statement in principle but has 
not recorded a formal reservation to the CM as France or South Africa are 
want to do (see below). By applying this formulation, Australia essentially 
recognizes CCAMLR's determination of a TAC. However, as a party to this 
determination, Australia would have been able to influence its final form 
under the consensus leading to the adoption of CM 41-08 in any case. 
In contrast, France and South Africa have both been more explicit in 
their use of the Statement. Through the years, France has made many 
reservations to CMs likely to impact on its jurisdiction. These have been 
recorded as footnotes to the CMs concerned and a consistent form of 
wording has been developed to such effect. 106 They have referred to 
103. Kaye, see n. 37 above, p. 388. 
104. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (last updated 15 Mar. 
2007), Bouvet0ya Island, available online at <https:/ /www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/ geos/bv.html>. 
105. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, para. 12.84. 
106. For example: "Except for waters adjacent to the Kerguelen and Crozet 
Islands" or "Except for waters adjacent to the Prince Edward Islands." 
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administrative matters such as data reporting or licensing requirements and 
fisheries matters such as directed fisheries prohibitions. Virtually all matters 
falling within such reservations also tend to fall under French national 
regulations. 
South Africa was initially less active than France and only recorded 
reservations to measures likely to impact directly on sovereignty, such as the 
granting of access or the issuing of licenses. Post-1994, it has tended to keep 
pace with France, particularly in respect to combating IUU fishing. 107 One 
notable exception has been a strongly worded statement by South Africa 
referring to its unreserved acceptance of CM 170/VIII (now CM 10-05), 
setting up the CDS.108 South Africa has also made it clear that invariably it 
incorporates the substance of such CMs into its domestic regulations under 
the 1998 Manne Living Resources Act or 1996 Antarctic Treaties Act.109 
The ongoing dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina 
concerning sovereignty over, inter alia, South Georgia (CCAMLR Statistical 
Subarea 48.3) and the South Sandwich Islands (Subarea 48.4) is unique in 
the CCAMLR experience. It is a legally complex110 and unresolved issue that 
is difficult to evaluate objectively in the context of the CCAMLR Chairman's 
Statement. 
South Georgia's waters in particular were intensively targeted by Soviet 
fishing fleets during the late 1960s, resulting in the unsustainable harvesting 
of Antarctic Cod (Notothenia rossiz'). According to Levy, this was the result of 
a shortsighted attempt to exercise de facto sovereignty by the United 
Kingdom Government, which allowed fishing to occur. 111 
On the Convention's entry into force, early CCAMLR initiatives were 
aimed exclusively at managing fishing in the South Georgia region (Subarea 
48.3). Such initiatives paved the way for measures that were later to become 
standard across the CCAMLRArea (e.g., mesh size limits, catch limits for D. 
ekginoides, and catch reporting systems).112 In fact, the first dozen CCAMLR 
CMs addressed South Georgia fisheries and none of these measures was 
subject to formal reservations by either the United Kingdom or Argentina. 
107. D. Miller, "The international framework for the management of fishing in 
the Southern Ocean" (paper presented to Outlook 2004, Canberra, 2 Mar. 2004), p. 
12. 
108. CCAMLR-XVIII, see n. 82 above, para. 5.39. 
109. E. Molenaar, "CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries," The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16, 3 (2001): 480. 
llO. D. Vignes, "Protection of the Antarctic Marine Fauna and Flora: The 
Canberra Convention of 20 May 1980 and the Commission set up by it," in 
International Law for Antarctica, eds. F. Franc1oni and T. Scovazzi (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), pp. 161-164. 
lll. M. Levy, The Enforcement of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Claims (paper 
presented to Duke University School of Law, International Development Clinic, 
1997), pp. 65-69. 
ll2. Miller et al., see n. 30 above. 
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In drawing attention to a joint Argentine/United Kingdom statement 
issued in May 1993 (during negotiation of the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement), Argentina reiterated that the two parties had agreed to "renew 
efforts in the context of CCAMLR to ensure the conservation of the marine 
living resources in the Southern Ocean." 113 It is worth noting that in July of 
that year the U.K had proclaimed the South Georgia Maritime Zone114 ; 
whether Argentina was aware of this legislation prior to its CCAMLR 
statement is unknown. Since that time, the United Kingdom has effectively 
assumed jurisdictional control by applying CCAMLR CMs while issuing 
licenses for, and enforcing control measures over, fishing in the South. 
Georgia zone. Unlike France and South Africa, neither the United Kingdom 
nor Argentina has recorded any formal reservation under the Chairman's 
Statement nor have they attempted to follow the Australian formulation. 
An interesting paradox is the fact that the relevant United Kingdom 
Ordinance actually gives the United Kingdom legislative precedence over 
CCAMLR measures.115 Ostensibly, this is to combat IUD harvesting of D. 
ekgi,noides, but the arrest of unlicensed Argentinean vessels fishing around 
South Georgia has heightened prevailing tensions and threatened to 
undermine CCAMLR's spirit of cooperation.116 The same Ordinance 
provides further that no inquiry in any court shall take place over whether 
fisheries officers carrying out the Ordinance did so with due regard to 
CAMLR Convention provisions and CCAMLR measures.117 
Predictably, Argentina repeatedly protests the licensing system and 
maintains a ritual objection to the United Kingdom's actions at the annual 
CCAMLR meetings. For example, the Argentine position is clearly outlined 
in paragraph 13.4 of the Final Report of CCAMLR XV (1996).118 The 
opposing United Kingdom interpretation is presented in paragraph 13.16 of 
the same Report.119 
113. Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XII), 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1993), para. 15.2. 
114. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Gazette (No: 3 of 1993), 
"The Fisheries (Conservatlon and Management) Ordinance 1993," (Falkland 
Islands: Government Printer), 23 July 1993. 
115. Id. 
116. Levy, see n. 111 above, pp. 70-73. 
117. See the discussion in F. Vicuna, "The Regime of Antarctic Marine Livmg 
Resources," in Francioni and Scovazzi, n. 110 above, pp. 153-156. 
118. Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XV), 
(Hobart: CCAMLR, 1996), para. 13.4-"Argentina rejects the UK's interpretation 
that the islands referred to in the Chairman's Statement include also those under 
disputed sovereignty, among other reasons, because this would lead to a paradox 
that no islands in the Convention Area north of parallel of 60° south would be 
excluded by the Statement." 
119. Id., para. 13.6: 
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Clearly, the two States differ on the view of whether paragraph five of 
the Chairman's Statement applies to their dispute over sovereignty in 
relation to South Georgia. On at least one occasion, Argentina has asserted 
that the dispute between the two countries is relevant in terms of applying 
and interpreting the Chairman's Statement, which should be addressed 
under Article XXV of the Convention.120 
Despite this impasse, international law clearly indicates that "recogni-
tion is not an essential prerequisite to allow States to exercise sovereignty 
over a territory." 121 Nonetheless, if one party asserts that a dispute exists, 
then from an international legal perspective it does. It is worth noting that 
the CIA World Factbook lists South Georgia under the heading "Interna-
tional Disputes. " 122 
To summarize, France and South Africa have both used the Chairman's 
Statement to protect national fishery interests and, ostensibly, to combat 
IUU fishing. "Ostensibly" implies that without independent verification, for 
example, via the CCAMLR observation and inspection procedures, any 
reports provided to the Commission by these countries in relation to their 
sovereign waters should not be taken at face value. 
In the absence of formal reservations, both Australia and the United 
Kingdom implement CCAMLR CMs in keeping with national policies. On 
the other hand, they also exercise jurisdictional competence regulating 
access to the Maritime Zones/FZs and enforcing licensing and permit 
conditions. The longer the situation persists, the more difficult it will be for 
Argentina to successfully challenge the United Kingdom's unilateral actions 
in respect of sovereignty over the South Georgia islands. 
The UK cannot agree with Argentina that there has to be unammous 
agreement within this Commission as to which state has sovereignty over South 
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands before the understandings of the 
Chairman's Statement can apply to them. The right of the UK to exercise 
coastal state jurisdiction is rooted in Article IV (2) (b) of the Convention and 
para. 5 of the Chairman's Statement. Paragraph 5 includes the cnocal phrase 
"over which the existence of state sovereignty is recognised by all Contracting 
Parties." This was most carefully formulated. Its sole purpose was to cover the 
islands which Parties accept are subject to the sovereignty of some state, even 
though there may be a dispute as to which. It is the recognition of the existence 
of state sovereignty which is referred to, not the recognition of the sovereignty 
of a particular state. There is no doubt that South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands is sovereign territory, nor that the UK exercises sovereignty 
over it de facto and, the UK of course believes, de Jure. 
120. CCAMLR-XXII, see n. 77 above, para. 10.21. 
121. Vigni, see n. 98 above, p. 90; J. Green, "Australian maritime boundaries: 
the Australian Aritarctic Territory," Manne Policy 25 (2001): 1-11. 
122. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (last updated 15 Mar. 
2007), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, available online: 
<https:/ /www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/sx.honl>. 
Consensus or not Consensus in CCAMLR 151 
Finally, it is likely that Norway has no interest in fishing around 
Bouvet0ya Island-which would account for Norway's non-declaration of an 
EEZ/FZ and lack of reference to the Chairman's Statement. 
DISCUSSION 
The Southern Ocean is vast, covering more than 35 million km2 (depending 
on where the boundaries are drawn). The navigable area also expands and 
contracts significantly with seasonal and annual sea-ice variations. Com-
bined with geographic remoteness and persistently inclement weather, the 
size of the Southern Ocean has isolated the CCAMLR Area and rendered it 
more accessible to fishing interests apart from those bound by the 
sustainability provisions of the CAMLR Convention. 
Since there is little maritime traffic in the CCAMLR Area, detecting 
vessels fishing in contravention of, or outside, CCAMLR CMs and monitor-
ing their movements has been a constant challenge for CCAMLR. Without a 
designated CCAMLR "police force," and with a low detection threshold, 
the obligations attached to a State's right to fish in the CCAMLR area under 
UNCLOS have tended to favor IUU activities. In other words, logistic 
limitations arising from the remoteness and the size of the area have tended 
to prevent CCAMLR Members from aggressively policing CMs other than in 
their sovereign waters. 
Under CCAMLR measures, all legitimately licensed vessels fishing for 
species other than krill must carry scientific observers on board. Nonethe-
less, it has not been uncommon for observer safety to be compromised, to 
the point where CCAMLR has reiterated the view that "the task of scientific 
observers is to report on factual information and not to make judgments or 
interpretations relating to compliance" .123 
At the outset of this study, we stated that our objective was to determine 
whether consensus-based decision making should be qualified by the new 
norm of consensus-minus-one. If so, what would be the likely consequences 
for CCAMLR's effectiveness? To answer this question, we must again 
examine how the notion of consensus-minus-one has arisen and the 
circumstances that have allowed this situation to occur. 
As we have shown, CCAMLR decisions on matters of substance are 
normally made in a manner consistent with the provisions of Article IX of 
the Convention. In practice, this entails a process of more or less protracted 
negotiation-resulting, if necessary, in a compromise concerning any 
disagreement over a consensus decision. The simplest illustration of the 
processes' effectiveness is CCAMLR's adoption of its annual budget in a 
123. CCAMLR-XXI, see n. 75 above, para. 5.4. 
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manner consistent with Article XIX. Failure to adopt a budget in the 
absence of consensus obviously has very serious implications for the 
organization's operation and has never occurred in CCAMLR's twenty-five-
year history. 
Similarly, CCAMLR has agreed upon a large number of Conservation 
Measures to address a wide range of management scenarios, ranging from 
environmental protection to the setting of catch limits and the implementa-
tion of trade-related provisions.124 At a CCAMLR meeting, new or replace-
ment Conservation Measures are negotiated until the Parties reach 
agreement on substance and wording. If an agreement cannot be reached, 
the measure is deferred until the next meeting to provide the Parties with 
an opportunity to address practical considerations related to implementa-
tion or to negotiate any points of contention further. In most instances, 
deferred Conservation Measures of this kind are resolved within a year or so. 
The best examples of such success have been described above (CDS and 
VMS).125 
In an effort to streamline its annual decisions on Conservation 
Measures, CCAMLR follows the practice of instituting Measures that remain 
in force for a number of years, in a number of cases indefinitely.126 This 
means that such Measures can be modified in part or whole when there is 
consensus to do so, otherwise they stand through time. 
Where agreement on a matter of substance cannot be reached, 
CCAMLR attempts to reflect all prevailing views about the matter at issue. 
The full record of debate, or negotiation, is thus included in the 
Commission's annual report in an effort to ensure transparency and 
objectively reflect all views. For example, at CCAMLR-XVIII (1999), the 
European Community submitted a notification on behalf of Portugal under 
CCAMLR's new and exploratory fisheries provisions. 127 It was argued that as 
a CCAMLR Contracting Party, the European Community and all its Member 
States were bound by CCAMLR's Conservation Measures as required under 
Article XXIX.2 and on the basis that the Community had assumed 
competence for all fisheries matters in respect of its members.128 However, 
124. See various CMs in CCAMLR, Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 
2006/07 (CCAMLR, Hobart, Australia, 2006) available online: <http:/ /www.ccamlr. 
org/pu/ e/ e_pubs/ cm/ drt.htm>. 
125. For a more in depth discussion on CCAMLR Conservation Measures, their 
development and efficacy, see Miller et al., see n. 30 above. 
126. For example, CMs 22-01, 22-02, and 22-03 regarding mesh size have not 
been modified since being adopted in 1986, 1984 and 1990 respectively. CM 10-02 
regarding licensing and inspection obligations of Contracting Parties has been 
modified four times since it was first adopted in 1997, most recently in 2006. 
127. CCAMLR-XVIII, see n. 82 above, para. 7.5. 
128. Id., para. 9.43. 
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the majority of CCAMLR Members believed that such circumstances would 
not be consistent with the provisions of the Convention, since Portugal had 
not acceded to the Convention and was not a Commission Member in its 
own right. 129 The European Community reserved its standing under the 
CAMLR Convention in respect of its competency to regulate Community 
vessels. 130 However, Portugal did not fish that season and has yet to fish in 
the Convention Area. CCAMLR's prevailing lack of agreement on this issue, 
and the associated debate, were completely reflected in the official rec-
ord.131 
At CCAMLR-XXI (2002) Australia advised CCAMLR that it intended to 
nominate toothfish for listing under Appendix II of the Convention on the 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).132 Twenty-two of the 
twenty-four CCAMLR Members opposed this proposal for a variety of 
reasons,133 most notably that such a listing could undermine CCAMLR's 
competency or authority in respect of managing the marine living resources 
for which it is responsible. The result was that toothfish was not listed under 
Appendix II of CITES, but the Twelfth Conference of CITES Parties 
(CoP12) adopted Resolution Conf. 12.4, which urged CITES Parties to 
adhere to the relevant CCAMLR Conservation Measures as well as the 
CAMLR Convention as a whole.134 
Finally, the 2006 issue of the Russian-flagged longliner, the Volna (see 
below), is another clear example of CCAMLR being unable to reach 
consensus on an issue of substance. Again, the need for transparency was 
recognized and the views of the Members were reflected in the report. 
However, this example differs somewhat from the two outlined above. The 
majority of Members wanted immediate action taken against the vessel to 
prevent it fishing during the forthcoming season. The compromise reached 
formally deferred any decision on the Volna's status as an IUD vessel until 
the following year.135 The outcomes of this process are awaited with interest. 
CCAMLR's 2006 Meeting was not the first time a Member has not 
joined consensus in finalizing the CP-IUU vessel list. At CCAMLR-XXII in 
2003, Russia also denied reports of toothfish offloads from two vessels, the 
Strela and the Zarya, when the vessels appeared to be carrying fishing 
licenses and catch documents that could not be verified as authentic. Russia 
asserted that the prevailing circumstances were attributable to the actions of 
129. Id., para. 9.44. 
130. Id., para. 9.45. 
131. Id., paras. 9.47-9.52. 
132. CCAMLR-XXI, see n. 75 above, para. 10.l. 
133. Id., paras. 10.3-10.75. 
134. CITES Secretariat, Resolution Conf. 12.4, available onlme at <http://www. 
cites.org/ eng/ res/ 12/ 12-04.shtml>. 
135. CCAMLR-XXV, see n. 38 above, para. 9.40. 
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previous Bolivian owners and therefore the vessels should not be included 
in the CP-IUU list.136 Russia also disputed observations of the Strela fishing 
in the Australian FZ in CCAMLR Statistical Division 58.5.2 claiming that 
evidence existed to indicate the vessel's inability to be at the location 
nominated. Consensus was not reached and, although Russia did not want 
to be identified in the report as blocking consensus, the European 
Community reiterated that all Members except Russia had agreed that the 
Strela and the Zarya should be on the CP-IUU vessel list.137 
Another CCAMLR Member, Uruguay, has also had several vessels 
recommended for inclusion on the CP-IUU Vessel List since 2002. The best 
known of these, the Viarsa 1, was the subject of a hot pursuit by Australia in 
2003 and was ultimately arrested on the high seas with the assistance of the 
United Kingdom and South Africa.138 Despite prevailing condemnation of 
the Vzarsa 1 incident, Uruguay accepted the inclusion of their vessels on the 
CP-IUU Vessel List. 
The examples above raise interesting questions in their own right as to 
how CCAMLR Parties reconcile their own interests with their role as 
custodians of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. Consensus-based decision 
making is obviously a vital element in this process. It is therefore worthwhile 
to note that all the delegates interviewed during the 2006 CCAMLR meeting 
defined CCAMLR's use of consensus as decisions made in the absence of 
formal objection. In other words, nobody says no even if not everyone says 
yes.139 
Furthermore, Article IOJ of UNFSA clearly indicates that decision-
making procedures in regional fisheries management organizations should 
"facilitate the adoption of conservation and management measures in a 
timely and effective manner." 140 Let us examine this requirement in 
CCAMLR's case. 
CCAMLR has been criticized for taking a decade to adopt a conserva-
tion measure regarding krill when krill is commonly regarded as the 
Convention's raison d'etre. At the time, there was a lack of scientific 
knowledge about the stocks of krill on which to base management mea-
136. CCAMLR-XXII, see n. 77 above, Annex 5, para. 2.50. 
137. Id., Annex 5, paras. 2.48 and 2.49, 8.30, 2.51 and 2.52, and 8.55 and 8 56 
respectively. 
138. E. Molenaar, "Multilateral Hot Pursuit and Illegal Fishing in the Southern 
Ocean: The Pursuits of the Viarsa 1 and the South Tomi," The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 19, 1 (2004): 19--42. 
139. Interviews conducted by author, Ms. J. Turner, in her capacity as M.Sc. 
candidate, Institute of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies. 
140. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, 1995, available onlme: <http:/ /www.un.org>. 
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sures141 ; however, at CCAMLR-X (1991), the Commission noted that 
reactive management was not viable for long-term management of the krill 
fishery and so decided to implement a precautionary approach, using 
precautionary catch limits that can be adjusted as new information is 
reported.142 Conservation Measure 32/X set a precautionary catch limit for 
krill in Area 48. This was the first precautionary catch limit implemented by 
an international fisheries management forum. 143 The Commission con-
tinues to apply precautionary catch limits to the krill fishery in Areas 48 (CM 
51-01), 58.4.1 (CM 51-02), and 58.4.2 (CM 51-03), and allocates the 
precautionary catch limit of Area 48 into Subareas (see CM 51-01). 
While some CCAMLR Members believe that consensus-based decision 
making takes too long (see above), all agree that reaching consensus reflects 
a pragmatically-based level of acceptability to all parties. Thus, decisions 
reached by consensus should be more inclusive, and consequently more 
effective, in terms of implementation and compliance. 
To facilitate consensus on CMs, CCAMLR uses an informal conserva-
tion measures drafting working group, convened during CCAMLR's annual 
meeting, to resolve potential differences through negotiation. Delegates 
attend informal sessions of this group to discuss new CMs, and revise old 
CMs if necessary. When the measures come up for formal adoption by 
CCAMLR, they have already been discussed fully and any accommodations 
necessary have already been made. 
Kaye has indicated that consensus-based decisions may not be the best 
or the most robust. However, they are accepted by all parties, whereas 
majority decisions may marginalize dissenters, who may then ignore, or not 
implement, such decisions.144 Such dissenters are most often those parties 
most likely to be affected by the decision. 
The essentially non-confrontational nature of consensus-based decision 
making may also help develop stronger decisions. The case of the CCAMLR 
C-VMS already discussed is a clear example of such a process. 
CONCLUSION 
In a normative sense, some CCAMLR decisions have considerable strength, 
particularly as they affect third parties. In this respect, the CDS has been 
considered to have significantly altered the balance in favor of legal fishing 
141. Nicol and de la Mare, see n. 19 above. 
142. CCAMLR-X, see n. 68 above, para. 6.13. 
143. Willock and Lack, see n. 40 above. 
144. Kaye, see n. 37 above. 
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operations.145 For example, the CDS provides for non-Contracting Party 
(NCP) participation, which broadens the Scheme's potential impact in 
respect of toothfish landed, imported, or exported globally. Furthermore, 
Resolution 14/XIX urged all Acceding States and CCAMLR NCPs that fish 
for, or trade in, toothfish to participate in the Scheme. Since 2000, many 
non-Contracting Parties have voluntarily implemented the CDS. Namibia 
acceded to the Convention and ultimately became a CCAMLR Member in 
2001. Similarly, the People's Republic of China, as a major importer and 
exporter of toothfish, acceded to the Convention in 2006.146 
From an operating system (structural) perspective, the CDS may be 
considered a general success. The CDS has effectively monitored toothfish 
trade for catches both inside and outside the CCAMLR Area.147 It has 
helped CCAMLR identify Port States where toothfish are landed, which in 
turn has allowed the Commission to solicit these States' involvement in 
CCAMLR's work and convince them to voluntarily implement the CDS. 
Individually, the VMS and the CDS are not as effective as they are 
together. Combined with other monitoring, control, and surveillance 
measures (for example, licensing requirements, at-sea inspection, port 
inspections, catch reporting requirements; Table 1), the VMS and the CDS 
tend to limit the entry of IUD-caught toothfish into the trade cycle and 
ensure that fishing takes place in a regulated environment in accordance 
with CCAMLR CMs. 148 As such, they are clear examples of consensus 
working effectively as a decision-making mechanism. With respect to the 
CDS, CCAMLR required urgent action to address a matter of universal 
concern, IUU fishing. It is telling that CCAMLR was then able to use 
consensus and agree on a significant and revolutionary Scheme, which was 
then implemented particularly rapidly. With all CCAMLR Members involved 
in the CDS's development and entry into force, CCAMLR was able to 
implement an effective and preventative measure that has done much to 
reduce the toothfish IUU fishing in the CCAMLR Area.149 
Therefore, in relation to IUU fishing alone, we conclude that CCAMLR 
has been effective in attaining concordance and coherence between its 
structural and normative systems. The political accommodations necessary 
to achieve consensus have therefore been fashioned from the legal 
provisions available in the Convention and the national regulations of 
CCAMLR Members. 
145. Sabourenkov and Miller, see n. 72 above. 
146. CCAMLR Statistical Bulletin 1996-2005. (Hobart: CCAMLR, 2006), 
Section E, Tables 17 and 18. 
147. Green and Agnew, n. 61 above; Sabourenkov and Miller, seen. 72 above. 
148. Miller et al., see n. 29 above. 
149. Sabourenkov and Miller, seen. 72 above; M. Lack, "Catching On? Trade-
Related Measures as a Frshenes Management Tool," TRAFFIC (2007). 
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The question that remains to be answered is: will this situation be 
undermined or affected by the adoption of a new consensus-minus-one 
norm? Delegates interviewed during the 2006 CCAMLR meeting were 
mostly in agreement that consensus-minus-one is not a useful decision-
making tool. While it can "name and shame" in practical terms, the 
objecting Member can then choose not to agree with any related measure 
under debate. 
The CAMLR Convention's opt-out provision also allows Parties to 
express reservations concerning any particular conservation measure. Since 
such provisions have only been used twice in twenty-five years, there is little 
to suggest that Convention Article IX.6 will become the preferred way of 
voicing dissent in the future. 
It is therefore difficult to objectively determine why the consensus-
minus-one scenario has arisen in CCAMLR in the first place. Under the 
Volna scenario described here, the Russian Federation could have simply 
opted out under Article IX.6(c-d) after the fact. A similar set of 
circumstances could theoretically apply to coastal States invoking the 
Chairman's Statement. 
To us, the point of consensus-minus-one seems to be more germane to 
improving the structural efficiency of CCAMLR procedures for developing 
CMs than to improving decision-making per se. Removing a potential 
dissenter from the initial debate on the basis of a perceived "conflict of 
interest" simplifies the entire procedure to agree a measure. The decision-
making process is then more likely to lead to decisions that reflect 
institutional norms as a whole. Nevertheless, decisions made on a consensus-
minus-one basis require considerable faith on the part of the potential 
dissenter. 
Therefore, consensus-minus-one is not only nonsense, it is an oxymo-
ron. At best it is a protest "vote" that has no legal effect. At worst it is a 
reminder to CCAMLR Members that the stakes are high in the Southern 
Ocean. Care thus needs to be taken to avoid losing credibility in the 
international community, where CCAMLR is perceived as a proponent of 
best practice among RFMOs worldwide. 
In this study, we have shown that the process of consensus decision-
making, which is embedded in the structural system of CCAMLR alongside 
cooperation and compromise, has actually resulted in improved compli-
ance. Under the CAMLR Convention this should be the natural outcome of 
any decisions made. CCAMLR's record in this regard speaks for itself. 
CCAMLRMap 
The following map was provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat. 
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